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Abstract
Recently, malicious computer users have been compromising computers en masse and
combining them to form coordinated botnets. The rise of botnets has brought the problem of
home computers to the forefront of security. Home computer users commonly have insecure
systems; these users do not have the knowledge, experience, and skills necessary to maintain
a secure system. I take steps toward designing a socio-technical system that will hopefully
help home computer users make better security decisions. Designing such a system requires
additional knowledge before a successful system can be developed.
First, more information is needed about the knowledge and skills that home computer
users currently possess. I conducted an interview study of home computer users and identi-
fied eight distinct mental models of security threats; four are models of “viruses,” and four
are models of “hackers.” The respondents in this study use the models to decide which
security precautions should be used and which can be ignored.
Second, to share information, users need an incentive to exert the time and effort required
for sharing. I describe two mechanisms that can be used in social computing systems to
encourage contribution. I illustrate the first mechanism, the side effect mechanism, by
describing how it is used in a popular social bookmarking website. I also illustrate a design
feature that is important when applying this mechanism: incentive alignment. The second
mechanism that I describe is technically simple: set a minimum threshold and exclude users
who don’t contribute enough. I develop a theory of how users are likely to respond to such a
mechanism and use that theory to characterize when such a mechanism should be used.
Finally, I bring all of these findings together to suggest some preliminary design features
for a socio-technical security system to help home computer users. While there are many





Home computer users commonly have insecure systems. Recently, this insecurity has
been exploited by criminals to build and control large networks of compromised ‘zombie’
computers that are then used for numerous Internet crimes. Home computer users typically
lack the knowledge and experience of professional system administrators, and consequently
do not make the same quality of security decisions as specialists.
I believe that a social computing system for sharing security-relevant information has the
potential improve the security decisions of home users without requiring costly-to-obtain
information from experts. To work, such a system will need to be designed to take advantage
of the capabilities and motivations of home users.
My approach in this dissertation is to use rigorous, social science based understanding
of home computer users to develop concrete, technical design ideas. I make three primary
contributions with this research. First, I describe how home computer users understand
information security and how they use that understanding to make security-relevant deci-
sions. Second, I provide concrete design ideas for social computing systems that can be
used to encourage users to contribute useful information. And finally, I illustrate how these
results can be used by synthesizing them into design features for a social computing system
intended help home computer users improve those security-relevant decisions.
1.1 The Botnet Problem and Home Security
Criminals and law enforcement have an adversarial relationship, in which “the law” is
constantly trying to stop “the bad guys.” As a result, criminals tend to have a number
of secondary objectives motivated by their desire to continue their work. To begin with,
criminals value stealth. They often choose hideouts and targets where they are unlikely to
be observed and caught by law enforcement. Criminals also value mobility. Being able
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to pick up and move when one plan or hideout is discovered greatly aids in avoiding law
enforcement. Closely related to this, criminals find redundancy to be useful. Redundancy
allows one part of their plan to be halted by law enforcement, as another part will just take
its place and allow the plan to be fulfilled.
For information criminals and hackers these secondary objectives are likewise valuable.
One growing strategy among information criminals is the use of botnets. A botnet is a
distributed army of computers not owned by, but under at least partial control of an attacker.
The attacker breaks into each computer and leaves a remote control program running. Once
the compromised, ‘zombie’ computer receives instructions from the attacker, it usually
independently follows the instructions without further contact. Often attackers automate the
process, allowing them to build extremely large botnets. Sizes in the tens of thousands are
considered moderate, and networks of 100,000 or more are not uncommon (Sieberg, 2006).
Botnets fulfill all three secondary objectives. They are stealthy because they provide a
layer of indirection between the attacker and his targets. If security professionals or law
enforcement manage to track down a zombie computer, they still have not discovered the
identity of the actual attacker. Botnets enhance mobility since they can accept commands
from anywhere. They also provide great redundancy. Finding and shutting down one or
two of the zombies has little impact on the botnet. The innovative structure of botnets has
enabled criminals to evade law enforcement and commit a large amount of information
crime (Sieberg, 2006; Stone, 2006).
Home computers, or computers whose primary use is for consumer or other home
purposes, seem to be disproportionately represented in botnets. To develop strategies that
reduce botnets, we need to understand why this is so. First, the targets are numerous: over
60 million home computers attached to the Internet in 2003 in the U.S. alone (Day et al.,
2005). Second, home computers are typically not under the administrative control of security
experts. Ordinary home users frequently are undereducated about how to detect and fix
information security problems.
Another less obvious problem contributes to the ease of creating botnets from home
computers: user motivations. Home computer users generally do not directly suffer the
ill effects of having their computer under the control of an attacker. Botnets are often pro-
grammed to be active only while the host computer is otherwise idle so that any slowdown
does not impact the host computer’s user. Additionally, attackers will use one zombie to
attack other computers on the Internet. For example, attackers routinely use botnets to send
large amounts of spam email. The compromised home computer does not directly receive
much of this email, but others do. While society would like to have this computer fixed, the
actual home user isn’t suffering much from her computer being a zombie. If she fixed her
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computer, it wouldn’t stop the flood of spam she receives. This is known as the problem
of (negative) externalities. This is true for other types of attacks also. In general, attackers
have a strong motivation to remain stealthy and only use botnets to attack other computers;
this strategy reduces the chances that any zombie owner will find it worthwhile to fix her
computer.
Despite my rhetoric of “home computer users,” many of these problems extend beyond
the home; most of my analysis and understanding in this dissertation is likely to generalize
to a whole class of users who are unsophisticated in their security decisions. This includes
many university computers, computers in small business that don’t have much technical
expertise, and personal computers used for business purposes.
1.1.1 The Need for Individualized Security
The HoneyNet project recently conducted a study of botnet activity obtained from their
sensors. (Zhuge et al., 2007, with a good summary by Andrew Jaquith on his blog1) Botnet
activity is strongly diurnal, meaning that they are active during the day and inactive at
night. This likely comes from infected machines being powered-off at night. There are large
numbers of bots; Over 1.5 million bots were tracked during this study, though the average
size of a botnet was only 800 bots. Over 50% of the methods that the botnets used to spread
themselves were exploits of three well-known security holes: the ASN12, DCOM3, and
LSASS4 vulnerabilities. Password guessing was only used 7% of the time. On average, a
command-and-control server was alive for 54 days. This means that once a botnet is created,
it is used for, on average, almost two months before it is either taken down or voluntarily
removed from service.
Another finding relates to the malware that was found on these botnets. The authors ran
all 90,000 unique samples of malware (average 250 per day) through nine popular anti-virus
tools. Note that all of this malware was actively circulating on the Internet at the time of
collection. Within 1 hour of finding the malware, the best antivirus tool detected only 92%
of the malware. This means that around 7,200 instances of malware would not be detected
by the best anti-virus software. The other tools decreased in effectiveness, with the worst
tool only detecting around 50% of the malware. 30 days after discovering the malware, the







From these results, I have some hypotheses about the botnet problem. First of all, it
appears that botnets are primarily targeting unpatched home computers. The diurnal pattern
of compromised hosts indicates that these machines are often taken offline at night, as many
home computers are. The botherders (the people who run the botnets) still mainly spread
using well-known vulnerabilities, most of which have existing patches. This indicates that
most of the compromised machines have not been properly patched and kept up-to-date for
some reason. Also, modern anti-virus tools are insufficient to detect most of the malware
being used on these botnets. It is possible for a computer to be part of a botnet despite the
fact that its anti-virus tool says everything is fine. With botnets becoming more stealthy over
time, this is a serious problem.
Computer security experts know who is being compromised, and how, but still cannot
stop it from happening. Particularly for home computers, part of the problem is that most
security software is a one-size-fits-all solution. Everyone is instructed to use an anti-virus
package, but most of these packages aren’t customized for the user(s) of that computer.
Anti-virus software has the difficult job of detecting all malware while letting through every
possible legitimate use of the computer. As an example, consider the DCOM server in
Windows, which I indicated above is one of the three most commonly exploited security
holes. Most home computers do not need to be listening for external DCOM connections.
However, the few users with a home network must have this enabled in order to share files.
Therefore, it is important that anti-virus tools not flag this activity as dangerous so they don’t
interfere with home networking. In trying to find a lowest-common-denominator security
policy, most security vendors have had to implement a policy that is too weak to stop real
malicious activity.
There are a number of factors that lead to this approach. First, having a single common
policy for everyone is a low-cost solution. Customizing every installation to the needs of
each end user is expensive. Most security vendors find it easier to adopt one policy that can
then be updated centrally and kept up-to-date easily. For example, new virus definitions are
sent to everyone’s home computer antivirus system whenever a new virus is found. Secondly,
most home users do not have the technical skill to customize their security detection software.
Home users are only aware of high-level uses of the computer (e.g. “I use email”) and not
the corresponding technical details that are important for customizing detection software
(“outgoing port 25 must be allowed”).
Individualized security could significantly help with the home computer security prob-
lem, and hence the botnet problem. If users that did not need DCOM could easily block it
or turn it off, that would prevent many compromises. The problem is that there are MANY
such decisions, most of which cannot be made cheaply by the average home computer
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user. To make a sweeping generalization, large businesses have much better track records
largely because they can afford to customize their security detection to their computer
use. Businesses that use Lotus Notes for email get suspicious when Microsoft Outlook is
run. They know which machines should be running web servers and IRC servers, and can
customize their security detection software to notice when an errant machine is running
unusual software. Home users don’t have this luxury; since some users run web servers at
home, a web server is not an automatic red flag. However, most home users know whether
their own computer should be running a web server.
Customizing detection for specific computer uses is currently too costly for most home
users to undertake. Individualized security has the potential to make a difference in the
security of home computers, but only if it can be done without too much cost in terms of
time and money, and without requiring too much sophistication on the part of the end users.
1.2 Designing A Social Firewall
Individualized security requires input from users. But for home computers, users are
frequently under-educated about security and other technical issues and generally find it
difficult to make appropriate technical choices. One option that some individualized security
systems have tried is to provide expert-written guidance as “help” for each of the security de-
cisions that a user has to make. For example, the ZoneAlarm personal firewall system gives
basic expert-written help, and provides a link to the Internet for more expert-written help.5
Firefox, the popular web browser, provides expert-written advice in all of its security-related
popups.
However, there are a very large number of security decisions that need to be made to
properly secure a home computer. Common expert-written firewall rulesets often run into
the hundreds or thousands of rules (Al-Shaer and Hamed, 2004). The number of possible
rules of interest is even larger. It is very costly and time-consuming to have experts write
useful advice for all the possible security decisions that a home computer use might need to
make. Also, it is not clear if the home computer users understand the advice from experts;
much of this advice currently found online uses technical jargon and is written assuming a
base level of security knowledge that home computer users might not possess.
I propose that home computer users can fill this gap by providing security advice to
each other. There are a large number of home computer users (over 60 million according
to Day et al. (2005)), and these users can write using language that other home computer
5See Figure 1.1 for an example ZoneAlarm popup. The expert-written help link is the button labeled “More
Info” next to the title “SmartDefense Advisor.”
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Figure 1.1 Screenshot of a ZoneAlarm personal firewall popup
users understand. While these users may not be familiar with computer security, security
decisions involve more information than just security concerns. Security decisions need to
balance security concerns with other factors such as usability and usefulness of the computer.
Home computer users are in a unique position to know exactly what they want to use their
computer for; for example, only the user knows whether allowing a given program to run is
essential or irrelevant to her use of the computer. Home computer users also might be able
to identify when a new security rule interferes with their use of the computer.
To accomplish this information sharing among home computer users, I propose a spe-
cially designed social computing system. This system would integrate social information
sharing with a personal firewall system to provide technological support for users sharing
information about personal firewall decisions.
However, the design of this social firewall is not straightforward; there are a number of
design issues that must be addressed before such a system would work. I devote the majority
of this dissertation to addressing some of these issues; but first I describe a basic technical
design.
1.2.1 Technical Design
Firewalls are a form of intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) (Scarfone and
Mell, 2007). Their design goal is to prevent unauthorized users from taking unwanted
actions on a computer. They monitor computer activities and can stop certain technical
actions in order to implement a policy stating which activities are acceptable and which are
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not. For example, a firewall might monitor network packets and can block those directed to
particular TCP ports.
Firewalls have several technical design challenges: accurately identifying behaviors,
offering a policy language flexible enough to map owner preferences over behaviors into
actions, and preventing compromise of the firewall itself, among others. One especially
difficult challenge for unsophisticated users is to configure the firewall policy appropriately.
Most firewalls focus on highly technical actions; many focus solely on creating network
connections. However, there are many other user actions that could also benefit from a
firewall. One can imagine a firewall policy for clicking on attachments in emails; exe-
cutable attachments are disallowed, but images and Word documents are OK. Browsers
have firewall-type policies for URLs. Web pages with invalid SSL certs, or that fall on a
known blacklist can be denied, as well as forms that submit information across domains.
Most systems also have an implicit policy for these actions, but they could be subject to user
decisions as well.
A common approach to the customization problem is interactive policy generation
(see, e.g., ZoneAlarm. A sample interactive policy query can be seen in Figure 1.1). A
firewall policy may specify one of three actions for any given event (including a default
for not otherwise specified events): allow, deny, or ask the user for a decision in real time.
Interactivity offers flexibility and convenience for users who may want to postpone decisions
until a event is encountered. Interactive policy generation allows detailed policies to be
developed that take advantage of information only the user has, such as what applications
are legitimately on the computer.
However, interactive policy generation is often the brunt of criticism: unsophisticated
users may not know the risks or the benefits of permitting certain requests, and may face
high costs of acquiring that knowledge, thus preventing effective policy decisions. Also,
frequent policy popups can annoy users. A common belief (supported by my interviews in
Chapter 3) is that many users always click ’allow’ for every popup because they don’t know
how to make better decisions.
Firewalls targeted at home computers that use interactive policy generation are often
called personal firewalls. There are a number of examples of personal firewall software on
the market: ZoneAlarm from Checkpoint software, Sunbelt Personal Firewall, Microsoft
Windows Firewall, McAfee Internet Security, Comodo Firewall Pro, and Norton 360, to
name a few.
I propose adding a new feature to this class of software: user-contributed content. Users
can contribute information to the system for each type of security decision they are faced
with, and that information is then re-distributed in some form to other users of the system
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when they face a similar decision. Technically, this is straightforward to implement. Each
installation of the personal firewall software acts a client, collecting information and dis-
playing the aggregated information from other users. There is a central server that stores
all of the contributed information and then sends appropriate sets of information to client
computers to help users make security decisions. This information sharing changes the
personal firewall software into a social system.
However, there are many aspects of the design of the user-contributed content feature
that are unspecified. What type of information should be shared? Should it be aggregated?
How can the feature motivate contribution? I devote the remainder of this dissertation to
better understanding design tradeoffs for this feature, and at the end I propose more concrete
designs to accomplish this information sharing.
1.3 Incentive-Centered Design
I devote most of my dissertation to understanding how to design the information sharing
aspect of a social firewall. To this end, I take an incentive-centered design approach.
Incentive-centered design is a paradigm for technology design that focuses on how
technical features influence user behavior. All features of a software application influence
user behavior. The What-You-See-Is-What-You-Get (WYSIWYG) editor in Microsoft Word
encourages the user to continually focus on formatting, but the markup style of LaTeX
encourages users to separately consider content and layout.
In applying incentive-centered design, I focus on these behavioral changes. I try to
understand how and why specific features lead to given behavioral changes. In general,
I look for incentive mechanisms: patterns in the design of computer systems that lead to
specific, intended, and predictable user behavior. This allows me to ask first “how do I
want the users of my system to behave?” and then design features that lead to the desired
behavior.
Incentive-centered design becomes particularly interesting in multi-user systems. Hu-
man behavior in these systems depends not only on the technical design, but also on the
behavior of other users. Strategic behavior, such as not contributing and free riding on the
contributions of others, is commonly found in multi-user systems. I strive to understand not
only how the technical design influences an individual’s behavior, but also how it provides
incentives for multiple people and how it interacts with strategic incentives between people.
Because of the focus on understanding the causes of user behavior, incentive-centered
design has its roots in the social sciences. I draw on theories of behavior from psychology
and economics to try to predict how users will react to specific technologies.
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1.3.1 Behavioral Design Challenges
There are a number of user behaviors that are critical to the success of the information
sharing feature of a social firewall. These issues are common to many different social
computing systems, and solutions that work for one might also generalize to help other
systems.
First, I focus on providing incentives for users to contribute information to social com-
puting systems. How can we design a social firewall to encourage users to contribute
their information? Contribution is primarily an issue of quantity: are we getting enough
information from users? I list this behavior first because without contributions, the other
behavioral issues don’t matter.
The second issue that depends on user behavior is quality. How can we make sure
that what users contribute is actually worthwhile? This is a big issue in a social firewall;
low quality information may do more harm than good. There are two classes of strategy
for approaching quality. First, it is sometimes possible automatically to filter high-quality
contributions from low-quality contributions. This filtering can be done programatically as
long as there is some method of measuring quality. Alternatively, you can have users rate
others’ contributions (like Amazon.com’s “Was this review helpful?”) and use those ratings
to identify high-quality contributions. Second, rather than trying to identify or measure
the quality of contributions, it may be possible to provide an incentive that ensures most
contributions are high quality. Wikipedia’s “barn star” system6 publicly rewards high-quality
contributions, thus encouraging all contributors to increase quality.
Another issue for social computing systems is user retention. How can these systems
keep their users coming back regularly? And why do some users stop using these systems?
Getting a user to contribute to a social firewall is good, but with security threats constantly
evolving, it is important to keep users using the system. How can we get users to stick
around and continue contributing? And, when is it better to let them leave?
Many social computing systems work best when users collaborate with each other. For
example, Wikipedia is a much better encyclopedia when users collaborate and co-author
articles and edit existing articles; its competition Google Knol has exclusively single-author
articles. How can we motivate users to not just contribute, but to work together so that the
sum is greater than the parts? Collaboration might play an important role in a social firewall
to resolve conflicting mental models and to resolve disagreements about policy advice.
Since most social computing systems are open to pretty much anybody, one of the big
issues is maliciousness: not all contributions support the goals of the system. A social fire-
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Barnstars, retrieved July 10, 2009
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wall is particularly likely to have attackers manipulate the system by contributing erroneous
content that helps further their attacks. Is it possible to discourage people from this type of
contribution? In some ways this is similar to the issue of quality, but focuses on the opposite
side: reducing unwanted contributing rather than encouraging valuable contributions.
Social computing systems do not just pop into existence; they must grow over time. The
first problem that any social media system faces is how to get the first few contributions
from users. This is known as the bootstrapping problem. The basic problem is that each
user gets value from the system that depends on how much useful information is currently in
the system; but when the system is first created there isn’t any information contained therein,
and therefore no one will want to use it. Technically, this is an instance of a positive network
externality; each user that joins the system makes the system more valuable to everyone
else, but that user doesn’t take that value into account when deciding if he or she should
join. Bootstrapping problems are particularly difficult to deal with precisely because there
isn’t much to work with; since very few users are yet on the system there isn’t much value
that can be used to motivate people to join.
And finally, social computing systems can be improved when end-users find innovative
new ways of using the system. For example, users on Twitter originally came up with
“@replies” and “#hashtags.”7 End-user innovation is extremely valuable because it allows
users to customize the experience of using the system to make it more useful. Encouraging
this type of innovation can greatly increase the value of a social firewall.
There are many behaviors that I would like to see from users of a social firewall. How-
ever, creating a design that induces all of them is a large and difficult task. In this dissertation
I focus primarily on one important behavioral challenge: encouraging user contributions.
I focus on this contributions because without contributions, the other behaviors are moot.
Contributing information is the fundamental, defining behavior in user-contributed content
systems. Some of my results also help with other behavioral issues (particularly quality of
contributions), but those issues are not the focus of this dissertation. Additionally, I chose to
study what users currently know in order to better understand what information they can
contribute, and what information from others might be useful to have. I feel that a successful
user-contributed content system should match the needs of the information users with the
capabilities and knowledge of the contributors. This knowledge helps to design contribution
mechanisms that induce users to contribute useful information.
The research literature has many results that might be helpful for this design problems.
7Twitter co-founder Biz Stone mentions this fact in his interview on the Freakonomics blog from
the New York Times website: http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/
biz-stone-answers-your-twitter-questions/
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Before I discuss my novel ideas I first describe some existing knowledge that can be applied




No knowledge exists in a vacuum. There is much that is currently known that is relevant
to designing a social firewall. In this chapter I discuss some of this knowledge that I build
upon.
I begin by describing what is known about botnets and non-technical computer users,
and a few of the technologies that non-technical users can use to improve their security. This
knowledge helps to put the current state of home computer security in context, both in its
successes and its weaknesses. Next, I describe a number of social science theories related to
motivation. Specifically, these are theories from psychology and economics that relate to
groups of people working together to create something. These two fields see this problem
different, and propose different ways to think about the problem and to solve it. Finally
I end by describing some existing socio-technical systems and the way they encourage
contributions.
2.1 Botnets and Home Computers
Computer security has been an active area of research for a number of decades. And there
has been a vibrant computer security industry for many years. This has lead to numerous
innovations that help protect computers from attackers. Consequently, attackers have had to
be creative for their attacks to succeed.
In botnets, modern attackers have discovered a very powerful method of attack that is
very difficult for the computer security community to defend against. Botnets are an instance
of a well-known and well-studied problem in economics, and many important properties
are well described by economic theory. Largely, home computer users are not keeping their
computers secure and have enabled botnets to flourish. Next I describe some economic
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theory that helps explain why it may be entirely rational for home computer users to leave
their computers with little security.
2.1.1 Botnets Create Negative Externalities
The botnet problem is not entirely unique. It is an instance of a negative externality problem
from economics. An externality is any effect, either cost or benefit, that that arises as a
result of one person’s actions and causes an effect on another person not mediated through
a transaction. Parties in a transaction can take into account their costs and benefits when
deciding whether and how to transact, but third parties that are affected by an externality
have no say. Negative externalities are externalities that impose costs on third parties;
pollution is the classic example. Negative externalities lead to more harmful actions than
would be socially efficient. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, esp. chapter 11)
Botnets create an externality (Camp and Wolfram, 2000). Normally, a hacker compro-
mises a victim and this compromise can be seen as a transaction. The victim can spend time,
money, and effort to better secure their computer from attack, but has chosen to bear the
costs of attack rather than spend more to make their computer secure. Hackers obviously
benefit from the compromise. All of the costs and benefits of the attack accrue to either the
hacker or the victim. However, with botnets, the compromised computer becomes a tool that
can be used to attack third parties. Botnets cause third parties to care whether the victim’s
computer is compromised, and the third party would prefer that the victim spent more time,
effort, and money on security than he or she rationally would.
There are a number of standard solutions to negative externality problems (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995, ch. 11). The two most common policy solutions are a Pigovian tax, and the
assignment of property rights to encourage Coasian bargaining. The government can impose
a Pigovian tax (named after the economist Arthur Pigou who advocated them) on transac-
tions to reduce the number of transactions, and hence reduce the externality. Some attempts
to control pollution are Pigovian taxes. This is unlikely to work for hacked computers;
compromises are already against the law, so collecting such taxes would be difficult.
An alternative suggested by Ronald Coase is to assign property rights. When property
rights are well-defined, the people involved in the externality have an incentive to bargain
with each other and “internalize” the externality. However, Coasian bargaining breaks
down when the transactions costs — the costs of doing the bargaining — are too high. For
the botnet problem, these costs are very high; it is very costly for a botnet victim (such
as a company who is being extorted) to negotiate with all of the home computer users in
the country. Likewise, since hacking is a crime, it is difficult for the victims to negotiate
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with hackers. When these negotiations are initiated by hackers, it is rightfully considered
extortion. (Ratliff, 2006)
2.1.2 Understanding Non-Technical Users
Hackers have targeted home computers because they are low-hanging fruit. The vast majority
of home computers are administered by people who have little security knowledge or train-
ing. While home users may be concerned with the security of their computers, they usually
lack the training and expertise to effectively use security technologies. Ross Anderson’s
1993 study of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) fraud found that the majority of the fraud
committed using these machines was not due to technical flaws, but to errors in deployment
and management failures. These problems in the banking industry illustrate the types of
security problems found in home computers and the difficulty that even professionals face
in producing effective security.
Existing research has investigated how non-expert users deal with security and network
administration in a home environment. Dourish et al. (2004) conducted a related study,
inquiring not into mental models but how corporate knowledge workers handled security
issues. They found that people saw security technologies as a barrier (like a locked door)
that keeps the bad guys out. Security technologies were expected to keep out all potential
bad guys, and technologies that focused on one specific type of bad (like anti-spam tech-
nologies without anti-virus capabilities) were seen as partial or imperfect. Users also felt
futility with security, referencing unknown others (like hackers) who will always be one
step ahead. Most users, lacking the time and inclination to deal with security, attempted to
delegate their security concerns. Dourish et al. found that users chose to trust in technology
(like a firewall), delegate decisions to a person (like a knowledgable colleague), trust in an
organization (we have a good support group), or trust that an institution (like a bank) would
protect them.
Gross and Rosson (2007) studied what security knowledge end users posses in the con-
text of large organizations. They specifically studied the people in the organization who were
not directly responsible for security (IT staff is usually where the direct responsibility lies),
but who still had some security concerns because they had access to data their organization
felt should be kept confidential. End users’ security knowledge was neither comprehensive
nor sufficient to maintain proper security, but common security actions such as locking the
screen when away were better understood and practiced. All the participants were aware
of some sensitive information they had access to, and knew to protect it and to be wary of
being tricked into revealing it (social engineering). Gross and Rosson also noted that their
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participants frequently conflated security and functionality failures.
Grinter et al. (2005) interviewed home network users and found that homes generally
had a single person who assumed the role of system administrator. It was his or her job to
maintain a network, troubleshoot and fix problems, and help others with network connectiv-
ity, and this person unanimously resented the amount of time spent in this role. They also
found that both this system administrator and other members of the household felt a sense of
uneasiness when the system administrator had to troubleshoot and fix computers belonging
to other members of the household.
Combining the results from these papers, it appears that many users exert much effort
to avoid security decisions. All three papers report that users often find ways to delegate
the responsibility for security to some external entity; this entity could be technological
(like a firewall), social (another person or IT staff), or institutional (like a bank). Users do
this because they feel like they don’t have the ability to maintain proper security, or to deal
with problems when things go wrong. However, these papers do report that despite this
delegation of responsibility, many users still make numerous security-related decisions on a
regular basis. These papers do not explain how those decisions get made; rather, they focus
mostly on the anxiety these decisions create.
Camp (2006) proposed using mental models as a framework for communicating complex
security risks to the general populace. She did not study how people currently think about
security, but proposed five possible models that may be active. These models take the form
of analogies or metaphors with other similar situations: physical security, medical risks,
crime, warfare, and markets. Asgharpour et al. (2007) built on this by conducting a card
sorting experiment that matches these analogies with the mental models of uses. They found
that experts and non-experts show sharp differences in which analogy their mental model is
closest to.
Another related area of literature concerns designing security software for non-technical
users. There has been some work in the field of human-computer interaction that attempts
to design security systems that non-specialists can easily understand and use. Cranor and
Garfinkel (2005) edited a book containing a number of such research papers. All technology
systems impose a usability cost on users: the cost of time, education, frustration, and skill
required to use the system. The security and usability community has focused on designing
technologies with a very low usability cost in the hope that user behavior will change
and users decisions will improve. This design approached is justified by the fundamental
benefit-cost calculus of decision theory: if marginal cost is reduced for an activity with
desirable outcomes, individuals will perform more of that activity.
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2.1.3 Existing Technical Solutions
A number of technologies have been designed with the same basic goal in mind: to stop
malicious people from taking unwanted actions on computer systems. There are three
popular technologies that are particularly relevant to this dissertation: firewalls, anti-virus
systems, and security updates.
Personal Firewalls A large and popular class of these security technology falls under the
heading Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (Scarfone and Mell, 2007). In short,
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a piece of technology (hardware and/or software)
that watches the behavior of other technologies for patterns that indicate unwanted activities.
When such behavior is noticed, the typical response is to notify a human system adminis-
trator. However, some IDSs can also take automatic actions to prevent this behavior from
continuing or causing harm. These systems are usually Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),
since they actively attempt to prevent unwanted behavior, rather than simply detecting it.
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) are generally classified by the type
of technological behavior they monitor. Network-based IDPSs monitor network traffic and
network devices to look for patterns. Host-based IDPSs generally monitor a single computer
for signs of unwanted behavior. Host-based systems are valuable because they are directly
able to monitor many important behaviors of computers which are likely to change if that
computer is compromised. However, they usually lack the sophistication to detect changes
across multiple computers. Network-based systems have a view of a larger portion of the
network so they can detect patterns a) before the network traffic gets to the end computers,
and b) across multiple computers. However, they lack the direct access to monitor most of
the software running on the end hosts, so can often miss intrusions. A number of modern
IDPSs are taking a hybrid approach, combining data from both host-based sensors and
network-based sensors to look for patterns of unwanted behavior.
A simple version of an IDPS is known as a firewall. Firewalls are devices that monitor
computer behavior and have the ability to stop certain behaviors from occuring. (Cheswick
et al., 2003) For example, a network-based firewall monitors network packets and has the
ability to block packets to a certain destination, or for a specific application such as email.
Firewalls implement a policy that states which behaviors are acceptable and which behaviors
should be stopped.
While most firewalls are network-based, there is a growing class of host-based firewall
systems. These systems are often called “personal firewalls,” particularly when the intent
is for the end computer user to specify the firewall policy, rather then having an external
system administrator set the policy. Many host-based firewalls take advantage of having
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interactive access to the user to relax the requirement that a firewall policy be fully specified
in advance. These firewalls have three possible actions for any behavior: allow the behavior,
deny the behavior, or ask the user for a policy decision in real time. This capability for
interactive policy generation has the potential to simplify firewall policy management, but
requires the end user to be capable of understanding technical details in order to decide on an
appropriate policy. Many users are unable to understand the functionality of the firewall in
sufficient detail to make appropriate security decisions, as security policy decisions require
the decision maker to trade off the benefits of access with the potential security risks.
Firewalls are proactive security systems. They try to prevent security problems before
they start by restricting what a computer can do. Properly used firewalls do not need to be
updated as hackers develop new techniques for attacks; however in reality sometimes new
versions of firewalls are need to combat particularly creative attacks.
Anti-Virus Systems Another popular type of Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
is an anti-virus system. Anti-virus systems are largely marketed to home computer users
and are designed to detect and remove computer viruses. They are very popular for personal
computers, but are less common among corporate IT infrastructure where more sophisticated
technologies can be used.
Most anti-virus systems work by looking for “signatures,” or recognizable patterns
from known computer viruses. These systems are effective at detecting viruses that are
well-known and have been around for a while. They fail, however, to detect novel viruses
and viruses that continually change their own code in order to evade detection. Anti-virus
systems are reactive security systems. They react only to known security threats and cannot
anticipate or prevent previously unknown security problems.
Because anti-virus systems can only detect known viruses, it is important for these
systems to continually update their database of known virus signatures. Many anti-virus
systems come with a subscription service that keeps these databases current; but these
subscriptions do not last forever and eventually the user must upgrade to the latest version
and pay for an additional subscription. Because of this, some home computer users have
out-of-date anti-virus systems that cannot detect newer viruses.
Security Updates Modern personal computers are general purpose computing machines.
This means that in theory these computers can run any application that is written for them.
However, most computers are intentionally limited to run only those applications approved
by the computer’s user.
All software has bugs; bugs in software are mostly harmless and at most cause an
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inconvenience to the user. However, a small subset of software bugs are particularly bad
because they are exploitable: a properly crafted input can cause the application to execute
arbitrary code. This class of bugs is particularly bad because it means hackers and viruses
can exploit these bugs to get their programs running on victims’ computers.
New exploitable bugs are being discovered all the time. The United States maintains a
national database of known bugs vulnerable to exploitation in this way. Currently it averages
13 new vulnerabilities reported per day. Every year since 2000 has seen at least 1000 new
vulnerabilities reported to this database.1
It is not unusual for software applications to issue “patches” that fix various software
bugs. Usually, these patches will be aggregated and formed into a “service pack,” or sim-
ply just fixed for the next version of the application. However, for exploitable bugs, it is
important that the patch for the bug be available quickly so that affected users can fix their
software and therefore prevent hackers from exploiting the bug. Many software vendors
work hard to release patches for exploitable bugs in a timely manor in order to protect their
users. Microsoft has even gone so far to declare the second Tuesday of each month “patch
Tuesday” where they release patches for all new exploitable bugs they know of.2
Many security experts advise all computer users to “stay up to date” on patches by
frequently checking for and applying any new patches for exploitable bugs. Staying up to
date on patches makes it more difficult for hackers and viruses to compromise a computer.
A number of technologies are used to help users stay up to date; the most prevalent one is
Microsoft Windows Update. This system automatically checks with Microsoft on a regular
schedule, looking for newly available patches that have not yet been applied to the computer.
It then automatically downloads and installs them for users unless they have configured the
computer to require manual permission.
This automatic system has helped many users stay up to date, but doesn’t work for
everyone. Sometimes patches can accidentally break some other functionality, so many
users don’t install patches, or delay installation to wait for other users to detect problem
patches. Also, many computers are not permanently connected to the Internet, and therefore
cannot always check for and download new patches when they become available. For these
reasons and others, many computers still are vulnerable to well-known exploitable bugs in
common software. Above I mentioned that some botnets primarily spread through three







for these bugs for years, yet many computers are still vulnerable.
2.2 Motivating Contribution: The Problem
The problem of inducing contributions to a social firewall shares many attributes with a
well-studied problem. Below I describe how social scientists characterize the basic problem
of contribution. Also, since the problem is not unique, many others have tried to solve this
problem in various different ways. I will describe both general approaches to solving the
contribution problem and then specific technologies that address the contribution problem
in interesting ways. Much work in the past has not distinguished the problem of inducing
contribution and the problem of inducing quality. I find that separating these two problem
can be quite beneficial, but most of the previous research has treated these as two aspects of
the same problem.
Economists call the problem the “voluntary provision of public goods” problem, and
psychologists refer to this problem as “social loafing.” But the basic problem is the same:
human beings naturally contribute less effort when others are involved than they should.
The fields of economics and psychology have different approaches to studying this problem,
and that has led them to different types of solutions.
2.2.1 Public Goods
User contributions to a social computing system can be seen as contributions, in the form
of information, to a single shared information pool. All users of the system have access
to this pool. This shared information pool has the properties of a public good (Samuelson,
1954). In particular, the pool is non-rivalrous since using the information pool does not
materially reduce the value of the pool to other people. To use a familiar example, once
National Public Radio broadcasts a program, consumption by one listener does not crowd
out consumption by other listeners. For information, nonrivalry is generally true because
the incremental costs of (digital) reproduction and distribution are approximately zero, and
thus multiple instances of the information can be “consumed” without “using it up”.
Shared information pools in social media are also commonly non-exclusive; the in-
formation in the system is available to anyone anytime. The information contained on
Wikipedia, del.icio.us, and Twitter is available for free to anyone with a web browser and
a network connection. However, non-exclusivity is a design choice; social media systems
could technically exclude users from accessing the public information pool. This potential
for exclusivity opens up new opportunities for creating incentive mechanisms. I explore this
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opportunity in Chapter 5.
When public goods are created through voluntary contributions, they generally have
the problem of underprovision: users prefer to “free ride” and use the public good without
contributing, relying on other people to do the hard work of creating it (Samuelson, 1954).
To see this, assume there are N people in the system, indexed by i = 1, . . . ,N. Each person
is given wi dollars (or effort or some other common unit). Each person then has to choose
how to allocate this wi dollars: they contribute gi it to the public good and xi to all of the
other private uses. The public good G will then be made up of everyone’s contributions:











gi ≥ 0;xi ≥ 0
Let G−i be the sum of everyone’s contribution to the public good except user i. If we add this
to both sides of the budget constraint equation, the budget constraint for person i becomes
xi +G = wi +G−i
In a Nash equilibrium, each person treats G−i as a given. From this, we can see person
i chooses his or her optimal level of G by “topping up” G−i, the amount expected from
everyone else. Person i treats G−i as his or her “social income” that can only be spent
on the public good. Under normal assumptions, it is straightforward to prove that a Nash
equilibrium exists and is unique for this setting. (Andreoni, 2006, e.g.)
In equilibrium, each user will choose an allocation such that ∂ui/∂G = ∂ui/∂xi. If this
wasn’t true, then user i could benefit from shifting some funds from xi into G or vice versa.
Another way of saying this is that the marginal rate of substitution between goods for person
i (MRSi) is equal to 1. However, Samuelson (1954) proved that the efficient level of the
good is acheived when the sum of the marginal rates of substitution (∑ni=1 MRSi) is equal
to one. When there is more than one person using a public good, this is not achieved, and
everyone voluntarily chooses to contribute inefficiently little to the public good. That is,
each person rationally chooses to free ride on the efforts of others and only contribute when
it is worthwhile to “top off” the public good.
Of course, if everyone prefers to free ride, then the information pool tiny. We see the
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free rider problem in social media: Adar and Huberman (2000) found that almost 70% of
users of a popular peer-to-peer system contribute nothing at all. While Wikipedia has over
9 million registered users, only 166,066 (less than 2%) have contributed effort in the last
30 days6. Of those who contribute to Wikipedia, 50% do not return after their first day of
contribution (Jian and MacKie-Mason, 2008).
This basic result is fairly extreme; for many public goods it predicts that no one will
contribute any amount at all, and that the public good therefore won’t exist. However, we
observe these types of public goods all of the time. The basic problem is that in the above
model, all contributions are equivalent. Therefore, each person would prefer that others
contribute so that he can save his budget for personal use. However, we often observe that,
all else being equal, many people prefer that the contributions come from themselves. An
improved theory includes the idea that some people receive a warm glow from contributing
to a public good. (Andreoni, 2006) These people gain utility both from having access to the
public good G, and from a warm glow that comes from contributing gi. When you include
a warm glow in the model, other people’s contributions are only imperfect substitutes for
one’s own.
Warm glow, as a motive for contribution, is slightly different than altruism. Andreoni
(2006) uses a great metaphor to illustrate the distinction:
Just like hunger tells a person it is time to eat but taste buds tells the person what
they want to eat, it is altruism that should tell you what to give, but warm-glow
tells you how much to give.
2.2.2 Social Loafing
Psychology has a different perspective on this same problem. It identifies the problem as one
of social loafing, which is the reduction in motivation when individuals work collectively
(Karau and Williams, 1993). Specifically, psychologists see the problem when people
work together on a group outcome, and not when individuals work co-actively on separate
individual outcomes. This difference is one of perception; an individual only social loafs
when he or she perceives a group outcome rather than his or her own individual outcome.
A meta-analysis (Karau and Williams, 1993) of the social loafing literature proposed
a useful model that integrates the results of many experiments into a coherent theory. The
basic logic of the theory states that “social loafing occurs because there is usually a stronger
perceived contingency between individual effort and valued outcomes when working in-
dividually.” Basically, people are less motivated to work toward group goals because they
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics, retrieved on March 16, 2009
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Figure 2.1 The Collective Effort Model of Karau and Williams (1993)
can’t see as strong of a connection between their effort and the final outcome that they value
as they can for individual work. Therefore, social loafing can be reduced by increasing the
perceived value and importance of the individual contributions, and the salience of their
connection to the final outcome.
This theory, called the Collective Effort Model, (CEM) is diagrammed in Figure 2.1.
It puts forward three psychological factors that influence the strength of motivation: ex-
pectancy, instrumentality, and valence of outcomes. Individuals need to expect that high
levels of effort will lead to high levels of performance. It is vital for motivation that high
performance be seen as instrumental in obtaining the outcome. And finally, the outcome
must be have high valence to the individual; that is, the individual must see the outcome as
desirable. Lessening any of these factors will reduce the individual’s motivation to put forth
effort.
Karau and Williams then break down instrumentality into three component parts, all
of which must be present for a person to perceive their contribution as instrumental. First,
individuals must believe that their individual performance has a strong influence on group
performance. For user-contributed information pools, this means that individuals must
believe that their contributions will help others contribute. Second, individuals must be-
lieve that the group performance determines the final group outcome. This means that
the individuals believe that the information pool is useful to the group as a whole. And
third, individuals must believe that the group outcome is related to the outcome they as
an individual will experience. For information pools, individuals believe that they will
benefit from the group doing well. All three relationships need to be salient and strong in
the individuals mind; any relationship that is weak consequently weakens the motivation to
contribute and thus reduces contributions.
This model makes a number of useful predictions. For example, motivation decreases as
group size increases. The CEM model gives a reason for this: with larger groups, individuals
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will not believe that their contributions are as important in the final group outcome. It
predicts that motivation will increase when individuals believe that their contributions are
unique. This is important for user-contributed information pools because each person’s
contribution likely contains different information. The CEM model suggests that reminding
users of this fact might lead to stronger motivation to contribute.
2.3 Motivating Contribution: Applying Theory
A number of researchers have worked to apply social science theory to design “mechanisms”
that encourage people to contribute. In economics, this research falls in the subfield called
mechanism design. This subfield has many tools that might be useful in designing software.
These tools include methods of mathematical modeling that help researchers understand
the incentives that people face and the consequences of their choices. Researchers have
used mathematical modeling to identify a number of useful properties for these mechanisms.
A mechanism for contribution is Pareto efficient if there exists no option for allocating
contributions such that no one is worse off. A mechanism is individually rational if all
participants are voluntarily willing to participate; no one ends up worse off than if they had
not participated. A mechanism is budget balanced when there is neither excess, unused
contributions nor a need for outside, third party contributions to make the mechanism work.
Any given mechanism may exhibit several different desirable properties, but of course there
are limits to how many desirable properties any mechanism can simultaneously exhibit. For
example Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) were able to prove that, under weak assumptions,
it is impossible to design a mechanism for bilateral trade with all three of these properties.
Many interesting designs have been proposed and a number of general design principles
have emerged. For example, one design principle states that systems can elicit honest
information from people by ensuring that the greatest benefits accrue when the participant is
honest; this can often be achieved by disconnecting a participant’s information revelation
from the received benefits. This is exemplified by a second-price auction (also known as a
Vickrey auction): participants can submit any bid they want, but have to pay the value of the
second highest bid. Thus, there is no incentive to lie because their bid does not determine
the price they pay.
2.3.1 Public Goods Mechanisms
Economic theorists propose several approaches to raising the level of private contribution
to a public good. For example, Groves and Ledyard (1977), Clarke (1971), Bagnoli and
23
Lipman (1989), and Varian (1994) all present mechanisms with different properties to ad-
dress this problem. Most mechanisms from the economics literature face practical problems
in any application, but in particular using these mechanisms to motivate contributions to a
social firewall is not straightforward.
First, many of these mechanisms assume that contributions can be returned if unused.
This works when contributions are money because money is easy to return. This doesn’t
work when contributions are in the form of information. The cost of contributing information
is primarily the time and effort involved in some or all of data collection, analysis, drafting,
formatting, editing, annotating, and organizing the information. It is simply impossible to
refund time and effort.
Second, a number of these mechanisms have users propose how much should be con-
tributed, and then the mechanism aggregates this information and decides how much each
user should contribute. This too works when contributions are money because dividing
money into any size contribution is easy. This is difficult to make work when contributions
are information because dividing information into smaller chunks is problematic. There
are some situations where something like this might work, but in general, telling users how
much information to contribute is infeasible.
These mechanisms, however, are a good starting point for designing new mechanisms.
They illustrate a way of thinking about incentive mechanisms that can be applied to new
designs (and indeed, I use this way of thinking in Chapter 5). It may also be possible to
make minor modifications to some of these designs to adjust them for the different nature of
information as a contribution medium.
2.3.2 Learning from Charitable Giving
Andreoni (2006) provides a survey of literature on the topic of philanthropy, or the voluntary
giving of resources to support a public good. Of particular interest is his discussion of
mechanisms that are used by charities to encourage giving. Most of these mechanisms were
originally observed in the wild, and then economic models were developed to explain how
they work. He makes an interesting and useful distinction between capital campaigns, where
the charity has a one-time need for large amounts of capital, and continuing campaigns,
where the charity is raising funds for day-to-day operations. Charities tend to use very
different forms of fund-raising for these different types of campaigns. For my purposes, I am
mostly interested in continuing campaigns, as I don’t want my system to rely on one-time,
special contributions; however, mechanisms from capital campaigns might be important to
get the system off the ground and solve the bootstrapping problem.
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Capital campaigns almost universally begin by finding a small number of people who
are willing to make very large donations – usually about 1/3 of the total desired amount.
They then announce these large donations and who they are from, and collect the rest
of what they need through numerous small donations. Economists have explained these
facts in two ways. First of all, the initial donations can allow a minimum threshold to be
reached, guaranteeing that some public good will be produced. This eliminates a potential
no-contribution equilibrium for a threshold good (Andreoni, 1998). Secondly, such capital
campaigns vary widely in quality; some are very worthwhile, others are not. The quality
of the to-be-produced public good is private information to the charity. Receiving large
donations from trusted individuals provides a credible signal to the numerous potential small
donors that the cause is worthy, without requiring them to each go through a costly process
to learn more about the proposed public good (Vesterlund, 2003). This suggests that, to get a
user-contributed content system started, it might be valuable to find a high-profile individual,
and get that person to make a lot of contributions to the system. Doing so signals that the
system is worthwhile and likely to be around for a while, but also signals that the system is
likely to overcome the network effects problems and grow to a self-sustaining size.
For continuing campaigns, charities usually use three different approaches. Charities
directly ask for money, which is an extremely effective tool. They recognize donors, usually
grouping them into categories by donation amount. And finally, they often use some form
of charity auction or lottery. Economists have explained the power of the ask mainly with
search costs – it is too costly for donors to figure out which charity to contribute to, and how
to do the contribution. By soliciting donations, charities can eliminate these costs and make
donating easier (Andreoni and Payne, 2003). Recognizing donors most likely works through
social means – by publishing donor names, it encourages donors who seek to signal their
wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). Also, grouping them into categories encourages donors
to contribute to the next higher category. Empirical evidence indicates that the majority of
donations occur at the bottom end of a reporting bracket (Harbaugh, 1998). Charity lotteries
effectively act as a subsidy on giving, even for risk-neutral donors (Morgan, 2000; Morgan
and Sefton, 2000).
All three mechanisms here are potentially useful in software. User-contributed content
systems should directly ask for contributions; however, I suspect that the “power of the ask”
is greatly diminished when the target is not a charity. Recognizing contributors can be a
powerful motivator in multi-user software systems. Many systems (such as Amazon.com’s
book reviews) label contributions with the name of the contributor. Also, some systems have
“leader boards” that recognize users who contribute the most.7 Finally, special lotteries have
7Amazon.com has a leader board that recognizes its top contributors: http://www.amazon.com/
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potential to encourage contributions, though I am not aware if any user-contributed content
system has ever tried to use one.
2.3.3 Applying Social Psychology to Design Software
Ling et al. (2005) took a different approach inspired by social psychology. They conducted
a series of experiments in which they took theories from social psychology and attempted to
apply them to the design of a social software system. In particular, they used these theories
to attempt to influence the amount of contribution of movie ratings in MovieLens, an online
movie recommendation system. Movie recommendations in MovieLens were chosen be-
cause they are an instance of the social loafing problem (Karau and Williams, 1993); users
benefit from the ratings of others in the form of more and higher quality recommendations,
but have little individual incentive to rate movies themselves.
In particular, Ling et al. looked to the Collective Action Model from Karau and Williams
(1993) for concrete behavioral patterns that they could turn into design recommendations
and test in a field experiment. The concrete behavioral patterns that they looked to are:
• People contribute more when they see their contribution as important to the group
• People contribute more when they are similar to others in the group
• People contribute more when they perceive their contribution as unique and important
to the group
• People contribure more when the group benefits of contribution are made salient
• People contribute more when they are reminded of the intrinsic benefits of contribution
• People contribure more when they are reminded of the multiple benefits of contribution
They also looked to the goal-setting work of Locke and Latham (2002) to provide more
behavioral patterns that can be turned into design recommendations:
• People contribure more when assigned challenging, numeric goals
• People contribure more when assigned individual goals rather than group goals
• People contribure more when not assigned overly-challenging goals
These behavioral predictions were turned into design recommendations by sending
MovieLens users emails that specifically made salient one of the above points for the user.
review/top-reviewers. Amazon recently revised their algorithm for choosing the top reviewers be-
cause one woman, Harriet Klausner, was so much more productive than everyone else that no one was able to
catch her. As of July 12, 2009, she had written over 19,000 reviews, averaging multiple reviews per day. The
second most productive reviewer had written less than 7,000 reviews. Rankings using the old algorithm are
available here: http://www.amazon.com/review/top-reviewers
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The experimenters then measured changes in rating behavior among the users, looking
for increases or decreases in contributions after these emails. However, many of these
behavioral patterns did not make good design recommendations for this study. Only two of
these behavioral patterns made good predictive design recommendations:
• Users contributed more when they believed their contributions were unique
• Users contributed more when assigned specific, challenging goals that are not overly
difficult
Most of the remaining behavioral patterns that were turned into design recommenda-
tions did not have a statistically significant effect on contributions. The experiments were
inconclusive on whether those recommendations would motivate contributions. However, a
couple of the behavioral patterns actually caused users to reduce contribution at a statistically
significant level, contrary to theoretical predictions:
• Users contributed less when their personal benefits were made salient
• Users contributed less when the benefits to the group were made salient
• Users contributes less when assigned individual goals than when assigned group goals
Social psychology can be a very useful source of concrete design recommendations
for social software systems. However, this research shows that there are often complex
interactions created by the various design decisions that can nullify the motivational effects.
Social psychologists worked hard to isolate and identify the behavioral patterns described
above, but in a real system the users must use the system as a whole and interactions between
these patterns can cause behavior that is difficult to predict.
Rashid et al. (2006) continued this line of research. They found that individual contribu-
tions on MovieLens can be increased by displaying how valuable a potential contribution
would be to other users.
2.3.4 The Problem with Information Cascades
A naive ‘social’ firewall system could simply aggregate users’ policy decisions and make
those decisions available to others. For example, when presented with a firewall policy
choice, the system could report information such as ‘10 of 30 (33%) of users chose Allow.’
Such a system would be simple to construct. And, a naive analysis would suggest that
as long as the modal user makes a correct choice, such a system could improve security.
However, since this system aggregates decisions and not the information that led to the
decision, it would suffer from a problem known as information cascades. (Bikhchandani
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et al., 1992) In short, users would rationally start to ignore their own opinions and follow
the crowd, even if the crowd is wrong.
Imagine this situation: You need to decide between two restaurants for dinner tonight.
You’ve never been to either one, and don’t know anything about either one. But you know for
sure that one of them will give you a good meal, and the other will be less than satisfactory,
but you don’t know which is which. Also you receive a signal that suggests you go to either
the restaurant on the left (L), or the restaurant on the right (R), but the signal is imperfect. It
is correct with probability p > 0.5. How do you choose?
One thing you can do is watch people go in ahead of you. If they are in the same position
you are, with zero information except an imperfect signal, you can learn something from
their choices. Say for example that person 1 chooses the restaurant on the right. You can
infer that he received a R signal. Person 2 approaches and has to make a choice. She saw
person 1 choose right, so believes that the probability that the right restaurant is the good one
is p. She also received a signal. If her signal is R, then she will choose the right restaurant.
If her signal is L, then she’s seen an L signal and knows person 1 got an R signal. She’s
back at 50/50 probability, so will just flip a coin to choose. You get to choose third. You saw
person 1 go right (and therefore got an R signal). If person 2 goes right, then chances are
she also got an R signal. Even if you get an L signal, you should go right also and follow the
crowd because you’ve observed more than one R signal and only one L signal. The person
after you goes through this same logic, and knows that you should go R regardless of your
signal, so they can’t figure out your signal. However, from watching the first two people,
they should also go right, and so should everyone after them. This is an information cascade
– by observing behavior of people before you, you come to the point where you rationally
ignore your own information and follow the crowd. And so should everyone else. But here’s
the interesting part: if the first two people got erroneous signals (or one erroneous signal
and a unfortunate coin flip), then everyone ends up making a bad choice. This happens with
non-trivial probability8.
This is the main point of the literature on information cascades (Bikhchandani et al.,
1998). When people have a discrete set of possible actions and can observe the actions of
others, they will end up in an information cascade in which everyone rationally ignores
their own private information and follows the crowd. Furthermore, there is a non-trivial
probability that the cascade will occur on a non-optimal outcome. The result seems to
depend on the discrete-ness of the possible actions – if individuals can choose actions from a
8In this example, the probability of an erroneous cascade is (1− p)2 + p(1− p)∗0.5). If p = 0.75 (an OK
signal), then there is approximately a 15% chance of an erroneous cascade. If p = 0.90 (a good signal), then
the chance of an erroneous cascade drops to about 5%.
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continuous space (like stock prices), then they can still incorporate their private information,
the cascade will not occur, and the group of people will eventually converge on the optimal
choice. Cascades are rational because the group will cascade on the optimal choice slightly
more often than if everyone chose solely based on their private signal. However, these
cascades are fragile. A single person deviating from the cascade (in theory) is enough
to dislodge the cascade and potentially change all following people to the other choice.
The literature claims that cascades can explain much follow-the-leader type behavior, and
particularly when this type of behavior is fragile and subject to sudden changes.
The result still holds if individuals can only observe summary statistics of past behavior
(like the percentage of people who choose ‘right’) rather than the actual behavior. It also
holds if individuals receive continuous signals rather than binary signals. If people have
heterogeneous signal qualties, meaning that some signals are more reliable than others, then
the people with the most reliable signals become fashion leaders and can derail an existing
cascade and start a new one based on their signals. (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) Anderson
and Holt (1997) have verified information cascades in a laboratory setting. They found that
the cascade was imperfect (some people ignored the cascade and chose based on their own
signal), and not quite as fragile as theory predicts.
Information cascades are a particularly large problem for a distributed firewall system.9
Consider a personal firewall system that records users’ allow/deny decisions and sends these
decisions to a central server. This server then aggregates these decisions and reports this
aggregate information to other users when they are faced with a similar decision. “10 of 30
(33%) of other users chose Allow.” Such a system meets the pre-conditions for information
cascades presented above. It would be particularly prone to information cascades, with users
ignoring their own personal feelings and going with the decision of the crowd. In a firewall
system, this is extremely bad. It means that users have stopped contributing information to
the system, because we cannot infer anything from their choice. But also, by figuring out
which vulnerabilities have an incorrect cascade, an attacker can exploit large numbers of
vulnerable people. Since cascades are highly sensitive to the early decisions, an attacker can
influence cascades by being an early adopter and create large-scale vulnerabilities.
There are a number of methods to get around the information cascades problem. Infor-
mation cascades are a problem because each user only observes the decision, but not the
outcome of the decision – whether the decision was a good one or not. One well-known
solution is to find a way to incorporate outcome information. For example, reporting the
number of users who chose Allow and then caught a virus might get around the information
cascades problem for some decisions. However, then the social firewall will need to find a
9Goecks et al. (2009) also discovered this problem for personal firewall systems.
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way to induce users to provide this outcome information, with sufficient accuracy.
Another potential solution is to segment the population. Rather than reporting statistics
for the whole population of users, the social firewall could instead figure out which users
are ‘similar’ and report statistics for just that group. These similar users could be found in
the same way that a standard recommender system works. Since each person will have their
own idiosyncratic group of similar users, this might be enough to prevent the information
cascades problem. To my knowledge, no one has looked at this idea as a solution to the
information cascades problem. As future work, I am interested in developing a model of this
situation to see if social clustering can diminish the information cascades problem. However,
this is beyond the scope of my dissertation.
2.4 Motivating Contribution: Existing Systems
Software systems have been recognized as providing incentives for behavior for a long time.
A number of interesting software designs have taken incentives seriously as an important
component in the design of the system. Some of these have even received rigorous research
attention. Below I summarize a few lines of research that are particularly relevant to my
research.
Spam Spam can be characterized as unwanted content, usually in the form of advertising
or malicious content, that is contributed to systems in which the barrier to bulk contribution
is low. Email is the classic example, but spam also exists on wikis, in blog comments, on
instant messaging, and on mobile phones. Spam is fundamentally an incentive problem –
spammers naturally have a strong incentive to spam because they are sending commercially
viable advertising for which the barrier to sending is very low – and many incentive-based
solutions have been proposed. Loder et al. (2006) proposed requiring contributors to post
a ‘bond’ that can be collected if the contribution is later deemed to be spam. This can
dramatically increase the costs of contribution and provides a disincentive that is largely
efficient if the proceeds from the bond goes to the party that exerts the cost of evaluation.
von Ahn et al. (2003) designed a system that can effectively distinguish between humans
and computer programs which has been used to fight spam. This works by eliminating the
cheap automating capabilities of computers for abusing large-scale webmail system and
requiring relatively expensive human labor to send spam in bulk.
Dwork and Naor (1993) proposed a method of increasing the cost of spam that requires
contributors to prove that they have done a certain amount of costly computation. This
is another disincentive based on increasing the costs of spam. Laurie and Clayton (2004)
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produce some cost estimates and conclude that such proof of work systems will not work
practically. However, Liu and Camp (2006) propose a modified proof-of-work system that
sufficiently increases the costs of spammers such that it might work.
Peer to Peer Systems Peer-to-peer file sharing systems all must solve a basic problem in
order to work: users of the system must choose to make their files available for download
(share files) if there is going to be any content available on the network. In this way, content
on a peer-to-peer network is a voluntarily provided public good that suffers from the usual
underprovision problems. Bittorrent (Cohen, 2003), one of the more popular peer-to-peer
systems, attempts to solve this problem by including a tit-for-tat mechanism that punishes
users who don’t contribute. Krishnan et al. (2004) propose that users naturally have an
incentive to share content because by sharing with a third party I can reduce the download
burden of the peers from whom I want to download. However, Jian and MacKie-Mason
(2006) estimate this this would be a weak incentive in large file sharing networks. They then
go on to propose a theory of generalized reciprocity. In this theory, users share content with
the belief that what goes around comes around and that others will in turn share with them.
Jian and MacKie-Mason characterize sharing network structures in which this belief holds
and sharing is an equilibrium.
User-Contributed Content Systems User-contributed content systems are web-based
applications that allow users to submit content to the system and then share that content
publicly. While a good number of these systems exist, not all of them have succeeded in
getting users to contribute valuable information. There have been a few studies of these
systems that try to understand users motivations and incentives for contribution.
Wikipedia is one of the largest and most popular user contributed content system. I
am not aware of much research that provides concrete results on why users contribute to
Wikipedia. Cosley et al. (2007) were able to motivate increased contributions by providing
existing users with customized suggestions of Wikipedia articles that the users might be
interested in editing and improving. They conducted a field experiment that showed an
increase in edits and contributions due to their automatically-provided recommendations.
Bryant et al. (2005) describe the process where users progress from novices to expert
‘Wikipedians,’ increasing their contributions as they gain expertise. Burke and Kraut (2008)
look at the challenge of building a consensus in an online community by studying how
Wikipedians decide which users get promoted to administrator status. They found that the
written criterion are important but not strictly enforced, and the community also developed
some additional implicit criterion that was important for promotion decisions.
31
Facebook is a very large social networking website with over 250 million users10, mean-
ing that it has a larger population than any country other than China, India, and the United
States.11 Ellison et al. (2007) found that people use Facebook to create and maintain ‘bridg-
ing social capital.’ (Putnam, 2000) This means that users are trying to maintain the ‘weak
ties’ in their social network that Granovetter (1973) found can be very valuable. Burke et al.
(2009) studied how new users to Facebook contribute photos, and found strong evidence
of social learning; users learned from their ‘friends’ how to contribute and what kinds of
contributions were appropriate.
Preece and Schneiderman (2009) study the spectrum of online social activity and present
a theory of how individual users develop over time from lurking readers to basic contribu-
tors on up to social leaders in an online community. They believe that any vibrant online
community supports all of these diverse types of participation. They don’t predict how users
move up the scale of contribution and participation, but they do try to characterize the types
of users and the types of contribution at each level of participation. This process is a more
general version of the process described by Bryant et al. (2005).
Games Luis von Ahn has come up with a very interesting method of motivating users:
give them a fun game that has a beneficial side-effect. His first, and probably best, example
is the ESP Game, now better known as the Google Image Labeler (von Ahn and Dabbish,
2004). The ESP game randomly matches two players together and presents the pair of them
with a series of images. For each image, the players must independently type words in that
describe the image, and get points when both players agree on a word. These words that
are agreed upon then are good labels for that image, since the image is all the users have in
common. If you present the same image to many different pairs of players, then you end up
with a good list of labels, and an estimate (frequency of agreement) for how well that word
describes the image. Image recognition and labeling is a computationally hard (NP-Hard)
problem in computer science, but humans are innately good at it.
Two other games have been published by von Ahn: Peekaboom (von Ahn et al., 2006b)
is a game for locating objects in images, and Verbosity (von Ahn et al., 2006a) is a game for
discovering common-sense facts. All three games here take advantage of skills that most
humans have but computers find difficult or impossible. Labeling images, locating objects
in images, and discovering common-sense facts about the world are all NP-Hard problems
in computing, but are fairly easy for most people to do. The difficultly in creating these
games is making them fun. Luis went through many prototype designs (over 30, private
10http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics, retrieved on August 9, 2009.
11World Population statistics retrieved from Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_countries_by_population on August 9, 2009.
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communication) in order to come up with these three games. It is not clear how to make
such games fun, but it is still worthwhile to try. People will often spend many hours playing
games, and harnessing that time and effort to do productive work can be very fruitful.
Recently, Microsoft began using a new game called ‘Page Hunt’ to motivate users to help
them improve the search results from their new ‘Bing’ search engine (Ma et al., 2009). The
game rewards users for helping them provide better metadata about query results, provide
alternative queries, and identify ranking issues.
2.5 My Contribution
Overall, there is no strong consensus for how to motivate users of a user-contributed content
system to contribute information. Both psychology and economics have studied this general
problem and put forth solutions, but those solutions are imperfect for a number of reasons.
In particular, none of the existing solutions are good candidates for how to motivate users of
a social firewall system to contribute information about security decisions.
In this dissertation, I describe my research into how to motivate users to contribute
information to a social firewall. I begin in Chapter 3 by describing the information that
home computer users possess in the form of folk models. I use an interview study to
understand how users differ in the way they think about security. With this knowledge, I
can better design systems to take advantage of this heterogeneity in user beliefs to increase
contributions through information sharing. By understanding how home computer users
make security decisions, I can tailor the system to solicit information that would be the best
influence on others’ decisions. Next, in Chapter 4, I describe a mixed methods case study of
one current user-contributed content system: delicious.com. From this case study I discover
one powerful method of encouraging users to contribute information: have users contribute
for personal reasons and expose the information publicly as a side effect. I also describe
an important constraint that is important for such designs to work: incentive alignment. In
Chapter 5, I describe a simple variation on some public goods mechanisms from economics
that works for users contributing information: setting a minimum threshold for contribution
and denying access to anyone who doesn’t meet this threshold. Using a mathematical
model, I predict how a users will react to such a design and provide advice for using this
mechanism. Finally, in Chapter 6, I gather all of this knowledge and use it to propose a
more concrete design for a social firewall. Together, I use a variety of research methods
to propose a number of novel mechanisms for inducing users to contribute information to
social computing systems, and then give examples of how those mechanisms can be applied
to the design of a social firewall system.
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Chapter 3
Folk Models of Home Computer
Security
3.1 Introduction
Home users are installing paid and free home security software at a rapidly increasing rate.1
These systems include anti-virus software, anti-spyware software, personal firewall software,
personal intrusion detection / prevention systems, computer login / password / fingerprint
systems, and intrusion recovery software. Nonetheless, security intrusions and the costs they
impose on other network users are also increasing. One possibility is that home users are
starting to become well-informed about security risks, and that soon enough of them will
protect their systems that the problem will resolve itself. However, given the “arms race”
history in most other areas of networked security (with intruders becoming increasingly
sophisticated and numerous over time), it is likely that the lack of user sophistication and
non-compliance with recommended security system usage policies will continue to limit
home computer security effectiveness.
Recently, home computer security has been rising in importance because of the emer-
gence of botnets. A botnet is a distributed army of computers not owned by, but under at
least partial control of an attacker. The attacker breaks into each computer and leaves a
remote control program running. Once the zombie receives instructions from the attacker,
it usually independently follows the instructions without further contact. Often attackers
automate the process, allowing them to build extremely large botnets. Sizes in the tens of
thousands are considered moderate, and networks of 100,000 or more are not uncommon
Sieberg (2006). Home computers, or computers whose primary use is for consumer or other
1Despite a worldwide recession, the computer security industry grew 18.6% in 2008, totaling over $13
billion according to a recent Gartner report. (Contu and Cheung, 2009)
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home purposes, seem to be disproportionately represented in botnets.
To design security technologies (like a social firewall) that will induce changes in user
behavior, it is first necessary to understand how users make security decisions, and thence
to characterize the security problems that result from these decisions. To this end, I have
conducted a qualitative study to understand users’ mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1980;
D’Andrade, 2005) of attackers and security technologies. Mental models describe how a
user thinks about a problem; it is the model in the person’s mind of how things work. People
use these models to make decisions about the effects of various actions. (Johnson-Laird
et al., 1998)
In particular, I investigate the potential existence of folk models for home computer
users. Folk models are mental models that are not accurate in the real world, thus leading to
erroneous decision making, but are shared among similar members of a culture. (D’Andrade,
2005) It is well-known that in technological contexts users often operate with incorrect folk
models. (Adams and Sasse, 1999) To understand the rationale for home users’ behavior,
and in particular to design technology that induces improved behavior, it is important to
understand the decision model that people use. If technology is designed on the assumption
that users have correct mental models of security threats and security systems, it will not
induce the desired behavior when they are in fact making choices according to a different
model.
As an example of folk models, Kempton (1986) studied folk models of thermostat
technology in an attempt to understand the wasted energy that stems from poor choices in
home heating. He found that his respondents possessed one of two mental models for how a
thermostat works. According to the ‘valve’ model a thermostat works like a faucet: turning
it higher makes more heat come out. In the ‘feedback’ model, the thermostat turns the heater
on if the temperature is too low and off if it is high enough. The ‘feedback’ model is closer
to an expert’s understanding of thermostats, but both models have flaws. Both models cause
thermostat users to make poor decisions, but both models can lead to correct decisions that
the other model gets wrong. For example, the ‘valve’ theory predicts that more fuel will
be consumed at higher temperatures than at lower ones, and the ‘feedback’ theory would
disagree. This prediction is correct, though the reasoning is wrong. The extra fuel comes
not from a valve that is open farther to produce more heat, but from the fact that hotter
houses lose heat to the outside environment faster than cool houses. Kempton concludes
that “Technical experts will evaluate folk theory from this perspective [correctness] – not
by asking whether it fulfills the needs of the folk. But it is the latter criterion [...] on
which sound public policy must be based.” The same argument holds for technology design:
whether the folk models are correct or not, technology should be designed to work well with
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the folk models actually employed by users.2
For home computer security, I examine two related problems: (1) how do home computer
users conceptualize potential security threats? and (2) how do these users use their mental
model to decide upon security responses? I found that home computer users conceptualize
computer security threats in multiple ways; consequently, users make different decisions
based on their conceptualization.
3.1.1 Existing Literature on Security Understanding
Hackers have targeted home computers because they are low-hanging fruit. The vast ma-
jority of home computers are administered by people who have little security knowledge
or training. While home users may be concerned with the security of their computers,
they usually lack the training and expertise to effectively use security technologies. Ross
Anderson’s 1993 study of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) fraud found that the majority
of the fraud committed using these machines was not due to technical flaws, but to errors
in deployment and management failures. These problems illustrate the difficulty that even
professionals face in producing effective security.
Existing research has investigated how non-expert users deal with security and network
administration in a home environment. Dourish et al. (2004) conducted a related study,
inquiring not into mental models but how corporate knowledge workers handled security
issues. Gross and Rosson (2007) also studied what security knowledge end users posses in
the context of large organizations. And Grinter et al. (2005) interviewed home network users
about their network administration practices.3 Combining the results from these papers,
it appears that many users exert much effort to avoid security decisions. All three papers
report that users often find ways to delegate the responsibility for security to some external
entity; this entity could be technological (like a firewall), social (another person or IT staff),
or institutional (like a bank). Users do this because they feel like they don’t have the ability
to maintain proper security, or to deal with problems when things go wrong. However,
these papers do report that despite this delegation of responsibility, many users still make
numerous security-related decisions on a regular basis. These papers do not explain how
those decisions get made; rather, they focus mostly on the anxiety these decisions create.
I add structure to these observations by describing the folk models that home computer
users use to make security decisions. I also focus on differences across people, and look at
2It may be that users can be re-educated to use more correct mental models, and that incentives could
induce re-education, but generally it will be harder to embed incentives for society-wide re-education into
technology than in social policy, so I focus on behavioral changes, not educational changes.
3More information about these papers can be found in Section 2.1.2.
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different methods of dealing with security issues rather than trying to find general patterns.
These mental models may explain differences observed between users in these studies, and
provide a context and reasoning for many of the decisions that these researchers observed.
Camp (2006) proposed using mental models as a framework for communicating complex
security risks to the general populace. Asgharpour et al. (2007) built on this by conducting a
card sorting experiment that matches these analogies with the mental models of uses. They
found that experts and non-experts show sharp differences in which analogy their mental
model is closest to.
Camp et al. began by assuming a small set of analogies that they believe function as
mental models. Rather than pre-defining the range of posssible models, I treat these mental
models as a legitimate area for inductive investigation, and endeavor to uncover users’
mental models in whatever form they take. This prior work confirms that the concept of
mental models may be useful for home computer security, but made assumptions which
may or may not be appropriate. I fill in the gap by inductively developing an understanding
of just what mental models people actually possess. Also, given the vulnerability of home
computers and this finding that experts and non-experts differ sharply (Asgharpour et al.,
2007), I focus solely on non-expert home computer users.
Another related area of literature concerns designing security software for non-technical
users. There has been some work in the field of human-computer interaction that attempts
to design security systems that non-specialists can easily understand and use. (Cranor and
Garfinkel, 2005) My work will help to inform such designs by helping designers better
understand the capabilities and needs of home computer users when managing security.
3.1.2 Botnets and Home Computer Security
This research is motivated by a recent development in computer security. In the past, com-
puters were targeted by hackers approximately in proportion to the amount of value stored
on them or accessible from them. Computers that stored valuable information, such as bank
computers with account numbers and access to transfer funds were a common target, while
home computers used to view personal pictures were fairly innocuous. However, recently
attackers have used a technique known as a ‘botnet.’ Briefly, the attacker hacks into a
number of computers and installs special control software on those computers. These hacks
can be direct or through a virus/worm. This control software then listens for commands
from a master control computer. The hacker can give the master control computer a single
command, and it will be carried out by all of the compromised computers (called zombies) it
is connected to. (Bacher et al., 2005; Barford and Yegneswaran, 2006) This enables crimes
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that require large numbers of computers, such as spam, click fraud, and distributed denial of
service (Trend Micro, 2006). Observed botnets range in size from a couple hundred zombies
to 50,000 or more zombies. Hacker techniques for developing and using botnets have been
evolving rapidly. (Bacher et al., 2005)
Since any computer with an Internet connection will be an effective zombie, hackers
have logically turned to attacking the most vulnerable population – home computers. Home
computer users are usually untrained and have few technical security skills. While some
software has improved the average level of security of this class of computers, home com-
puters still represent the largest population of vulnerable computers with decent Internet
connections. As these computers are compromised, they are often used to commit crimes
against other people. The vulnerability of home computers is a security problem for many
companies and individuals who are the victims of these crimes, even if their computers are
secure.
The popular press is reporting that botnets are currently being used for a number of
different crimes. 9 of out 10 email messages on the Internet are spam (Stone, 2006), and
80% of those messages are being sent through botnets (Markoff, 2007; Sieberg, 2006).
Botnets are used to steal personal information, and to conduct various types of online fraud
such as click fraud and trust fraud (Sieberg, 2006). Botnets are also used for extortion.
Criminals will contact various websites and threaten to use a botnet to overwhelm the
website, preventing legitimate users from accessing it. Unless, of course, the website pays
up. Ratliff (2006) vividly describes the difficulties a number of victims have had in dealing
with this crime. In January 2007 John Markoff reported in the New York Times that
[B]otnets are being blamed for the huge spike in spam that bedeviled the Internet
in recent months, as well as fraud and data theft. Security researchers have
been concerned about botnets for some time because they automate and amplify
the effects of viruses and other malicious programs. What is new is the vastly
escalating scale of the problem” (Markoff, 2007).
Some facts about the current severity of the problem (all reported in (Markoff, 2007):
• David Dagon of the Georgia Institute of Technology says there is scientific consensus
that botnet programs are present on about 11% of the more than 650 million computers
attached to the Internet.
• Rick Wesson, CEO of Security Intelligence, reports that sensor data identifies more
than 250,000 new botnet infections daily.
• MessageLabs reports that more than 80% of all spam now originates from botnets.
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• In December 2006 Trend Micro identified one 24-hour period in which computers
from a single Internet service provider generated more than one billion spam messages.
• In a single data file retrieved from a botnet, 54,926 log-in credentials and 281 credit
card numbers could be found. This data affected 1,239 companies.
Botnets are a major problem for the Internet today, and the threat they pose is growing.
Compromised home computers form the majority of most botnets today. Home computer
users appear to be unable to prevent their computers from being co-opted into botnets by
Internet hackers. In this chapter, I use my description of the folk models to understand why
home computer users cannot prevent their computers from being compromised, and what
they are currently doing to protect their computers.
3.2 Methods
Though home computer users have little technical training, they do have some idea of the
security threats they face and the potential countermeasures; indeed, the market for home
security software is quite active. I conducted a qualitative inquiry into how home computer
users understand and think about potential threats to their computer and information security.
I began by conducting a series of 23 semi-structured interviews. Respondents were cho-
sen from a snowball sample (Kuzel, 1992) of home computer users evenly divided between
two midwestern U.S. cities in two different states. I began with a few home computer users
that I knew in these states. I then asked them to refer me to others in the area who might
be information-rich informants. I screened these potential respondents to exclude people
who had expertise or extensive training in computers or computer security. From those not
excluded, I purposefully selected respondents for maximum variation (Kuzel, 1992); I chose
respondents from a wide variety of backgrounds, ages, and socio-economic classes. Ages
ranged from undergraduate (19 years old) up through retired (over 70). Socio-economic
status was not explicitly measured, but ranged from recently graduated artist living in a small
efficiency up to a successful executive who owns a large house overlooking the main river
through town. Selecting for maximal variation allows me to document diverse variations in
folk models and identify important common patterns. (Kuzel, 1992)
After interviewing the chosen respondents, I asked them to refer me to more people
with home computers who might provide lots of useful information. In this way, I grew
my potential interview pool by “snowballing” out from an initial pool of people. This
snowballing through recommendations helped to ensure that the contacted respondents
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would information-rich (Kuzel, 1992) and cooperative. These new potential respondents
were also screened, selected, and interviewed.
The purpose of qualitative research is not to generalize to a population; rather, it is to
explore phenomenon in depth. To avoid misleading readers, I do not report how many users
possessed each folk model. Instead, I describe the full range of folk models I observed. To
develop depth in my exploration of the folk models of security, I used an iterative method-
ology as is common in qualitative research. (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007) I conducted
multiple rounds of interviews punctuated with periods of analysis and tentative conclusions.
The first round of 23 interviews was conducted in Summer 2007. Preliminary analysis
proceeded throughout the academic year, and a second round of 10 interviews was conducted
in Summer 2008, for a total of 33 respondents. This second round was more focused on
models of viruses, hackers, and identity theft, and specifically searched for negative cases
of earlier results. (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007) Interviews averaged around 45 minutes
each; they were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.
I developed an (IRB approved) interview protocol that pushes subjects to describe and
use their mental models, based on formal methods presented by D’Andrade (2005). I
specifically probed for past instances where the respondents would have had to use their
mental model to make decisions, such as past instances of security problems, or efforts
undertaken to protect their computers. By asking about instances where the model was
applied to make decisions, I enabled the respondents to uncover beliefs that they might not
have been consciously aware of. It also ensured that the respondents believe the model
enough to base choices on it.
My focus in the first round was broad and exploratory. I asked about any security-related
problems the respondent had faced or was worried about; I also specifically asked about
viruses, hackers, data loss, and data exposure (identity theft). I probed to discover what coun-
termeasures the respondents used to mitigate these risks. Since this was a semi-structured
interview, I followed up on many responses by probing for more information.
After some preliminary analysis of this data, I drew some tentative conclusions and had
many more questions that needed clarification. It seemed that many respondents had very
distinct mental models of ‘hackers’ and ‘viruses’ and that there were a couple of major types
of each model. To better elucidate these models and to look for negative cases, I conducted
10 more second-round interviews in a third midwestern U.S. city in a third state. For the
second round I developed a new (IRB approved) interview protocol. I focused more on
three specific threats that subjects face: viruses, hackers, and identity theft. I challenged
respondents to describe instances where these threats influenced their actions.
For this second round, I also used an additional interviewing technique: hypothetical sce-
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narios based on knowledge gained in the previous interviews. This technique was developed
to help focus the respondents and elicit additional information not present in the first round
of interviews. I presented the respondents with three hypothetical scenarios and asked the
subjects for their reaction. The three scenarios correspond to each of the three main themes
for the second round: finding out you have a virus, finding out a hacker has conpromised
your computer, and being informed that you are a victim of identity theft. Respondents
were asked to give initial reactions and also describe what they think might have happened
based on the very little information provided in the scenario; basically, they were asked to
describe what they thought would happen if all they knew was that they have a virus or were
compromised by a hacker. The interview guide and the details of the scenarios is available
in Appendix A.
For each scenario, after the initial description and respondent reaction, I would then add
an additional piece of information that appeared to not be salient in the mental models that I
discovered after the first round. For example, one preliminary finding from the first round
was that people never talked about the creation of computer viruses; it was unclear how
they would react to a computer virus that was created by people for a purpose. In the virus
scenario, I informed the respondents that the virus in question was written by the Russian
mafia. This scenario was taken out of recent news linking the Russian mafia to widespread
viruses such as Netsky, Bagle, and Storm.4
Another preliminary finding from the first round was that respondents always talked
about hackers as breaking in, looking around, and then leaving. No one mentioned the idea
of the hacker running an application on the compromised computer. In the hacker scenario,
I informed the respondents that the hacker has left a program running on their computer. I
asked the subjects if they thought this was reasonable, and what they thought the program
might do. Technically, hackers always have some program running on the compromised
computer, so this scenario is fairly realistic, even if it is outside of the mental model of some
respondents.
Finally, in the identity theft scenario, the first round of data collection could not accu-
rately identify what was included in the model of identity theft; some people thought that
using a credit card number without permission was identity theft and others thought that
would not be identity theft. To this end, the identity theft scenario started by informing the
respondent that they had been the victim of identity theft and asking them for their reaction
and what they thought they meant. Then I offered two clarifications: first, that what actually
happened was that someone had used their credit card number to make a large purchase;
and second, that someone had taken out a large loan in their name. After each clarification, I
4http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/33127.html?wlc=1244817301
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Table 3.1 A fragment of the data matrix from the initial analysis of Round 1. It includes a basic
descriptions of each subject’s statements for each of the major questions in the interview.
asked the respondent for their reaction and if that was indeed identity theft in their mind.
Once I had all of the data collected and transcribed, I conducted both inductive and
deductive coding of the data to look both for predetermined and emergent themes. (Miles
and Huberman, 1994) I began with a short list of major themes I expected to see from my
pilot interviews, such as information about viruses, hackers, identity theft, countermeasures,
and source of information. I identified and labeled (coded) instances when the respondents
discussed these themes. I then expanded the list of codes as I noticed interesting themes and
patterns emerging.
Once all of the data was coded, I summarized the data on each topic by building a data
matrix in the style of Miles and Huberman (1994). A fragment of this matrix can be seen in
Table 3.1. This data matrix helped me to identify basic patterns in the data across subjects, to
check for representativeness, and to look for negative cases. (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007)
After building the initial summary matrices, I identified patterns in the way respondents
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talked about each topic, paying specific attention to word choices, metaphors employed, and
explicit content of statements. Specifically, I looked for themes in which users differ in their
opinions (negative case analysis). These themes became the building blocks for the mental
models: each theme became a feature of a model, and a model consists of a collection of
features. I built a second matrix that matched subjects with these features of mental models.
The part of this matrix for the 10 participants in Round 2 can be seen in Table 3.2. This
second matrix allowed me to identify and characterize the various mental models that I
encountered. Table 3.3 Shows which participants from Round 2 had each of the 8 models. A
similar table was developed for the Round 1 participants, and is available in Appendix B. I
then took the description of the model back to the data, verified when the model description
accurately represented the respondents descriptions, and looked for contradictory evidence
and negative cases. (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007) This allowed me to update the models
with new information or insights garnered following up on surprises and incorporating
outliers. This was an iterative process; I continued updating model descriptions, looking for
negative cases, and checking for representativeness until I felt that the model descriptions I
had accurately represented the data. In this process, I developed further matrices as data
visualizations, some of which appear in my descriptions below.
3.3 Folk Models of Security Threats
I identified a number of different folk models in the data. Each of these folk models were
shared by multiple respondents in this study. I divide the folk models into broad categories
based on a distinction that most subjects possessed: 1) models about viruses, spyware,
adware, and other forms of malware which everyone refered to under the umbrella term
‘virus’; and 2) models about the attackers, referred to as ‘hackers,’ and the threat of ‘breaking
in to’ a computer.
Each respondent had at least one model from each of the two categories. For example,
Nicole5 believed that viruses were mischievous, and hackers are criminals who target big
fish. These models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a few respondents
talked about different types of hackers and would describe more than one folk model of
hackers.
Note that by listing and describing these folk models, in no way do I intend to imply
that these models are incorrect or bad in any way. They are all certainly imcomplete, and do
not exactly correspond to the way malicious software or malicious computer users behave.
But, as Kempton (1986) learned in his study of home thermostats, what is important is not























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Buggy Software x x




Support Crime x x x x
Graffiti x x x x
Burglar x x x






Table 3.3 A sample data matrix from near the end of the analysis. This matrix shows which folk
model was held by the Participants in Round 2. A similar table was developed for the participants in
Round 1.
how accurate the model is but how well it serves the needs of the home computer user in
making security decisions.
Additionally, there is not “correct” model that can serve as a comparison. Even security
experts will disagree as to the correct way to think about viruses or hackers. To show an
extreme example, Medin et al. (2006) conducted a study of expert fishermen in the North-
woods of Wisconsin. They looked at the mental models of both Native American fishermen
and of majority-culture fishermen. Despite both groups being experts, the two groups
showed dramatic differences in the way fish were categorized and classified. Majority-
culture fishermen grouped fish into standard taxonomic and goal-oriented groupings, while
Native American fishermen groups fish mostly by ecological niche. This illustrates how
even experts can have dramatically different mental models of the same phenomenon, and
any single expert’s model is not necessarily correct. However, experts and novices do tend
to have very different models; Asgharpour et al. (2007) found strong differences between
expert and novice computer users in their mental models of security. In Section 3.4 I discuss
how well each of the models work for my respondents.
Common Elements of Folk Models Most of the respondents made a distinction between
‘viruses’ and ‘hackers.’ To them, these are two separate threats that can both cause problems.
Some people believed that viruses are created by hackers, but they still usually saw them as
distinct threats. Some people realized this and tried to describe the difference; for example at
one point in the interview Irving tries to explain the distinction by saying “The hacker is an
individual hacking, while the virus is a program infecting.” After some thought, he clarifies
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his idea of the difference a bit: “So it’s a difference between something automatic and
more personal.” This description is characteristic of how many respondents think about the
difference: viruses are usually more programatic and automatic, where hacking is more like
manual labor, requiring the hacker to be sitting in front of a computer entering commands.
This distinction between hackers and viruses is not something that most of the respon-
dents had thought about; it existed in their mental model but not at a conscious level. Upon
prompting, Dana decides that “I guess if they hack into your system and get a virus on there,
its gonna be the same thing.” She had never realized that they were distinct in her mind, but
it makes sense to her that they might be related. She then goes on to ask the interviewer if
she gets hacked, can she forward it on to other people?
This also illustrates another common feature of these interviews. When exposed to new
information, most of the respondents would extrapolate and try to apply that information to
slightly different settings. When Dana was prompted to think about the relationship between
viruses and hackers, she decided that they were more similar than she had previously realized.
Then she began to apply ideas from one model (viruses spreading) to the other model (can
hackers spread also?) by extrapolating from her current models. This is a common technique
in human learning and sensemaking. (Russell et al., 1993) I suspect that many details of
the mental models were formed in this way. Extrapolation is also useful for analysis; how
respondents extrapolate from new information reveals details about mental models that are
not consciously salient during interviews. (Collins and Gentner, 1987; D’Andrade, 2005)
During the interviews I used a number of prompts that were intended to challenge mental
models and force users to extrapolate in order to help surface more elements of their mental
models.
3.3.1 Models of Viruses and other Malware
All of the respondents had heard of computer viruses and possessed some mental model
of their effects and transmission. The respondents focused their discussion primarily on
the effects of viruses and the possible methods of transmission. In the second round of
interviews, I prompted respondents to discuss how and why viruses are created by asking
them to react to a number of hypothetical scenarios. These scenarios help me understand
how the respondents apply these models to make security-relevant decisions.
All of the respondents used the term ‘virus’ as a catch-all term for malicious software.
Everyone seemed to recognize that viruses are computer programs. Almost all of the respon-
dents classify many different types of malicious software under this term: computer viruses,
worms, trojans, adware, spyware, and keyloggers were all mentioned as ‘viruses.’ The
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Table 3.4 Summary of folk models about viruses, organized by model features
respondents don’t make the distinctions that most experts do; they just call any malicious
computer program a ‘virus.’
However, a few subjects made a distinction one specific type of malware and rest of the
malware, which are still called ‘viruses.’ For example, Jack distinguishes ‘trojans’ from
other ‘viruses.’ To Jack, trojans are like their namesake; a trojan is “something that you’re
fooled into taking into your computer.” But viruses are “kind of hidden” programs that “at-
tach themselves to harmless files.” Viruses have an “automatic mechanism for reproducing”
where trojans don’t. Note that all other types of malware are still referred to as ‘viruses.’
Thanks to the term ‘virus,’ all of the respondents used some sort of medical terminology
to describe the actions of malware. Getting malware on your computer means you have
‘caught’ the virus, and your computer is ‘infected.’ Everyone who had a Mac seemed to
believe that Macs are ‘immune’ to virus and hacking problems.
In addition to the mental model that each respondent possessed, they seemed to know
one or two pieces of security advice that they believed came from security experts. Every
respondent in this study believed the advice to not open attachments from strangers. Every-
one believed that doing this will lead to getting a virus. However, different people fit this
information into their mental model in different ways.
Overall, I found four distinct folk models of ‘viruses.’ These models differed in a number
of ways. One of the major differences is how well-specified and detailed the model was,
and therefore how useful the model was for making security-related decisions. One model
was very under-specified, labeling viruses as simply ‘bad.’ Respondents with this model
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had trouble using it to make any kind of security-related decisions because the model didn’t
contain enough information to provide guidance. Two other models (the Mischief and Crime
models) were fairly well-described, including how viruses are created and why, and what the
major effects of viruses are. Respondents with these models could use them to extrapolate
many different situations and use them to make many security-related decisions on their
computer. Table 3.4 summarizes the major differences between the four models.
3.3.1.1 Viruses are Generically ‘Bad’
A few subjects had a very under-developed model of viruses. These subjects knew that
viruses cause problems, but these subjects couldn’t really describe the problems that viruses
cause. They just knew that they were generically ‘bad’ to get and should be avoided.
Respondents with this model knew of a number of different ways that viruses are trans-
mitted. These transmission methods seemed to be things that the subjects had heard about
somewhere, but the respondents did not attempt to understand these or organize them into
a more coherent mental model. Zoe believed that viruses can come from strange emails,
or from “searching random things” on the Internet. She says she had heard that blocking
popups helps with viruses too, and seemed to believe that without questioning. Peggy had
heard that viruses can come from “blinky ads like you’ve won a million bucks.”
Respondents with this model are uniformly unconcerned with getting viruses: “I guess
just my lack of really doing much on the Internet makes me feel like Im safer.” (Zoe)
A couple of people with this model use Macintosh computers, which they believe to be
“immune” to computer viruses. Since they are immune, it seems that they have not bothered
to form a more complete model of viruses.
Since these users are not concerned with viruses, they do not take any precautions against
being infected. These users believe that their current behavior doesn’t really make them
vulnerable, so they don’t need to go to any extra effort. Only one respondent with this model
uses an anti-virus program, but that is because it came installed on the computer. These
respondents seem to recognize that anti-virus software might help, but are not concerned
enough to purchase or install it.
3.3.1.2 Viruses are Buggy Software
One group of respondents saw computer viruses as an exceptionally bug-ridden form of
regular computer software. In many ways, these respondents believe that viruses behave
much like most of the other software that home users experience. But to be a virus, it has to
be ‘bad’ in some additional way. Primarily, viruses are ‘bad’ in that they are poorly written
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software. They lead to a multitude of bugs and other errors in the computer. They bring out
bugs in other pieces of software. They tend to have more bugs, and worse bugs, than most
other pieces of software. But all of the effects they cause are the same types of effects you
get from buggy software: viruses can cause computers to crash, or to “boot me out” (Erica)
of applications that are running; viruses can accidentally delete or “wipe out” information
(Christine and Erica); they can erase important system files. In general, the computer just
“doesn’t function properly” (Erica) when it has a virus.
Just like normal software, viruses must be intentionally placed on the computer and
executed. Viruses do not just appear on a computer. Rather than ‘catching’ a virus, com-
puters are actively infected, though often this infection is accidental. Some viruses come
in the form of email attachments. But they are not a threat unless you actually “click” on
the attachment to run it. If you are careful about what you click on, then you won’t get the
virus. Another example is that viruses can be downloaded from websites, much like many
other applications. Erica believes that sometimes downloading games can end up causing
you to download a virus. But still, intentional downloading and execution is necessary to
be infected with a virus, much the same way that intentional downloading and execution is
necessary to run programs from the Internet.
Respondents with this model did not feel that they needed to exert a lot of effort to
protect themselves from viruses. Mostly, these users tried to not download and execute
programs that they didn’t trust. Sarah intentionally “limits herself” by not downloading
any programs from the Internet so she doesn’t get a virus. Since viruses must be actively
executed, anti-virus program are not important. As long as no one downloads and runs
programs from the Internet, no virus can get onto the computer. Therefore, anti-virus
programs that detect and fix viruses aren’t needed. However, two respondents with this
model run anti-virus software just in case a virus is accidentally put on the computer.
Overall, this is a somewhat underdeveloped mental model of viruses. Respondents who
possessed this model had never really thought about how viruses are created, or why. When
asked, they talk about how they haven’t thought about it, and then make guesses about how
‘bad people’ might be the ones who create them. These respondents haven’t put too much
thought into their mental model of viruses; all of the effects they discuss are either effects
they have seen or more extreme versions of bugs they have seen in other software. Christine
says “I guess I would know [if I had a virus], wouldn’t I?” presuming that any effects the
virus has would be evident in the behavior of the computer. No connection is made between
hackers and viruses; they are distinct and separate entities in the respondent’s mind.
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3.3.1.3 Viruses Cause Mischief
A good number of respondents believed that viruses are pieces of software that are intention-
ally annoying. Someone created the virus for the purpose of annoying computer users and
causing mischief. Viruses sometimes have effects that are often much like extreme versions
of annoying bugs: crashing your computer, deleting important files so your computer won’t
boot, etc. Often the effects of viruses are intentionally annoying such as displaying a skull
and crossbones upon boot (Bob), displaying advertising popups (Floyd), or downloading
lots of pornography (Dana).
While these respondents believe that viruses are created to be annoying, they rarely have
a well-developed idea of who created them. They don’t naturally mention a creator for the
viruses, just a reason why they are created. When pushed, these respondents will talk about
how they are probably created by “hackers” who fit the Graffiti hacker model below. But the
identity of the creator doesn’t play much of a role in making security decisions with this
model.
Respondents with this model always believe that viruses can be “caught” by actively
clicking on them and executing them. However, most respondents with this model also
believe that viruses can be “caught” by simply visiting the wrong webpages. Infection here
is very passive and can come from just from visiting the webpage. These webpages are
often considered to be part of the ‘bad’ part of the Internet. Much like graffiti appears in the
‘bad’ parts of cities, mischievous viruses are most prevalent on the bad parts of the Internet.
While most everyone believes that care in clicking on attachments or downloads is
important, these respondents also try to be careful about where they go on the Internet. One
respondent (Floyd) tries to explain why: cookies are automatically put on your computer by
websites, and therefore, viruses being automatically put on your computer could be related
to this.
These ‘bad’ parts of the Internet where you can easily contract viruses are frequently
described as morally ambiguous webpages. Pornography is always considered shady, but
some respondents also included entertainment websites where you can play games, and web-
sites that have been on the news like “MySpaceBook” (Gina). Some respondents believed
that a “secured” website would not lead to a virus, but Gail acknowledged that at some sites
“maybe the protection wasn’t working at those sites and they went bad.” (Note the passive
tense; again, she has not thought about how site go bad or who causes them to go bad. She
is just concerned with the outcome.)
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3.3.1.4 Viruses Support Crime
Finally, some respondents believe that viruses are created to support criminal activities.
Almost uniformly, these respondents believe that identity theft is the end goal of the crimi-
nals who create these viruses, and the viruses assist them by stealing personal and financial
information from individual computers. For example, respondents with this model worry
that viruses are looking for credit card numbers, bank account information, or other financial
information stored on their computer.
Since the main purpose of these viruses is to collect information, the respondents who
have this model believe that viruses often remain undetected on computers. These viruses
do not explicitly cause harm to the computer, and they do not cause bugs, crashes, or other
problems. All they do is send information to criminals. Therefore, it is important to run an
anti-virus program on a regular basis because it is possible to have a virus on your computer
without knowing it. Since viruses don’t harm your computer, backups are not necessary.
People with this model believed that there are many different ways for these viruses
to spread. Some viruses spread through downloads and attachments. Other viruses can
spread “automatically,” without requiring any actions by the user of the computer. Also,
some people believe that hackers will install this type of virus onto the computer when they
break in. Given this wide variety of transmission methods and the serious nature of identity
theft, respondents with this model took many steps to try to stop these viruses. These users
would work to keep their anti-virus up to date, purchasing new versions on a regular basis.
Often, they would notice when the anti-virus would conduct a scan of their computer and
check the results. Valerie would even turn her computer off when it is not in use to avoid
potential problems with viruses.
3.3.1.5 Multiple Types of Viruses
A couple of respondents discussed multiple types of viruses on the Internet. These respon-
dents believed that some viruses are mischievous and cause annoying problems, while other
viruses support crime and are difficult to detect. All users that talked about more than one
type of virus talked about both of the previous two virus folk models: the mischievous
viruses and the criminal viruses. One respondent, Jack, also talked about a third type of virus
that was created by anti-virus companies, but he seemed like he felt this was a conspiracy
theory, and consequently didn’t take that suggestion very seriously.
For the respondents with multiple models, they generally would take all of the precau-
tions that either model would predict. For example, they would make regular backups in case
they caught a mischievous virus that damaged their computer, but they also would regularly
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Am I a target? Possibly Possibly No No
Table 3.5 Summary of folk models about hackers, organized by model features
run their anti-virus program to detect the criminal viruses that don’t have noticeable effects.
This fact suggests that information sharing between users may be beneficial; when users
believe in multiple types of viruses, they take appropriate steps to protect against all types.
3.3.2 Models of Hackers and Break-ins
The second major category of folk models describe the attackers, or the people who cause
Internet security problems. These attackers are always given the name “hackers,” and all of
the respondents seemed to have some concept of who these people were and what they did.
The term “hacker” was applied to describe anyone who does bad things on the Internet, no
matter who they are or how they work.
All of the respondents describe the main threat that hackers pose as “breaking in” to their
computer. They would disagree as to why a hacker would want to “break in” to a computer,
and to which computers they would target for their break ins, but everyone agreed on the
terminology for this basic action. To the respondents, breaking in to a computer meant that
the hacker could then use the computer as if they were sitting in front of it, and could cause
a number of different things to happen to the computer. Many respondents stated that they
did not understand how this worked, but they still believed it was possible.
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My respondents described four distinct folk models of hackers. These models differed
mainly in who they believed these hackers were, what they believed motivated these people,
and how they chose which computers to break in to. Table 3.5 summarizes the four folk
models of hackers.
3.3.2.1 Hackers are Digital Graffiti Artists
One group of respondents believe that hackers are technically skilled people causing mis-
chief. There is a collection of individuals, usually called “hackers,” that use computers to
cause a technological version of mischief. Often these users are envisioned as “college-age
computer types” (Kenneth). They see hacking computers as sort of digital graffiti; hackers
break in to computers and intentionally cause problems so they can show off to their friends.
Victim computers are just a canvas for their art.
When respondents with this model talked about hackers, they usually focused on two
features: strong technical skills and the lack of proper moral restraint. Strong technical
skills provide the motivation; hackers do it ”for sheer sport” (Lorna) or to demonstrate
technical prowess (Hayley). Some respondents envision a competition between hackers,
where more sophisticated viruses or hacks “prove you’re a better hacker” (Kenneth); others
see creating viruses and hacking as part of “learning about the Internet” (Jack). Lack of
moral restraint is what makes them different than others with technical skills; hackers are
sometimes described as people as maladjusted individuals who “want to hurt others for
no reason.” (Dana) Respondents will describe hackers as ”miserable” people. They feel
that hackers do what they do for no good reason, or at least no reason they can understand.
Hackers are believed to be lone individuals; while they may have hacker friends, they are
not part of any organization.
Users with this model often focus on the identity of the hacker. This identity – a young
computer geek with poor morals – is much more developed in their mind than the resulting
behavior of the hacker. As such, people with this model can usually talk clearly and give
examples of who hackers are, but seem less confident in information about the resulting
break-ins that happen.
These hackers like to break stuff on the computer to create havoc. They will intention-
ally upload viruses to computers to cause mayhem. Many subjects believe that hackers
intentionally cause computers harm; for example Dana believes that hackers will “fry your
hard drive.” (Dana) Hackers might install software to let them control your computer; Jack
talked about how a hacker would use his instant messenger to send strange messages to his
friends.
These mischievous hackers were seen as not targetting specific individuals, but rather
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choosing random strangers to target. This is much like graffiti; the hackers need a canvas
and choose whatever computer they happen to come upon. Because of this, the respondents
felt like they might become a victim of this type of hacking at any time.
Often, victims like this felt like there wasn’t much they could to do protect themselves
from this type of hacking. This was because respondents didn’t understand how hackers
were able to break into computers, so they didn’t know what could be done to stop it.
This would lead to a feeling of futility; “if they are going to get in, they’re going to get
in.” (Hayley) This feeling of futility echoes similar statements discussed by Dourish et al.
(2004).
One specific type of mischief that some respondents talked about is looking for secrets.
Usually, respondents envisioned hackers as going after some sort of government secrets or
high-profile corporate secrets, and the hackers did this for the thrill of it. Hackers interested
in secrets weren’t really looking to sell or profit from these secrets; rather, these secrets were
an end unto themselves. Respondents who believed that hackers were looking for secrets
felt that they were definitely not intentional targets of hackers because they didn’t have any
secrets stored on their computer. However, they felt that they might be hacked “by mistake.”
(Christine)
3.3.2.2 Hackers are Burglars Who Break Into Computers for Criminal Purposes
Another set of respondents believe that hackers are criminals that happen to use computers
to commit their crimes. Other than the use of the computer, they share a lot in common with
other professional criminals: they are motivated by financial gain, and they can do what
they do because they lack common morals. They would “break into” computers to look
for information much like a burglar will break into houses to look for valuables. The most
salient part of this folk model is the behavior of the hacker; the respondents could talk in
detail about what the hackers were looking for but spoke very little about the identity of the
hacker.
Almost exclusively, this criminal activity is some form of identity theft. For example,
respondents believe that if a hacker obtains their credit card number, for example, then
that hacker can make fraudulent charges with it. But the resondents weren’t always sure
what kind of information the hacker was specifically looking for; they just described it as
information the hacker could use to make money. Ivan talked about how hackers would
look around the computer much like a thief might rummage around in an attic, looking for
something useful. Erica used a different metaphor, saying that hackers would “take a digital
photo of everything on my computer” and look in it for useful identity information. Usually,
the respondents envision the hacker himself using this financial information (as opposed to
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selling the information to others).
One consequence of this targeting of information is that computers are not harmed by
the break-ins. Since hackers are simply looking for information, they generally do not cause
harm to the computer. They simply rummage around, “take a digital photo,” possibly install
monitoring software, and leave. The computer continues to work as it did before. The main
concern of the respondents is how the hacker might use the information that they steal.
These hackers choose victims opportunistically; much like a mugger chooses his victims,
these hackers will break into any computers they know about to look for valuable informa-
tion. Or, more accurately, the respondents don’t have a good model of how hackers choose,
and believe that there is a decent chance that they will be a victim someday. Gail talks about
how hackers are opportunistic, saying “next time I go to their site they’ll nab me.” Hayley
believes that they just choose computers to attack without knowing much about who owns
them.
Respondents with this belief are willing to take steps to protect themselves from hackers
to avoid becoming a victim. Gail tries to avoid going websites she’s not familiar with to
prevent hackers from discovering her. Jack is careful to always sign out of accounts and
websites when he is finished. Hayley shuts off her computer when she isn’t using it so
hackers cannot break into it.
Also, a few respondents believe that this type of hacker will sometimes leave viruses
on the computer to continue to collect information. For these people, running an anti-virus
program is important to catch these viruses and stop these hackers.
3.3.2.3 Hackers are Criminals who Target Big Fish
Another group of respondents had a conceptually similar model. This group also believes
that hackers are Internet criminals who are looking for information to conduct identity theft.
However, this group has thought more about how these hackers can best accomplish this goal,
and have come to some different conclusions. These respondents seemed willing to believe
in “massive hacker groups” (Hayley) and other forms of organization and coordination
among criminal hackers.
Most tellingly, this group believes that hackers only target the “big fish.” Hackers
primarily break into computers of important and rich people in order to maximize their
gains. Every respondent who holds this model believes that he or she is not likely to be a
victim because he or she is not a big enough fish. They believe that hackers are unlikely
to ever target them, and therefore they were safe from hacking. Irving believe that “I’m
small potatoes and no one is going to bother me.” They often talk about how other people
are more likely targets: “Maybe if I had a lot of money” (Floyd) or “like if I were a bank
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executive” (Erica).
For these respondents, protecting against hackers isn’t a high priority. Mostly they
find reasons to trust existing security precautions rather than taking extra steps to protect
themselves. For example, Irving talked about how he trusts his pre-installed firewall program
to protect him. Both Irving and Floyd trust their passwords to protect them. Basically, their
actions indicate that they believe in the speed bump theory: by making it slightly hard for
hackers using standard security technologies, hackers will decide it isn’t worthwhile to
target them.
3.3.2.4 Hackers are Contractors Who Support Criminals
Finally, there is a sort of hybrid model of hackers. In this view, hackers the people are very
similar to the mischievous graffiti-hackers from above: they are college-age, technically
skilled individuals. However, their motivations are more intentional and criminal. These
hackers are out to steal personal and financial information from people.
Users with this model show evidence of more effort in thinking through their mental
model and integrating the various sources of information they have. This model can be
seen as a hybrid of the mischievous graffiti-hacker model and the criminal hacker model,
integrated into a coherent form by combining the most salient part of the mischievous model
(the identity of the hacker) and the most salient part of the criminal model (the criminal
activities). Also, everyone who had this model expressed a concern about how hacking
works. Kenneth stated that he doesn’t understand how someone can break into a computer
without sitting in front of it. Lorna wondered how you can start a program running; she feels
you have to be in front of the computer to do that. This indicates that these respondents are
actively trying to integrate the information they have about hackers into a coherent model of
hacker behavior.
Since these hackers are first and foremost young technical people, the respondents
believe that these hackers are not likely to be the identity thieves. They believe that the
hackers are more likely to sell this identity information for others to use. Since the hackers
just want to sell information, the respondents reason, they are more likely to target large
databases of identity information such as banks or retailers like Amazon.com.
Respondents with this model believed that hackers weren’t really their problem. Since
these hackers tended to target larger institutions like banks or e-commerce websites, their
own personal computers weren’t in danger. Therefore, no effort was needed to secure their
personal computers.
However, all respondents with this model expressed a strong concern for who they do
business with online. These respondents would only make purchases or provide personal
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information to institutions they trusted to get the security right and figure out how to be
protected against hackers. These users were highly sensitive to third parties possessing their
data.
3.3.2.5 Multiple Types of Hackers
Some respondents believed that there were multiple types of hackers. Most of the time,
these respondents would believe that some hackers are the mischievous graffiti-hackers and
that other hackers are criminal hackers (using either the burglar or big fish model, but not
both). These respondents would then try to make the effort to protect themselves from both
types of hacker threats as necessary.
It seems that there is some amount of cognitive dissonance that occurs when respon-
dents hear about both mischievous hackers and criminal hackers. There are two ways that
respondents resolve this: the simplest way to resolve this is to believe that some hackers are
mischievous and other hackers are criminals, and consequently keep the models separate; a
more complicated way is to try to integrate the two models into one coherent belief about
hackers. This latter option involves a lot of effort making sense of the new folk model
that is not as clear or as commonly shared as the mischievous and criminal models. The
‘contractor’ model of hackers is the result of this integration of the two types of hackers.
3.4 Following Security Advice
Computer security experts have been trying to provide security advice to home computer
users for many years now. There are many websites devoted to doling out security advice,
and many technical support forums where home computer users can ask security-related
questions. There has been much effort to simplify the security advice so regular computer
users can easily understand and follow this advice.
However, many home computer users do not follow this advice. This is evident from the
large number of security problems that plague home computers. There is a disagreement
among security experts as to why this advice isn’t followed. Some experts seem to believe
that home users do not understand the security advice, and therefore more education is
needed. Others seem to believe that home users are simply incapable of consistently making
good security decisions (Cranor, 2008). However, none of these explanations explain which
advice does get followed and which advice does not.
The folk models described above help to understand how home computer users choose
which expert advice to follow and which advice to ignore. For example, respondents who
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believe that viruses are buggy software believe that it is not important to run anti-virus
software because if they simply refuse to run unknown software, then they will never get a
virus. By better understanding why people choose to ignore certain pieces of advice, we can
better craft that advice to have a greater effect.
In Table 3.6, I list 12 common pieces of security advice for home computer users. This
advice was collected from the Microsoft Security at Home website6, the CERT Home
Computer Security website7, and the US-CERT Cyber-Security Tips website8, and most
of it appears on multiple of these websites. This advice represents the distilled wisdom on
many computer security experts, and is the closest thing to an agreed-upon expert mental
model. This table then summarizes, for each folk model, whether that advice is important to
follow, helpful but not essential, or not necessary to follow.
To me, the most interesting entries indicate that users believe that a piece of security
advice is not necessary to follow (labeled ‘xx’ in the table). These entries show how home
computer users apply their folk models to determine for themselves whether following a
given piece of advice is important. Also interesting are the entries labeled ‘??’; these entries
indicate places where users believe that the advice will help with security, but do not see
the advice as so important that it must always be followed. Often users will decide that
following advice labeled with ‘??’ is too costly in terms of effort or money, and decide to
ignore it. Advice labeled ‘!!’ is extremely important, and the respondents feel that it should
never be ignored, even if following it is inconvenient, costly, or difficult.
3.4.1 Anti-Virus Use
Advice 1–3 has to do with anti-virus technology: Advice #1. states that anti-virus software
should be used; #2. states that the virus signatures need to be constantly updated to be able
to detect current viruses; and #3. states that the anti-virus software should regularly scan a
computer to detect viruses. All of these are best practices for using anti-virus software.
Respondents mostly use their folk models of viruses to make decisions about anti-virus
use, for obvious reasons. Respondents who believe that viruses are just buggy software also
believe it is not necessary to run anti-virus. This is because they think they can keep viruses
off of their computer by controlling what gets installed on their computer; they believe
viruses need to be executed manually to infect a computer, and if they never execute one
then they don’t need anti-virus.
Respondents with the under-developed folk model of viruses, who refer to viruses as
6http://www.microsoft.com/protect/default.mspx, retrieved July 5, 2005
7http://www.cert.org/homeusers/HomeComputerSecurity/, retrieved July 5, 2005
8http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/, retrieved July 5, 2005
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1. Use anti-virus ?? xx ?? !! !! xx xx
2. Keep anti-virus updated xx xx ?? !! xx
3. Regularly scan computer with anti-virus xx xx ?? !! xx
4. Use security software (firewall, etc.) xx ?? ?? ?? ?? xx
5. Don’t click on attachments !! !! !! !! !! !!
6. Be careful downloading from websites ?? !! ?? !! ?? ?? xx xx
7. Be careful which websites you visit xx !! ?? !! !! ?? !!
8. Disable scripting in web and email xx
9. Use good passwords ?? ?? xx
10. Make regular backups ?? !! xx !! xx xx xx
11. Keep patches up to date ?? xx !! !! !! xx xx
12. Turn off computer when not in use xx xx !! ?? !! xx xx
!! Important It is very important to follow this advice
?? Maybe Following this advice might help, but it isnt all that important to do
xx Not Necessary It is not necessary to follow this advice
Not Applicable
This model does not have anything to say about this advice, or there is
insufficient data from the interviews to determine an opinion
Table 3.6 Summary of Expert Security Advice. Each folk model responds to this advice differently.
generically ‘bad,’ also do not use anti-virus software. These people understand that viruses
are harmful and that anti-virus software can stop them. However, they have never really
thought about specific harms a virus might cause to them. Therefore, they don’t feel that
they have a strong reason to prevent those harms from occurring, and generally find it
unnecessary to exert the effort to follow the best practices around anti-virus software.
Finally, one group of respondents believe that anti-virus software can help stop hackers.
Users with the burglar model of hackers believe that regular anti-virus scans can be important
because these burglar-hackers will sometimes install viruses to collect personal information.
Regular anti-virus use can help detect these hackers.
3.4.2 Other Security Software
Advice #4 concerns other types of security software. This states that home computer users
should run a firewall or other type of Internet security suite. I think that most of the re-
spondents didn’t understand what this security software did other than a general notion of
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providing “security.” As such, no one included the security software as an important com-
ponent of their mental model. Respondents who held the graffiti-hacker or burglar-hacker
models believed that this software must help with hackers somehow, even though they don’t
know how, and would suggest installing it. But since they don’t understand how it works,
they wouldn’t consider it of vital importance. This highlights an opportunity for home user
education; I suspect that if these respondents better understood how security software help
protect against hackers, then they might be more interested in using it and maintaining it.
One interesting belief about this software comes from the respondents who believe
hackers only go after big fish. For these respondents, security software can serve as a
speedbump that discourages hackers from casually breaking into their computer. For these
people, they don’t care exactly how it works as long as it does something.
3.4.3 Email Security
Advice #5 is the only piece of advice about email on my list. It states that you shouldn’t
open attachments from people you don’t recognize. Everyone in my sample was familiar
with this advice and had taken it to heart. Everyone believed that viruses can be transmitted
through email attachments, and therefore not clicking on unknown attachments can help
prevent viruses.
3.4.4 Web Browsing
Advice 6-9 all deal with security behaviors while browsing the web. Advice #6 states that
users need to ensure that they only download and run programs from trustworthy sources.
Many types of malware are spread through downloads. Advice #7 states that users should
only browse webpages from trustworthy sources. There are many types of malicious web-
sites such as phishing websites, and some websites can spread malware simply by visiting
the site and executing the javascript on the website. Advice #8 states that users should dis-
able scripting like Java and JavaScript in their web browsers. Often there are vulnerabilities
in these scripts, and some malware uses these vulnerabilities to spread. And Advice #9
suggests using good passwords so attackers cannot guess their way into your accounts.
Overall, many respondents would agree with most of this advice. However, no one
seemed to understand the advice about web scripts; indeed, no one seemed to even under-
stand what a web script was. Advice #8 was largely ignored because it wasn’t understood.
Everyone seemed to think that they need to be careful in choosing what to download.
Downloads were strongly associated with viruses in the respondents’ minds. However, only
users with well-developed models of viruses (the Mischief and Support Crime models)
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believed that viruses can be “caught” simply by browsing web pages. People who believed
that viruses were buggy software didn’t see browsing as dangerous because they weren’t
actively clicking on anything to run it.
While all of the respondents expressed some knowledge of the importance of passwords,
few went to extra efforts to make good passwords. Everyone seemed to know that, in general,
passwords are important, but they couldn’t really say why. Respondents with the graffiti
hacker model would sometimes put extra effort into their passwords so that mischievous
hackers couldn’t mess up their accounts. And respondents who believed that hackers only
target big fish thought that passwords could be an effective speed bump to prevent hackers
from casually targeting them.
Respondents who believed in hackers as contractors to criminals uniformly believed that
they were not targets of hackers and were therefore safe. However, the one piece of advice
they did strongly believe in was to be careful in choosing which websites to do business with.
Since these hackers targeted web businesses with lots of personal or financial information, it
is important to only do business with websites that are trusted to be secure enough to resist
these hackers.
3.4.5 Computer Maintenance
Finally, Advice 10-12 is all about computer maintenance. Advice #10 suggests that users
make regular backups in case some of their data is lost or corrupted. This is good advice for
both security and non-security concerns. Advice #11 states that it is important to keep the
system patched with the latest updates to protect against known vulnerabilities that hackers
and viruses can exploit. Advice #12 echoes the old maxim that the most secure machine is
one that is turned off.
Different models had dramatically different suggestions as to which types of mainte-
nance are important and which don’t need to be done. For example, mischievous viruses
and graffiti hackers can cause data loss, so users with those models feel that backups are
very important. But users who believe in more criminal viruses and hackers don’t feel that
backups are necessary; hackers and viruses are trying to steal information, not to delete it.
Patching is one of the more important pieces of advice; hackers and viruses need vulner-
abilities to exploit. Most of the respondents only experience patches through the automatic
updates feature in their operating system or in their software. Respondents mostly associated
the patching advice with hackers; respondents who felt that they would be a target of hackers
also felt that patching was an import tool to stop hackers. Respondents who believed that
viruses are buggy software feel that viruses also bring out more bugs in other software on the
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computer; patching the other software makes it more difficult for viruses to cause problems.
3.5 Botnets and the Folk Models
This study was inspired by the recent rise of botnets as a strategy for malicious attackers.
Understanding the folk models that home computer users employ in making security deci-
sions helps us to understand why botnets are so successful. Modern botnet software seems
designed to take advantage of gaps and security weaknesses in multiple folk models.
I begin by listed a number of stylized facts about botnets. These facts are not true about
all botnets and botnet software, but these facts are true about many of the recent and large
botnets.
1. Botnets attack third parties. When a botnet viruses compromises a machine, that
machine only serves as a worker. That machine is not the end goal of the botnet. The
owner of the botnet intends to use that machine (and many others) to cause problems
for third parties.
2. Botnets only want the Internet connection Most botnets compromise computers be-
cause they are connected to the Internet. The only real resources that are used is the
Internet connection; botnet software rarely takes up much space on the hard drive,
rarely looks at any data on the hard drive, rarely occupies much memory, and usually
don’t use much CPU.
3. Botnets don’t directly harm the host computer. Most botnet software, once installed,
does not directly cause harm to the machine it is running on. It consumes resources,
but often botnet software is configured to only use the resources at times they are
otherwise unused (like running in the middle of the night). They might indirectly
cause harm to the host machine; for example, the botnet may send out spam that
ends up cluttering the host machine’s inbox. Some botnets even install patches and
software updates so that other botnets cannot also use the computer.
4. Botnets spread automatically through vulnerabilities. Botnets often spread through
automated compromises. The will automatically scan parts of the internet for vulnera-
ble, compromise any vulnerable computers it finds, and install copies of the botnet
software on the compromised computers. This does not require any human interven-
tion; neither the botnet owner nor the zombie owner nor the vulnerable computer
owner need to be using their computer at the time.
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Botnets attack third parties ? – – – – – – –
Botnets only want the Internet connection – – – – ? – – –
Botnets don’t harm the host computer – – – + – + + +
Botnets spread automatically ? – – – – – – –
+ Makes sense It makes sense that malicious software / attackers would do this
? Related This statement is odd, but viruses or hackers might do something similar
– Unusual Malicious software / attackers that do this would be unusual
Table 3.7 How each folk model would probably react to the stylized facts about botnets
These stylized facts about botnets are not true for all botnets, but for many of the current,
large, well-known, and well-studies botnets around now. I believe that botnet software
effectively takes advantage of the limited and incomplete nature of the folk models of home
computer users. Table 3.7 illustrates how each model does or does not incorporate the
possibility of each of the stylized facts about botnets.
Botnets attack third parties None of the hacker models would predict that compromises
would be used to attack third parties. Respondents who held both the Big Fish mental
model and the Contractor mental model believe that, since hackers don’t want anything on
the computer, they would target other computers and leave the unwanted computer alone.
Respondents with the Burglar model believe that they might be a target, but only because
the hacker wants something that might be on their computer. They would believe that once
the hacker either finds what they were looking for, or cannot find anything interesting, then
the hacker would leave. Respondents with the Graffiti model believe that hacking and
vandalizing the computer is the end goal; it would never cross their mind to then use that
computer to attack third parties.
None of the respondents used their virus models to discuss potential third parties either.
A couple of respondents with the Viruses are Bad model mentioned that once they got a
virus, it might try to “spread.” However, they had no idea how this spreading might happen.
Spreading is a form of harm to third parties; however, it is not the coordinated and intentional
harm that botnets cause. Respondents who employed the other three virus models never
mentioned the possibility of spreading beyond their computers. They were mostly focused
on what the virus would do to them, and not to how it might affect others. Also, since they
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had an idea of how viruses spread, those ideas only involved spreading through webpages
and email. They don’t run a webpage on their computer, and no one acknowledged that a
virus could use their email to send copies out.
Botnets only want the Internet connection No one in this study could conceive of a
hacker or virus that only wanted the Internet connection of their computer. The three crime-
based hacker models (Burglar, Big Fish, and Contractor) all believe that hackers are actively
looking for something stored on the computer. All the respondents with these three models
believed that their computer had (or might have) some specific and unique information that
hackers wanted. Respondents with the Graffiti model believed that computers are a sort of
canvas for digital mischief. I would guess that they might believe that botnet owners would
only want the Internet connection; they believe there is nothing unique about their computer
that makes hackers want to do digitial graffiti on their computer.
None of the virus models would have anything to say about this fact. Respondents with
the Viruses are Bad model and the Buggy Software models didn’t attribute any intentionality
to viruses. Respondents with the Mischief and Support Crime models believed viruses were
created for a reason, but didn’t seem to think about how using the computer to spread.
Botnets don’t harm the host computer This is the one stylized fact on this list that any
respondents explicitly mentioned. Respondents with the Supports Crime model believe
that viruses might try to hide on the computer and not display any outward signs of their
presence. Respondents who employ one of the other three virus models would find this
strange; to them, viruses always create visible effects. To users with the Mischief model,
these visible effects are the main point of the virus!
Additionally, the three folk models of hackers that relate to crime all include the idea that
a ‘break in’ by hackers might not harm the computer. To these respondents, since hackers are
just looking for information, they don’t necessarily want to harm the computer. Respondents
who use the Graffiti model would find compromises that don’t harm the computer to be
strange, as the main purpose of ‘breaking into’ computers is to vandalize them.
Botnets spread automatically The idea that botnets spread without human intervention
would be strange to most of the respondents. Almost all of the respondents believed that
hackers had to be sitting in front of some computer somewhere when they were “breaking
into” computers. Indeed, two of the respondents even asked the interviewer how it was
possible to use a computer without being in front of it.
Most of the respondents belived that viruses generally also required some form of human
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intervention in order to spread. Viruses could be ‘caught’ by visiting webpages, or by
downloading software, or by clicking on emails. But all of those required someone to do
something with the computer. Only one subject explicitly mentioned that viruses can “just
happen” (Jack). Respondents with the Viruses are Bad model knew that viruses could spread,
but didn’t know how they might spread. These respondents might not be surprised to learn
that viruses can spread without human intervention, but probably haven’t thought about it
enough for that fact to be salient.
Summary Botnets are extremely cleverly designed software. They take advantage of
home computer users by operating in a very different manor from the one conceived of by
the respondents in this study. The only stylized fact listed above that a decent number of my
respondents would recognize as a property of attacks is that botnets don’t cause harm to the
host computer. And not everyone in the study would believe this; some respondents had a
mental model where not harming the computer wouldn’t make sense.
This analysis illustrates why eliminating botnets is so difficult. Many home computer
users probably have similar folk models to the ones possessed by the respondents in this
study. If so, then many home computer users never really thought about a number of the
properties of the attacks that botnets use to compromise home computers. Some of the
properties even seem counter to the way that home computer users believe that hackers and
viruses operate.
3.6 Limitations and Moving Forward
By conducting a series of 33 interviews, I was able to discover 8 different folk models that
describe how home computer users view security threats against their computers. These
models are divided into two major classes of threats: viruses and hackers. Respondents
viewed the threats against their computer in a number of different ways, and the folk models
are common descriptions of these threats. The respondents would make decisions using
some sort of mental model in their head; I have tried to understand these mental models,
and classified them into these 8 folk models.
In this study, I am able to describe in detail a number of common folk models of threats
to home computer systems. Previous literature (Dourish et al., 2004; Gross and Rosson,
2007) was able to describe some basic beliefs help by non-technical users; I provide structure
to these theories by understanding how home computer users group these into semi-coherent
mental models in their mind. However, the models I discovered are not exhaustive; other
home computer users might have other models. Indeed, the snowball sampling method
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increases the chances that I will interview users with similar folk models. Additionally,
this method makes it impossible for me to estimate how prevalent each model is. Such
information might be useful in understanding nationwide vulnerability to botnets, but I leave
such estimates to future work.
Understanding these folk models helps to explain why users strictly follow some se-
curity advice from computer security experts and ignore other advice. Respondents in
this study had different beliefs about possible threats, and consequently chose different
countermeasures based on those beliefs. Some countermeasures are important since they
directly address threats in a way that the respondents understand. Other countermeasures
seem unnecessary either because the respondent doesn’t understand how the countermeasure
provides security, or because they don’t believe that there is a treat.
Understanding these folk models also helps to understand why botnets work so well on
the Internet today. Botnets have a number of properties that would seem unusual to many of
the respondents. Since respondents are not looking for threats like botnets, they often do not
take the appropriate countermeasures that are necessary to prevent being compromised and
becoming part of a botnet.
There is some hope. A number of respondents believed multiple types of viruses, or mul-
tiple types of hackers. When a respondent believed that there are multiple types, they tended
to take all of the countermeasures that were appropriate for both types. This suggests that
educating users about the multiple types of threats they truly face might help them to make
better security decisions. However, the Contractor model illustrates one possible problem
with this approach. Respondents with the Contractor model seemed to have integrated two
different models of hackers into a single, new idea of hackers. They then used this model
to reason that they were not likely to be a victim of hackers, and consequently take few
precautions to protect themselves.
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Chapter 4
Designing for Side Effects: Tagging on
Delicious
Users of social computing websites both produce and consume the information found on the
site. This creates a novel problem for web-based software applications: how can website
designers induce users to produce information that is useful for others? I study this question
by looking at how people use the social bookmarking website del.icio.us. I find that users
in our sample use metadata reflecting who bookmarked a webpage to support information
seeking rather than free-form keyword metadata (tags). I explain this finding by describing
how del.icio.us provides a private incentive to contribute both bookmarks and tags, and
makes these publicly available as a side effect of contribution. However, differences in
the private incentive to contribute bookmarks and the incentive to contribute tags make
bookmarks more useful to consumer than tags.
Websites like flickr.com, YouTube.com, and del.icio.us belong to a growing category
of Internet applications broadly referred to as social computing sites. The information
presented by these sites is generated by the users themselves, rather than by an agency
officially tasked with that responsibility, like a publishing company or news distributor.
Users of social computing websites play two roles with respect to the information the sites
contain: they can act as producers (contributors of information) or consumers (seekers of
information). Consider the social bookmarking website del.icio.us (http://del.icio.us), which
provides the capability for users to bookmark web pages and associate user-generated meta-
data, or tags, with them (Marlow et al., 2006). Information consumers are able to discover
new web pages using del.icio.us only because the actions of information producers caused
the web pages to be stored by del.icio.us in the first place, through the action of saving
the web pages as bookmarks. This aspect of social computing — that the community of
information consumers benefits from the contributions of information producers — presents
an interesting research question. How is it that producers, possibly through actions intended
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to serve purely personal goals, come to generate information that is beneficial for the larger
community?
An incentive is something that influences a person to choose one course of action over
the alternatives. Often, incentives are thought of in terms of money: a bonus for meeting
performance goals, or a subject payment in an experiment. However, incentives can be
anything that induces expectations of a future positive outcome or benefit. For example, the
capability of del.icio.us to store one’s bookmarks in such a way that they are available from
any computer connected to the Internet provides an incentive to use del.icio.us rather than
a web browser’s built-in bookmark feature. Incentives are important in social computing
because they motivate or induce certain types of actions and not others. By identifying
the pattern of incentives, we better understand how user behaviors leads to both individual
outcomes and a community of users.
In this chapter, I focus on del.icio.us as a case study of the incentives in social comput-
ing. Many researchers have studied del.icio.us as the canonical example of a collaborative
tagging system for information management (Golder and Huberman, 2006). In particular, I
am interested in how the technical design of del.icio.us provides incentives to producers that
influence the information they contribute, and how those incentives then indirectly influence
how consumers use the site. I discovered that even when users contribute for only individual,
non-social reasons, a social information system can succeed in producing a broadly-useful
pool of shared information.
In the first study, Emilee Rader and I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews
with twelve regular users of del.icio.us. We discovered that metadata reflecting the identity of
the user who saved a web page, which is automatically associated with each bookmark when
it is created, was more useful for consumers’ information seeking than the user-generated
tags. We also discovered that producers created public bookmarks and tags for their own
private, and not social, reasons.
This finding was surprising; existing literature has suggested that most tags are applied
for social reasons. (Golder and Huberman, 2006; Halpin et al., 2007; Sen et al., 2006)
To better understand and validate this finding, we conducted two subsequent studies that
empirically examined tagging patterns on del.icio.us and that tested these competing hy-
potheses about how users choose tags. For Study 2, we conduct a large-scale empirical
analysis that uses a logistic regression on tag choice data to look for evidence to test three
different hypotheses about tag choices. In Study 3, we use a computer model that assumes
different tag choice strategies for simulated users and compares the resulting aggregate
tagging patterns to empirical patterns on del.icio.us. In both of these studies, our findings
confirm the qualitative results from Study 1.
68
Finally, I will bring in some theory from economics to characterize the incentives that
are important in del.icio.us. I refer to this pattern of incentives as the Side Effect Mechanism
and describe the major difficulty in implementing this mechanism: incentive alignment.
del.icio.us provides a great illustration of this mechanism because one feature on del.icio.us
(bookmarks) implements this well, and another feature (tags) implements this poorly. I use
del.icio.us as a case study to illustrate that even when users contribute for only individual,
non-social reasons, a social information system can succeed in producing a broadly-useful
pool of shared information. Applying this theory from economics allows me to generalize
these findings beyond the single social computing system studied, and provide concrete
design recommendations for future social computing systems.
4.1 An Overview of del.icio.us
I begin with a description of the interface and functionality of del.icio.us, and some impor-
tant definitions. Users of del.icio.us willing to create an anonymous user account are able
to save web pages as bookmarks. When bookmarks are created, it is possible to associate
tags with them. In del.icio.us, tags are restricted to a single word, and plurals or different
spellings of the same word are treated as different tags. When a user creates a new bookmark,
the interface displays recommended tags selected automatically by the system, your tags
which are all tags chosen in the past by that user, and popular tags for that particular web
page. Each bookmark has the following metadata automatically associated with it when
it is created: the username of the information producer, the tags selected, and the date
and time the bookmark was created. Users may also associate a “note”, or text string,
with each bookmark they create. By default, bookmarks and tags in del.icio.us are public
information. See Figure 4.1(a)1 for an example of the del.icio.us interface for creating, or
posting, bookmarks.
Information consumers browsing del.icio.us view subsets of bookmarks delimited by
metadata such as a particular username, tag, or user-tag combination. For example, clicking
the tag library in the list of popular tags on del.icio.us displays all web pages bookmarked
by any del.icio.us user having the tag library associated with them. Each user account is
a collection of bookmarks delimited by the the username of the person who created the
bookmarks, as shown in Figure 4.1(b)1. For example, this particular user posted the ASIS&T
call for papers to del.icio.us one day ago using the tags “asist, conference, 2007, paper.” The
metadata for a given web page can also be displayed including the usernames of all the users
1Yahoo! updated the user interface of del.icio.us in August 2008. Since all of our data is from before this
interface change, I only discuss the old interface to the system.
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(a) The old interface for posting bookmarks (b) One user’s collection of bookmarks
Figure 4.1 The user interface of del.icio.us
who bookmarked it, and all the tags ever associated with it. That specific web page has been
bookmarked by 12 other people. All metadata items are also links that filter collections of
bookmarks. The Library of Congress home page has been bookmarked in del.icio.us by
3060 different users, and tagged “library” by 13372.
If a registered user wishes to follow the latest bookmarks saved by a certain person,
or having a certain tag, it is possible to “subscribe” to users, or tags, or a combination.
New bookmarks satisfying these metadata criteria will then appear in the user’s account.
For example, if user A subscribes to user B, every time B posts a new bookmark it will
appear when user A clicks the “your network” link in her account (see Figure 4.1(b)). In
addition, registered users can subscribe to all bookmarks associated with a given tag, or
all bookmarks posted by a given user with a given tag, which can be accessed by clicking
on the “subscriptions” link. Finally, the “links for you” link returns bookmarks that have
been saved by one user specifically for another user, using a special tag format supported by
del.icio.us.
4.2 Existing Knowledge
A number of researchers have studied del.icio.us and the phenomenon of social bookmarking
and tagging. User-contributed metadata, also known as tags, provides a means for users to
associate personally salient keywords or labels with content items (Golder and Huberman,
2006; Sen et al., 2006), enabling them to find the content later via information they are pre-
disposed to recognize or recall (Lansdale, 1988). Tagging helps users “package” information
2As of April 17, 2008
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for future information seeking and reuse (Markus, 2001). Tagging has not only been applied
to personal information management; many collaborative tagging systems have appeared in
recent years. Collaborative tagging systems such as del.icio.us and citeulike.org publicly
expose individual users’ associations between content items and tags, thereby providing
visibility into words others have used to tag similar items. Grudin (2006) suggests that
collaborative tagging can be a low-effort solution for shared or group information manage-
ment, because it does not require that users try to conform to a controlled vocabulary or
organization scheme. However, in other shared information management contexts, the effort
required to “package” information is necessary for effective information reuse (Markus,
2001).
In a collaborative tagging system, users interested in viewing content tagged a certain
way by others can browse the system by clicking on tags. Tags provide the “information
scent” (Pirolli, 2005) that connects users with information; they are the infrastructure upon
which information organization and finding takes place, allowing users to navigate by
recognition rather than recalling terms by which to search (Teevan et al., 2004). This has
interesting consequences when one considers the potential utility of tags for information
management, finding, and re-finding. If a given tag is applied in an inconsistent manner
among many users, more variability exists in the content items displayed when a user
browses to a particular tag. For example, users tend to assign high-level tags like “tech-
nology” and personal tags like “to read”, as well as words like “apple” that can refer to a
computer or a fruit, and “photos” or “pictures” which are synonyms.
Golder and Huberman (2006) and Halpin et al. (2007) found (for del.icio.us) that the
frequency distribution of tags used on a given site tends to stabilize over time, with a definite
most appropriate tag and a power-law distribution of tags. A number of researchers have
tested designs to improve tagging systems like the one in del.icio.us (Rivadeneira et al.,
2007; Sen et al., 2006; Storey et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2006) Ames and Naaman (2007)
qualitatively studied motivations for tagging in Flickr. They found tags were used both for
organization and to communicate, and were used both for selfish and for social purposes.
However, they could not identify to what extent tags were social or selfish (as we do in
Studies 2 and 3). Also, they did not describe how tags were used by information consumers,
and could not link motivations for creating tags to the eventual use of tags by consumers.
By default, bookmarks and tags in del.icio.us are public information, meaning that any
user may browse any other user’s bookmarks and tags without logging in to the system.
This makes the del.icio.us corpus a public good, meaning that the information in the corpus
can be accessed simultaneously by everyone without ever being used up (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995).One of the distinguishing features of public goods is that most of the time individuals
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N=12 (8 Men, 4 Women) Mean Std. Dev.
Total Bookmarks 950 1030.77
Total Unique Tags 400 356.08
Months Using del.icio.us 15.90 8.73
New Bookmarks / Week 16.15 25.35
New Bookmarks / Day 2.31 3.62
Table 4.1 Description statistics about our respondents
are insufficiently motivated to contribute to public goods relative to what would be best
for the community or society as a whole. The standard solution is to have the government
provide the good, as is the case for the provision of national defense (the army). Voluntary
provision of public goods by individuals is an open research problem (Andreoni, 2006).
Chapter 2 reviews existing work that looks at ways to get around this problem.
4.3 Study 1: Interviews
We conducted twelve 1.5 hour semi-structured interviews with users of del.icio.us during the
summer of 2006. All had used del.icio.us for multiple months, and had posted bookmarks
to del.icio.us about once a week on average, for a number of months before the study took
place. Five of the twelve users were masters students or recent graduates at a local university,
three were PhD students, one was an undergraduate, and three were information technology
professionals. A number of del.icio.us users responded to fliers posted around campus and to
Internet postings on del.icio.us. Our respondents were selected from that group to represent
a wide variety of usage patterns. For example, the total number of bookmarks that had
been saved by a single respondent varied from a low of 60 to a high of approximately 3000.
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on respondents’ use of del.icio.us. Our selection of
these particular respondents for participation in the study reflects our desire to collect data
on a range of possible user behaviors.
Our sample consisted of highly educated, tech-savvy students and professionals, mean-
ing that our respondents were likely to be more sophisticated and self-aware in their use
of technology than the average home computer user. As a result, our respondents were
probably more likely to have attempted to optimize their personal usage of del.icio.us, to
expend more effort when taking advantage of the available functionality, and to tolerate
usability problems. In addition, respondents self-selected for participation when they re-
sponded to our advertisements, which indicates that their use of del.icio.us was salient and
important enough to them that they were willing to volunteer to participate. We believe that
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by requiring that respondents be regular users of del.icio.us for several months before the
study took place, such bias was unavoidable. Our choice to use this criterion was motivated
by a desire to interview people who could recall many past instances when they had used
del.icio.us. Our sample therefore consists of users likely to have explored different features
and uses, biasing our results toward a greater variety of activities than might be seen in a
sample obtained based on different criteria.
The interviews were comprised of three phases. In the first phase, the interviewer asked
general questions about respondents’ use of del.icio.us: how often do you use it?, what do
you bookmark?, how do you choose tags?, and similar high-level questions. The second
phase consisted of ten search tasks. Respondents were sequentially presented with ten
printouts of web pages found in del.icio.us, five bookmarked by the respondent and five
bookmarked by others, and were to find them using only del.icio.us. They were instructed
to think aloud during this task. Results from the search tasks will not be presented here,
though the search tasks did prompt the users to make a number of interesting statements
about bookmarking and tagging that are presented below, and were followed up on later in
the interview. Finally, the interviewer looked through the respondent’s bookmark history
and asked questions designed to trigger retrospective accounts of past actions, such as “Tell
me about that bookmark. What were you doing when you posted it? Tell me about the tags
you chose.” The interviewer also asked detailed questions about respondents’ use of their
subscriptions.
We recorded and transcribed the interviews, and then coded them using Atlas.ti . The
analysis was conducted in a similar fashion to Miles and Huberman (1994). We began
informal coding with a list of classes of behavior upon which to focus, and the code list
developed as we proceeded. We identified the stated motivations of the respondents, their
actions undertaken using del.icio.us, and the outcomes of those actions, including inferences
about benefits they received from using del.icio.us. We created summary matrix displays
showing which users exhibited similar motivations, subsequently undertook which actions,
and received which benefits. Coding for these three things (among others) enabled us
to locate and analyze possible instances where incentives had influenced behavior. It is
important to note that this is not an exact science; unlike monetary incentives that can be
explicitly identified and measured, identifying factors that induce users to behave in certain
ways is an interpretive process. Nevertheless, and despite the varied usage patterns of our
respondents, patterns emerged that present intriguing evidence for the role incentives play
in del.icio.us. I describe these patterns below.
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4.3.1 Results: Producer and Consumer Incentives
In this section we present data describing three categories of activities users engage in
with del.icio.us: bookmarking, tagging, and information seeking. We first describe the
motivations that our respondents, in their role as information producers, cite as the reasons
they contribute to del.icio.us. Following a distinction made by the respondents, we divide
these results into the two distinct producer actions: contributing bookmarks and contributing
tags. Next, we discuss how these respondents seek information on del.icio.us, using both
information from bookmarks and information from tags. This allows us to see how the
user-contributed information is or is not used by consumers on del.icio.us.
4.3.1.1 Why Bookmark?
Respondents reported three motivations for bookmarking web pages:
• To keep track of useful or interesting web pages
• To access bookmarks from multiple computers
• To achieve recognition from other users of del.icio.us
The most frequently mentioned motivation for bookmarking web pages, reported by
all respondents, was a desire to have ready access to information they found useful or
interesting. In other words, our respondents created bookmarks so that they could easily go
back to useful or interesting webpages in the future. As one respondent, Fred3, said: “Any
web page that I see, I basically ask myself this question: Would I ever have a need to find
this again? And if I do I just bookmark it.” Seven respondents valued the ability to access
their bookmarks from multiple computers. Zoe liked del.icio.us “because I’m working on
so many computers and so many different places, it’s just made me so much more efficient.
It’s a lifesaver.” The action of bookmarking leads to the benefit of future access to web
pages that contain information important enough to save. The websites that respondents
bookmarked can be divided into a few categories:
• Topics of specific interest to the respondent. Alice bookmarked PhD programs she
was interested in, Bob bookmarked library-related links, Charlie liked web pages on
sustainability, Oscar looked for programming skills, and Marvin was into community
informatics. There is a different list of topics for every respondent in our study.
3Respondents have been given pseudonyms. While some of the pseudonyms are the same, none of the
respondents from Chapter 3 participated in this study.
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• Pages the respondent hasn’t finished reading. Bob described this well: “Umm, I get
to that situation where I have eight different tabs open in Firefox and I don’t really
have the time to read them all. [I’ll] get up and do something, and so I’ll bookmark
a bunch of them so that I will go back and in theory read them later.” Half of these
respondents expressed discontent over rarely actually returning to these web pages.
• Reference information or Internet tools. Nine respondents reported this type of book-
mark. Examples include new search engines (Zoe), manuals for the Perl programming
language (Oscar and Eve), and collaborative text editors (Eve).
• Novelty or funny web pages. Fred described these well: “something funny. Like a
video of a monkey sniffing itself or something. [...] Or if something is just, oh wow
cool, a new story or an amusing rant or a blog post, those get added [...] as well.”
Another example was when Victor bookmarked a web page “because I thought the
title was so ridiculous.”
In addition, eight out of twelve respondents were motivated to bookmark in order to share
web pages with other people. They used a variety of actions for sharing: using del.icio.us’
built-in tag convention for sending a bookmark to another user (the “for:username” tag );
using a previously agreed-upon tag; through knowing that a particular person subscribes
to their bookmarks; or just by explicitly instructing the person to go look for it. As Trent
explained, he does this “in lieu of [having] sent an e-mail with a link in it.” Five of those
eight, however, reported that this motivation only rarely influenced them to bookmark.
Two respondents bookmarked webpages they had created in del.icio.us, hoping that other
del.icio.us users would find them. Also, one respondent mentioned that he believes some
search engines index del.icio.us, and therefore bookmarks pages to increase their Google
PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998).
Social recognition only functions as a motivation when the respondent is aware of other
users’ behavior, and in our sample this awareness varied widely. One respondent seemed
to have no knowledge of others looking at his bookmarks. Seven respondents had directly
told other people to look at their bookmarks, either indicating a specific bookmark, as
in: “I couldn’t remember the Dog Judo link but I wanted him to check it out, so I sent
him a thing that said Go to Dog Judo on my del.icio.us” (Eve), or directing them to a
certain tag. Six respondents were aware of other people who subscribed to their bookmarks;
often this awareness came from conversations with friends. Isaac was aware of his friends’
subscription because, “Like every so often [a friend] will say I noticed you bookmarked that
or [another friend] will say that.”
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Half of our respondents mentioned a general awareness that the bookmarks they post are
public information, unless they specify that they should be private. However, they reported
that this awareness rarely affected their actions. For example: “I do make a conscious
decision of whether or not I want it to be available for everybody but 98% of the time I don’t
care” (Charlie); and, “Even though [my use of del.icio.us ] is oriented primarily towards
myself, the awareness that it is public never goes away totally” (Trent).
Bookmarks on del.icio.us are primarily created to enable re-finding by the bookmark
creator. This is a personal, not social, reason for bookmarking. Some bookmarks are created
for more social reasons, but the majority of bookmarks created by our respondents are done
so without explicit social purpose.
4.3.1.2 Why Tag?
The most frequently mentioned motivation respondents reported for tagging was to organize
their bookmarks and make it easier to find them if the need arose in the future. Respondents
chose specific tags that they believed would help them organize their bookmark collection,
using one or more heuristics to help choose good tags:
• Reuse tags he or she has applied before
• Create and adhere to mental rules or definitions for specific tags
• Choose terms he or she expects to search on
These are only heuristics, do not apply in all cases, and were not necessarily applied con-
sistently. In addition, these data are self-reports, and other unconscious factors could also
be a factor in the choice of tags. We have attempted to verify the reports by manually
looking through the respondents’ tagging history and by eliciting multiple instances of the
heuristics during the interviews. Respondents’ observable bookmarking behaviors indicate
a fair amount of compliance with these heuristics.
To reuse tags, respondents placed priority on choosing tags they had used in the past.
“I will not add a new tag until I have a group of things that I think it goes with,” said Zoe.
Reusing old tags made bookmarks easier to find by minimizing the length of respondents’
tag lists, which most respondents reported searching visually when they wanted to find a
bookmark. Victor described the problem his tag reuse solves: “One of my friends, his tag
section goes way down below the fold [...] I’m like ‘How on earth do you sort through all
these?’ And he said, ‘I don’t.”’
Respondents often reported that they had created mental rules or definitions for a number
of their tags. For example, Peggy described some of her rules about tags related to blogs:
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“So ‘blogs’ are usually other people’s blogs. ‘Blogging’ would be something that’s about
usually research about blogging. And then if it’s something like Blogger for instance or
LiveJournal then that would be a ‘bloggingtool’.” The creation of such rules is also observed
in the creation of folders in which to store documents (Whittaker and Sidner, 1996). One
advantage of tags over folders is that a single web page can be associated with multiple tags,
reducing the effort involved with selecting one and only one location for the information.
However, the more tags one has, the more overhead is involved with remembering the
mental rules necessary for distinguishing among tags. People in general have a hard time
being consistent within themselves with the tags they use (Golder and Huberman, 2006),
and our respondents were no different. Trent described how he handles this problem: “I’ve
been sloppy in the past about ‘collaborative’ and ‘collaboration,’ so this one got tagged as
both. Just to make sure that I got coverage.” Eve’s tags showed the same characteristics:
“So, apparently I’m using funny and humor interchangeably. And not reliably. So I should
remember that when I’m looking for something funny I also label it humor. [...]” Respon-
dents also had problems with singular/plural tags and with misspelled tags, all of which
create the situation where multiple tags have the same logical meaning. Respondents with
this problem speak of their tags as “dirty,” and the occasional act of fixing this as “cleaning”
their tags.
Seven respondents reported choosing tags by trying to guess what terms they might
search on in the future to find the bookmark. Eve described her thought process:
Interviewer: So, on the librarian video, how did you choose the tags that you
have?
Eve: [...] If I were looking for this again [...] I’d be like ”What was that video
about the girl in the library with that guy?” But girl and guy is not very helpful,
so library and video won.
In addition to the general heuristics for tag choice, respondents used tags to represent person-
ally meaningful categories. Five respondents used tags to represent projects. Whenever they
bookmarked a web page related to the project, one of the tags they applied to that web page
was the project name. Marvin said this was “so I can just type in [the project name] and the
things related to that project should show up if I did it right.” Ten of the twelve respondents
used tags for purely personal purposes. This is similar to the “functional purpose” tags of
(Golder and Huberman, 2006), and the personal tags of (Sen et al., 2006b). Rather than
placing icons in a specific location on the desktop to serve as reminders, as seen in some
personal information management studies (Barreau and Nardi, 1995; Bruce et al., 2004),
respondents were using special tags as reminders within del.icio.us. The “toread” tag is
one example, used by at least four of the respondents. Fred had a “wishlist” for items he
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would like to purchase. Both Alice and Oscar used the tag “research” to refer to web pages
they wanted to remember to return to, because they might be useful for their respective
research projects. The meaning of all of these tags is highly subjective and personal, and are
of limited usefulness to others because they can only be correctly interpreted and understood
by someone who knows the context.
Four out of twelve respondents mentioned consciously choosing tags for non-personal
reasons. These respondents are each trying to build a collection of links on a specific topic
that would benefit the larger community of del.icio.us users. Alice said, “I tag everything
on [topic of interest] I can find. I was so frustrated when I started working with this stuff
that I just couldn’t find information about it. [...] There aren’t many places for it so I have
probably collected one of the larger lists out there.” For Alice, wanting to be known as an
expert on the topic of the collection seemed to be an additional motivation beyond personal
organization and community benefit.
4.3.1.3 Information Seeking
Information consumers are the beneficiaries of others’ bookmarking activities when they
view other users’ bookmarks on del.icio.us. Our respondents primarily consumed informa-
tion from del.icio.us by browsing to find new information. Browsing has been defined as,
“a kind of searching in which the initial search criteria or goals are only partially defined
or known in advance” (Chang and Rice, 1993). We found that respondents’ goals for
discovering new information fell into three categories:
• Novelty information: “something entertaining” (Alice)
• Topical information: web pages relevant to specific topics
• Social information: updates on friends’ interests and activities via following their
bookmarks
The most common action for novelty discovery, undertaken by seven respondents, was
subscribing to someone they knew personally. Eve said: “I check out [my friend, he] always
goes to really interesting places,” and, Bob reported that he subscribed to a friend because
he, “like[s] to pick his brain for cool stuff.” Respondents’ topical discovery, or seeking web
pages that contain information on specific topics, was either a one-time seeking behavior,
or it was due to a continuing interest in a particular topic. For one-time seeking, the most
common action was to click on the “Saved by X other people” link. Seven respondents
reported doing this for topical discovery, and two for novelty discovery. Bob described his
reasoning:
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“If I’ve got something bookmarked myself and it says ‘Saved by X other people,’
then it’s more intriguing to me if there are very few people who have saved
it. Because that means I belong to this elite group of people who actually find
this stuff interesting. [...] And then maybe I’ll take a look at what else they’ve
bookmarked because if they are interested in something that I’m interested in
maybe they’ve got other stuff that I’d be interested in.”
For continuing topical discovery, respondents again reported subscribing to someone
they knew in real life, or occasionally someone who is famous, or was found using “Saved
by X other people.” As Zoe discovered, “certain people tend to tag the same things I’m
interested in.” Five respondents reported looking on del.icio.us for other users with similar
interests, and then subscribing to those users.
Finally, social discovery was used to keep tabs on friends. Peggy reported, “It’s just
interesting to see what it is they’re up to. So like my friend Matt who’s not in the area
anymore, I think I get a sense of what it is he’s doing.” Mostly, this occurred through
subscriptions. Charlie gives a good example:
“One of my friends [...] just got, you know, just got a job in San Francisco. I
believe she went out to interview and then all of a sudden there’s like 50 links
to apartment search in San Francisco, and a few days later she tells me oh I got
the job in San Francisco and I was like I know.”
Figure 4.2 illustrates the number of respondents who reported using each of the six
information discovery strategies we found. Interestingly, most respondents reported taking
advantage of user metadata for information seeking and discovery, but not tag metadata.
Tags were rarely mentioned in the context of novelty and social discovery. Because as-
sessments of how interesting or entertaining a web page might be is a subjective judgment,
it is reasonable to expect that it would be difficult to find a tag which would capture this
assessment accurately. Only one respondent reported browsing tags (like “funny”), or
searching del.icio.us, for novelty purposes. In social discovery, it is the user and not the
topic that is of interest. Since bookmarks are always automatically associated with the user
who bookmarked them, tags are not needed. Finally, a number of respondents struggled
with using tags for topical discovery; three explicitly mentioned trying to do so and failing
find the information they wanted. Only one respondent (Trent) subscribed to any tags, and
he was careful to block users (using del.icio.us’s built-in blocking mechanism) who post
too many bookmarks for which “none of [them] fit my definition.” Only four respondents
mentioned browsing del.icio.us for one-time topical discovery by looking at specific tags,





















Figure 4.2 This chart depicts the number of respondents who used these strategies for information
discovery. The light bars are tag-related strategies, and the dark bars are username-related strategies
4.3.2 Incentives on del.icio.us
One of the difficulties in understanding why people contribute to social computing systems
is that each person is not acting alone. One person’s decision is potentially affected by
everyone else on the site, and everyone else’s decision is in turn potentially affected by that
one persons decision. For example, some respondents reported occasionally bookmarking
webpages because they know others will see them and comment on them. This strategic
interplay between contribution decisions can make understanding the reasons behind these
decisions difficult.
Del.icio.us is a good system to study because many bookmarks on del.icio.us are created
for non-strategic reasons. The reason that our respondents reported for creating the majority
of their bookmarks is a personal reason; they choose to bookmark webpages because they
think that they might go back and visit the website sometime in the future. And tags are cho-
80
sen mainly to support this potential re-finding activity; our respondents’ tags are chosen to
help themselves organize their own collection of bookmarks. Users create these bookmarks
for personal reasons, and would continue to do so even if no one else ever saw them.
However, del.icio.us makes all bookmarks public by default. Anyone can go and view
the bookmarks from anyone else. This public benefit is a side effect of the personal reason
that users contribute bookmarks. The main purpose of creating bookmarks isn’t to benefit
others, but this benefit happens because of the default-to-public nature of the site.
This suggests a general mechanism, or design pattern, for inducing user contributions.
Social computing systems can provide a strictly private benefit from contributions — poten-
tially by emulating something that users already do on their computers like store bookmarks
— and then make these contributions public by default. Making things publicly available as a
side effect of normal, personal use can encourage contribution to a social computing system.
4.3.2.1 Clutter, Tags, and Language Use
However, del.icio.us also illustrates how simply making data public is not enough. As seen
in Figure 4.2 and discussed above, most of our respondents found it very difficult to use tags
for information discovery. There are a number of problems with tags related to language use
that complicate their use for discovering new information.
First, in describing the ‘vocabulary problem,’ Furnas et al. (1987) state that random pairs
of people choose the same label for an object on average about 20% of the time. This robust
tendency results from humans’ imprecise and flexible use of language in conversational
settings, where meaning is determined by the surrounding context and complex communi-
cation processes. This suggests that if two random users having different knowledge and
situational contexts create a tag for the same web page, there is an 80% chance on average
that they will NOT choose the same tag. Similarly, if an information consumer attempts to
imagine what tags might be applied to the information she is looking for, chances are low
that she will end up using the same words to represent the same concepts in the same way
as others have used them.
Second are synonymy (multiple words that can be used interchangeably in the same
context) and plurals/tenses of the same word. Eight respondents noticed this problem just
within their own bookmarks! Trent mentioned being “sloppy in the past about ‘collaborative’
and ‘collaboration”’ and Charlie “at one point had ‘recipe’ and ‘recipes’.” Del.icio.us uses
exact word matches, so the difference here is important. Third is polysemy, or one word that
has many meanings or senses. One example of this is the word “python” which can represent
a snake, a programming language, or a comedy troupe from Great Britain. Expertise can
also contribute to polysemy: people with different levels of expertise may end up using the
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same word to represent different concepts — their internal rules for what that tag represents
are different. Fred subscribed to the ‘security’ tag, but as a computer security expert he
found many of the bookmarks with that tag too basic for him. However, a novice user would
likely find the web pages he bookmarked under ‘security’ too advanced. Finally, users of
del.icio.us tend to create tags that have personal or figurative meanings only they have the
requisite contextual knowledge to understand, like the “research” or tag several respondents
used to refer to their respective projects.
These characteristics of language use produce a great deal of variability in the collections
of bookmarks delimited by specific tags. Many tags have a problem with clutter; each new
bookmark associated with a given tag makes it more difficult to find things with that tag,
in much the same way that each new book or paper on a desk makes it more difficult to
find anything on that desk. This is particularly important for ongoing discovery through
subscriptions, where the rate of incoming bookmarks depends on how prolific others are;
too many bookmarks make it difficult to keep with the influx of web pages. Fred reported
experiencing this when he subscribed to the tag “security”: “I’d go through it [the list of
bookmarks], but I end up skipping a lot.” Ultimately, he stopped using that subscription
altogether. We did not find evidence that our respondents attempted to match their internal
rules for tag use with the ways in which others applied the same tags, which exacerbates the
clutter problem with all the language use issues just discussed.
4.3.2.2 Incentive Alignment
The bookmarks associated with a given user don’t normally have a major clutter problem;
most users have a reasonable number of bookmarks and can find things when needed.
Above, we describe how a number of respondents look through other users’ collections of
bookmarks to discovery new information. Rarely were clutter problems mentioned. If we
look back at how our respondents choose bookmarks, we get some insight as to why a user’s
bookmarks have relatively little problem with clutter.
Bookmarks represent an implicit endorsement of a web page; when an information
producer chooses to post a web page to del.icio.us, she is in effect making a statement that
this particular web page is valuable enough to save for later. Since our respondents wanted
to re-find webpages using del.icio.us, they reported that they were careful to only bookmark
pages worth re-finding. This limits the clutter associated with each username; if they were
to bookmark many more websites, re-finding would be more difficult. Our respondents had
an incentive to limit the clutter associated with their usernames: they wanted to be able to
easily re-find webpages in the future.
For bookmarks, the incentives faced by our respondents in their role as information
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producer were aligned with the information discovery goals our respondents reported in
their role as consumers. As producers, our respondents were motivated to create collections
of bookmarks associated with their usernames with limited clutter. This limited clutter is
an important property for other users who, acting as information consumers, look at these
collections for discovery. Fred even indicated some level of awareness of this incentive
alignment: “[I have] mostly just a general sense of the network, of people. If someone tracks
the stuff I post enough, then I assume they care about the eigenvalues of the things that I
like. And so I figure if I like it, they’ll like it.”
When contributing tags, on the other hand, our respondents did not report attempts to
limit system-wide clutter associated with those tags. None of our respondents checked to
see how other users on del.icio.us had used a tag. Our respondents indicated that rarely they
would use a tag in the same way they had seen others use it on del.icio.us, meaning that
the only time that other users’ tag choices did influence the choices of our respondents, it
actually lead to increased clutter. Our respondents simply chose tags primarily for personal
organization. There is little incentive to expend the effort required to combat the naturally
occurring system-wide problems of clutter resulting from overuse of tags, the vocabulary
problem, polysemy and synonymy. The incentives for contributing tags are not aligned with
the goals of our respondents as information consumers because they do not induce users to
limit the system-wide clutter associated with tags.
This discussion illustrates an important lesson for designing social computing systems.
When users are motivated to contribute for personal reasons and those contributions are
shared as a side effect, it is important to ensure that incentives for contribution are aligned
with the goal of the users as information consumers. This was accomplished for bookmarks
and usernames on del.icio.us by only allowing users to associate bookmarks with their own
username. This ensured that the collection of bookmarks associated with that username is
relatively clutter-free and useful, because making that collection useful is exactly why those
bookmarks were contributed in the first place. del.icio.us failed to do this with tags because
anyone can associate a bookmark with any tag. Without further incentives to limit clutter on
those tags, users naturally overused tags and contributed to a number of problems associated
with normal language use. This resulted in multiple orders of magnitude more bookmarks
associated with many tags than are found associated with most users. For most tags in the
system, the collection of bookmarks associated with those tags is very cluttered and difficult
to use for information discovery; indeed none of our respondents use tags for this goal.
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4.3.2.3 Locus of Control
One way to think about the difference between bookmarks and tags is that the collection
of bookmarks created by a given user is under a single locus of control (the user), while
no central authority oversees the way words are used as tags. When choosing tags for a
new bookmark, none of our respondents expressed concern about increasing the number
of bookmarks system-wide already associated with a tag. This difference is similar to the
architectural difference between the Internet and Cable TV (MacKie-Mason et al., 1996).
Content-aware architectures, like cable television, have the capacity for editorial control
over the content they deliver. Cable TV providers have an incentive to make it easier for
information consumers to find something interesting to watch: the larger the audience, the
more money they make. They do so by limiting their offerings to those that appeal to a
majority of their audience. Content-blind architectures like the Internet have no single locus
of control, and therefore there is no agent for whom an incentive to limit content offerings
might exist. Anybody can create a web page or a podcast and make it available on the
Internet, but there is no guarantee that it will ever be noticed. Bookmarks in del.icio.us
are content-aware: because an information producer has control over his collection of
bookmarks, he also has an incentive to place limits on that collection so that it meets his
needs. No such incentive exists for tags, which are content-blind.
4.3.2.4 Bookmarks are Endorsements
However, there is yet one more wrinkle to be considered. Bookmarks represent an implicit
endorsement of a web page; when an information producer chooses to post a web page
to del.icio.us, she is in effect making a statement that this particular web page is valuable
enough to save for later. There is no similar assumption for tags. del.icio.us provides
information on which tags and bookmarks are currently popular based on aggregate usage
statistics; however, this method of creating a valuation for tags fails for topical discovery
because popular tags are often the noisiest. Because tagging doesn’t necessarily represent
an endorsement, aggregating tagging decisions doesn’t have the same effect as aggregating
bookmarking decisions.
4.3.3 Conclusion
Del.icio.us users control their bookmark history, and receive benefits from using del.icio.us
to store their bookmarks. This has effectively aligned the incentives for information pro-
ducers with the needs of information consumers on del.icio.us. However, no one controls
the uses of a tag, and the natural tendencies of language use preclude the applications of
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tags in a way that is beneficial for information seeking. We have shown how the design and
architecture of del.icio.us, a social computing website, can influence the choices that users
make.
As social computing becomes more pervasive, it is important to understand how such
systems can induce users to contribute. Future systems that rely on user-contributed con-
tent will need to provide users with an incentive to contribute, and might be able to learn
from del.icio.us. Users can be induced to contribute by providing a private usefulness to
contributions and having the social nature of the contributed information be an intentional
side effect. However, systems that use this design pattern need to ensure that the incentives
for information production are aligned with the needs and goals of users who consume
the information. Misaligned incentives can lead to users abandoning certain features (like
the use of tags for information discovery), and possibly to halting the use of the system
altogether.
4.4 Study 2: Large-scale Data
In Study 1, we claim that the incentives to contribute bookmarks are aligned with the
goals of del.icio.us users as they consume information, but the incentives for creating tags
are not aligned. However, this claim was based on data from only 12 users. This is not
enough data to make the claim that enough users of del.icio.us are making bookmarking and
tagging decisions in this way to actually affect the available information on del.icio.us for
consumption.
Additionally, our finding that users choose tags for personal reasons was very surprising.
Much existing literature claims that users of del.icio.us are following a social process for
choosing tags (Golder and Huberman, 2006; Halpin et al., 2007; Sen et al., 2007), and
that this social process results in a large-scale bottom-up classification system. This claim
is so widespread that it has spawned new terminology (“social tagging” for the process,
“folksonomy” for the classification system) complete with a Wikipedia page4.
To address these two issues, we undertook two studies that examined a very large dataset
of tagging choices on del.icio.us. Our objective in this research was to look for a pattern of
evidence indicating that either a social process or a personal process is affecting tag choices.
Golder and Huberman (2006) speculate that users might imitate each others’ tag choices;
in other words, tag choices might be influenced by tags that had been previously applied
to the same web page by other users. However, it is reasonable to assume that there might
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_tagging. The same page describes both social
tagging and folksonomy.
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be other sources of influence on users’ tag choices having to do with personal information
management goals. In Study 1, we found that users of del.icio.us chose tags for organizing
and re-finding their own bookmarks according to mental rules and definitions they had
established, striving for consistency within their own personal “controlled vocabulary”.
Finally, users might desire to expend as little effort as possible when choosing tags, and
simply select tags suggested in the del.icio.us posting interface when they create a new
bookmark.
We conducted a multiple-method investigation that teases apart these competing expla-
nations. In Study 2, we performed a logistic regression analysis of a large sample from
del.icio.us, in which we evaluated the influence of several predictors on users’ tag choices.
In Study 3 we developed a computer model in which we assume a number of different tag
choice strategies one at a time, and compare aggregate patterns in model results against the
same measures in the data from del.icio.us5. We found evidence that users’ tag choices are
not a result of imitation of others’ tags; instead, they follow an individual, idiosyncratic
pattern. This suggests that personal information management goals, rather than social
processes, have a greater influence on tag choices in del.icio.us. This finding supports
our claims in Study 1 and helps to give credence to the idea of incentive alignment (and
mis-alignment) on del.icio.us.
4.4.1 Background and Hypotheses
Furnas et al. (1983) began the study of tagging with their paper on the vocabulary problem,
in which they reported that when two random people create a label for the same document,
they choose identical words less than 20% of the time. Tagging has been studied in a
mobile context (Ames and Naaman, 2007) and for photos (Marlow et al., 2006). It has
been applied to personal information management (Cutrell et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2008),
and in a corporate environment (Millen et al., 2007, 2006). Researchers want to better
understand tagging patterns (Halpin et al., 2007; Golder and Huberman, 2006) and make
recommendations for how users might produce better tags (Farooq et al., 2007; Sen et al.,
2007, 2006). We focus here in particular on the findings of Golder and Huberman (2006)
and Sen et al. (2006), because they motivated and guided our investigation most directly.
Golder and Huberman (2006) argue that users’ tag choices are not random; instead,
consensus emerges for which tags best represent a given web page. They show that web
pages bookmarked in del.icio.us demonstrate a stable frequency distribution following a
power-law pattern in which the same few tags are chosen by many users, while most other
5Our database schema and code for our computer model and analyses may be downloaded from
http://bierdoctor.com/papers/cscw08
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tags are selected by only one or two people. Golder and Huberman hypothesize that when a
user bookmarks a web page in del.icio.us, their tag choices are influenced by tags that had
been previously applied to that web page by others (p. 206). They illustrate this imitation
hypothesis through a mathematical construct: the stochastic urn of Polya (Page, 2006). For
users to behave according to Polya’s Urn, they must randomly select tags from the tag distri-
bution for a given webpage. This means that if the tag “library” makes up 13.5% of all tags
applied to the Library of Congress home page, users must somehow choose “library” 13.5
times out of 100. However, the del.icio.us interface does not provide users with sufficient
information about the tag frequency distribution to behave according Polya’s Urn. Rather,
users are presented a nonrandom, biased sample in the posting interface: the recommended
and popular tags (see Figure 4.1(a)). Golder and Huberman suggest that imitation occurs
via these tags presented in the interface, but do not address the distinction between biased
sampling methods and the unbiased random draws of Polya’s Urn. In our computer model
we implemented several different forms of sampling from the tag distribution, allowing us
to clarify the difference.
Sen et al. (2006) manually assigned tags from MovieLens, a movie recommendation
system, to one of three classes: factual, subjective, or personal. Through a field experiment
manipulating the information displayed in the MovieLens tagging interface, they found
that users imitated tag classes when tagging movies, and concluded that “community influ-
ence plays an important role in vocabulary” (p186). In our analysis we focus on a more
fine-grained dependent variable, individual users’ exact tag choices, rather than subjectively
assigning tags to classes. This allows us to test competing hypotheses from the literature
using a larger dataset containing tag choices made over a longer period of time, albeit
without the experimental control afforded by the ability to make changes to the interface.
The difference in the unit of analysis (tag classes versus exact tag choices) allows us to
potentially reach different conclusions. As we will show below, our findings contradict those
of Sen et al.; we found little support for the hypothesis that users imitate one another’s exact
tag choices.
4.4.2 Methods
Over two weeks in January 2007, we downloaded the entire bookmark and tag history for
approximately 20,000 different web pages in del.icio.us. The web pages were chosen by
periodically sampling the “recently posted” and “popular” del.icio.us pages. We randomly
chose 30 web pages from our sample that had been bookmarked by at least 100 users. Then,
in June 2007 we downloaded the complete public bookmark and tag histories for all of the
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approximately 12,000 users who had ever bookmarked any of these 30 web pages. In other
words, our dataset contains the complete tag histories for 30 web pages bookmarked in
del.icio.us, as well as tag histories for all users who ever bookmarked any of those 30 web
pages as of June 2007.
4.4.2.1 Model and Data Setup
We used a logistic mixed model regressionAgresti (2007) to evaluate the influence of three
hypotheses on users’ tag choices:
1. Imitation: Users imitate tags that previous users have applied to a web page
2. Organizing: Users re-use tags that they have applied to other web pages
3. Recommended: Users choose tags that are suggested via the del.icio.us posting
interface6
If the imitation hypothesis has a strong influence, tags previously associated with a given
web page by other users will be correlated with tag choices. We can assume a social process
is at work, and a socially constructed vocabulary is truly emerging. If tagging behavior is
determined more by Organizing than by Imitation, then we expect tags a user has applied
before to other web pages to be correlated with tag choices. Finally, if the Recommended
hypothesis is true, users’ tag choices are influenced by tags suggested in the del.icio.us
posting interface.
We model the dependent variable — the choice of a single tag — as a yes/no choice.
We lack evidence indicating what tags users have or have not viewed prior to choosing
tags; therefore we cannot directly observe when a user makes a ‘no’ choice. We make a
simplifying assumption that each user made a yes/no choice about all tags that had been
applied to the particular web page at the time our data were collected. Basically, we assumed
that each tag on our list of observed tags was at least implicitly considered by all subjects
and a yes/no choice was made about it. We attempt to estimate the probability of saying
“yes” to each tag as a function of three different factors included in the model as predictors.
First, if Imitation is shown to have strong influence on a particular tag choice by a particular
user, then the probability that a tag is chosen should be higher if the word has been used
previously as a tag. This would be reflected in the model as a large, positive coefficient
for the “used.onsite” predictor. Second, if Organizing is shown to have strong influence,
6It is difficult to concretely specify this hypothesis because del.icio.us does not reveal its method for
selecting tags to suggest, and the method may have changed multiple times.
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the probability that a word is chosen should be higher if the word has been previously
used by that user as a tag for a different web page. This would be reflected by a large,
positive coefficient for “used.byuser”. For the Recommended hypothesis, the algorithm
for selecting tags to display in the posting interface is not publicly known; however, some
experimentation with del.icio.us has led us to believe that a tag is much more likely to be
recommended if it has both been applied previously to that web page and used previously
by the user. Therefore, we approximated the Recommended hypothesis by including an
interaction term that is 1 when both used.onsite = 1 and used.byuser = 1.7
The model also includes several controls for other factors that may influence the prob-
ability of choosing a tag. Some tags seem to “fit” the web page better than others (i.e.,
library for the Library of Congress home page), and are more frequently applied. Since the
data include repeated measures for each tag, it is important to control for per-tag variability
using fixed effects. This is represented in the model by “tag dummys”.8 Also, some users
tend to assign more tags to their bookmarks than others; we controlled for this within-user
variability using random effects. Finally, we account for temporality in the used.onsite
variable.9 This variable is 0 for early bookmarks and 1 for later bookmarks, switching after
a tag is used. We believe used.onsite controls for any autocorrelation that might result from
the previous use of certain tags, and therefore a time series model is not necessary. The
model is set up as follows:
tag chosen = f (used.onsite,used.byuser, interaction,
tag dummys, random effect(user))
7We do not claim that this interaction term fully identifies the recommended hypothesis. We only claim
that if the Recommended hypothesis describes a large number of tag choices, then the coefficient on the
interaction term will be positive and large. There are many other effects than can also cause a large positive
coefficient here, including a non-linear interaction between the first two hypotheses. However, this is OK. The
Recommended hypothesis predicts a large coefficient; therefore if we do not observe a large coefficient, that
casts doubt on the Recommended hypothesis. Since we aren’t sure how del.icio.us chooses tags to recommend,
this is at best a weak test and we hesitate to draw strong conclusions from it.
8Each row of the data table is associated with a user considering a single tag. The dummy variable for
‘library’ is 1 for the rows when the user is choosing whether to apply the tag ‘library’ and 0 when the user is
considering other tags.
9This does not necessarily account for temporality in the used.onsitevariable; it is possible that users only
took notice when a tag had been used many times before. We ran a number of alternative models with a
‘number of previous applications’ variable (and some polynomial combinations of this variable to account
for non-linearity) and the results were substantially similar to those we report below. We chose to report the
simple binary used.onsitevariable because it is easier to interpret and because there seemed to be little effect
from additional applications of a tag.
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4.4.3 Logistic Regression Results
We estimated the model using maximum likelihood estimation, separately for each of the 30
web pages in the study. This allowed us to compare web pages and determine whether an
overall pattern exists.10 We summarize the estimates for the model coefficients in Table 4.2.
In logistic regression, the dependent variable is dichotomous, meaning it takes only two
possible values. The model is used to estimate the probability of the dependent variable
taking on the value 1, given a set of predictors. This probability is represented in the form
of odds. For example, a probability of 50% can be represented as 1:1 odds, and 2:1 odds
translates to a 66% probability. The coefficients for the predictors in a logistic regression
model are the natural logarithm of odds ratios, or the ratio of the odds of one possible
outcome divided by the odds of another outcome. In the model, our predictors are dummy
variables that can be either 1 or 0. Therefore, the coefficient represents the natural logarithm
of the ratio between the odds that a tag will be chosen when the value of the predictor is 1 to
the odds when the predictor is 0. If the coefficient is positive, then the probability of a tag
being chosen is greater when the value of the predictor is 1 (or true). If the coefficient is
negative, the probability of a tag being chosen is greater when the predictor is 0 (or false).
To interpret the results in Table 4.2, first focus on the columns for used.onsite,
used.byuser, and Interaction. The values in these columns are the coefficient estimates
for predictors representing our three hypotheses. The size of the coefficient and whether it is
positive or negative indicates whether that predictor increases or decreases the probability
of a given tag being chosen, and how strong the effect is. From these coefficients, we can
calculate the predicted probability of being chosen for each tag applied to a given web page.
An example of fitted probabilities for “101 Cookbooks” is presented in Table 4.3. The
remaining columns of Table 4.2 present the results of statistical tests to evaluate the validity
of our model.
The three hypotheses are operationalized as follows:
1. Imitation: When bookmarking a given web page, users choose tags previously associ-
ated with that web page by other users (Used.onSite > 0)
2. Organizing: When bookmarking a given web page, users choose tags they had applied
before to other web pages (Used.byUser > 0)
3. Recommended: When bookmarking a given web page, users choose tags suggested
in the del.icio.us posting interface, operationalized in our model as tags that had
10Combining the data for all 30 web pages into one large dataset proved computationally infeasible.
11These two web pages in our sample had more users bookmark them than listed (1427 and 1137 respectively)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































used.onsite used.byuser food cooking recipes blog
no no 0.2034 0.2285 0.2183 0.0340
yes no 0.2216 0.2482 0.2374 0.0377
no yes 0.9494 0.9561 0.9535 0.7209
yes yes 0.8737 0.8892 0.8833 0.4879
Table 4.3 Fitted Probabilities for the top 4 tags on 101 Cookbooks
previously been both applied the web page and used by the user on other web pages
(Interaction > 0)
A Wald test12 can be done on each parameter estimate, similar to the standard t-test used
in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. It compares the Null hypothesis that the true
value of the parameter is 0 with the alternative hypothesis that the parameter is not 0. The
stars in Table 4.2 show the statistical significance of these Wald tests.13
The Imitation hypothesis was supported for one web page, ManyEyes, which has a
positive (though small) parameter estimate significant at the 5% level. Although the Wald
test for the used.onsite predictor is significant for 13 sites, 12 have a negative parameter
estimate, which does not support the Imitation hypothesis. From this we reject Hypothesis
1. However, the Organizing hypothesis is supported for all 30 web pages at the 0.1% level.
The parameter estimates are quite high, indicating a strong effect. From this pattern, we
conclude that Hypothesis 2 is supported. Finally, the Recommended hypothesis is supported
for 4 of the 30 web pages at the 5% level (the other 12 significant estimates are negative).
However, because we are uncertain how well we have approximated the recommendation
algorithm in del.icio.us, we hesitate to draw conclusions about this hypothesis.
To illustrate the pattern of our results, Table 4.3 shows the model-estimated probabilities
of choosing the 4 most frequently used tags (as of June 2007) on the 101 Cookbooks web
page for an average user. When a tag has been used previously by a user, our analysis shows
a much greater probability of it being chosen again than if the user had not used it before.
This pattern is consistent across all 30 webpages.
Model Fit and Diagnostics We conducted two different types of goodness-of-fit tests to
ensure that these results actually represent what is in the data. The first test is analogous
to the standard goodness-of-fit test for OLS regression. In OLS regression, the F statistic
12The likelihood ratio test is more conservative, but requires more time to compute; this can be problematic
for very large samples (like ours). Using the Wald statistic can increase the standard error when the estimated
coefficient is large, leading to failure to reject the null hypothesis (Type II error) (Menard, 2002).
13Multi-collinearity can produce large standard errors, making it impossible to get statistically significant
estimates. We frequently rejected the null, indicating that collinearity is not a problem (Judge et al., 1985).
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is a statistical test that the model actually fits the data. Technically, it is a hypothesis test
that the specified model fits the data better than the simplest possible model – the mean of
the data. For logistic regression, the Gm statistic is analogous to the F statistic. It compares
the specified model to the mode of the data, which is the simplest explanatory statistic for a
binary variable. The Gm test is statistically significant at the 0.1% level for all 30 models.
The OLS R2 statistic represents how much of the variability in the data the model is able to
explain. It is a substantive, rather than statistical test of significance. The R2L statistic is the
logistic equivalent of R2 (Menard, 2002), and represents the percentage of the likelihood
explained by the model.14 For our models, R2L indicates that the models explain about 50%
of the likelihood on average. This indicates that there is definite room for improvement in
understanding why users choose certain tags, but that our predictors account for a nontrivial
portion of the likelihood.
The second test we conducted concerns the predictive efficiency of the model. With a
binary independent variable, we can use the model to “predict” our dependent variable. To
do this, we calculate the estimated probability (as we did in Table 4.3) and predict that a user
will choose that tag if this probability is greater than 50%. The P column in Table 4.2 shows
the percentage of tag choices that our model predicts correctly. For every web page, our
model is over 94% accurate. However, this number can be misleading, as always predicting
that the user will choose no tags can achieve above 90% correct for many web pages. To
measure how much better our model predicts tag choices, we calculated the λp statistic
Menard (2002). This statistic represents the “proportional reduction in errors” — how many
fewer errors does our model make than expected? This statistic ranges from 1 when all
errors have been eliminated, to 0 when we make the same number of errors as a simple
predict-the-mode model, to potentially negative if we make more errors than expected. In
general, our model allows us to predict tag choices approximately 10 to 20 percent better
than a simple predictor, and never worse. This improvement is statistically significant at the
0.1% level for all but 6 web pages (and 4 of those 6 are significant at the 5% level).
4.4.3.1 Interpretation
The results in Table 4.2 have a clear pattern; of our three explanatory variables, the strongest
influence is users’ previous tag choices. The coefficients on used.byuser consistently in-
dicate a much larger influence than that of used.onsite or the interaction term. While user
variability and individual tag ‘fit’ (represented by control variables in the model) play an
important role in the choice of tags, the data indicate that users’ previous tag choices are also
14Menard (2002) points out that the standard R2 statistic can be calculated for logistic regressions, but is
biased. For this reason, we do not report it here.
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important. This analysis also casts doubt on the Imitating and Recommended hypothesis, as
operationalized in our model. We were only able to detect influence of these predictors in 1
and 4 web pages, respectively, and in these instances the influence was small. If there is a
social process at work promoting a socially constructed vocabulary, we doubt that it takes
the form of direct imitation. We are less sure about the effect of recommended or popular
tags because we do not have a compelling measure of this explanatory variable.
4.4.4 Summary of Study 2
We believe ours is the first quantitative study of how users of del.icio.us choose tags to
compare competing hypotheses from the literature. Our logistic regression showed that
users’ past tag choices had a large influence on future tag choices, while the fact that a tag
had been used before on a web page had very little influence. Using logistic regression
allows us to control for sources of variability that the cosine similarity measures used by
Sen et al. (2006) do not. Also, our emphasis on exact tag choice rather than tag class means
we are able to consider how the processes shaping the tag vocabulary on del.icio.us might
affect its utility as a tool for personal and shared information management. del.icio.us users
do not navigate by tag classes; specific words and the multiple meanings associated with
them are important for finding and re-finding. It might also be that tagging is just different
on del.icio.us and MovieLens. del.icio.us has a strong information management component
(storing and organizing bookmarks), while it is less clear for what purpose tags might be
chosen or used on MovieLens.
4.5 Study 3: Computational Modeling
The logistic regression analysis described above allows us to detect patterns in tag choices a
posteriori; as such we are only able to speculate about what processes may have caused those
patterns to occur. To address this weakness, we developed a computer model to evaluate
competing explanations for the aggregate pattern of tags that appears on del.icio.us. We call
these competing explanations tag choice strategies. In addition, the analysis described in
Study 2 lumped together several forms of what might be considered “imitation” strategies
into one explanatory variable. Computer modeling allows us to specify different forms
imitation might take, and control what strategy is used to choose tags. It would be nice
to instruct collections of real people to use one or more of the strategies suggested by the
literature; we could then determine whether those tag choices resulted in tagging patterns
similar to those found on del.icio.us. However, this technique would be prohibitively costly.
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Computer modeling allows us to explore the effects of different strategies, and compare
them with the real-world data (Nan et al., 2005). Such models cannot tell us which strategy
or strategies real users of del.icio.us used; they can only tell us which strategies result in
patterns of tags that are different from those observed in our large sample downloaded from
del.icio.us, henceforth called the real world data. In other words, this technique cannot
confirm which strategy is prevalent on del.icio.us, but it can be used to rule out possible
explanations.
4.5.1 Measures
Axtell et al. (1996) described two types of measures for validating computer models against
each other or against a real world dataset. Distributional equivalence is achieved when the
distributions of results being compared are statistically indistinguishable; numerical identity
exists when samples from different sources are shown to produce results that are numerically
equivalent. We selected two measures to compare the tag choice strategies in our computer
model against the real world data, one to test for distributional equivalence, and the other to
test for numerical identity.
Baseline for Distributional Equivalence To establish a baseline measure against which
to evaluate the distributional equivalence of tag choice strategies implemented in our model,
we identified the theoretical distribution that most closely matched the tag frequency dis-
tribution in our del.icio.us sample. We fit the data from each web page to seven different
discrete probability distribution families (discrete powerlaw, negative binomial, binomial,
discrete lognormal, discrete exponential, poisson, and geometric), estimating parameters
with maximum likelihood estimation, to discover which distribution fit “best” (a statistical
determination (Clauset et al., 2007)). We then used a non-nested Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test to conduct pairwise comparisons between these distributions. The KS test is a common
goodness-of-fit test to determine how well a set of data points fits a particular theoretical
distribution. We are using it here to fit our data to distribution types other than normal.
The discrete powerlaw distribution fit the empirically observed (real world) tag distri-
butions better than the other seven distributions we tested. The fitted distribution had an
average exponent α of 1.92± 0.40. This is a low exponent for a powerlaw distribution,
and indicates that the “long tail” of tags is very long and heavy. This low exponent also
has another important implication. Newman (2005) explains that powerlaw distributions
with an exponent less than 2 have an infinite (or undefined) mean. Therefore, estimates of a
“mean” or average tag are undefined, and any inferential statistics based on the mean of the
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tag distribution cannot be used.
Baseline for Numerical Identity To measure the extent of the vocabulary problem (Fur-
nas et al., 1983), we calculated the average inter-user agreement (IUA) for a sample of 200
users from each of the 30 web pages in our sample from del.icio.us described above; this
measure became our baseline for establishing numerical identity. On average, users who
bookmarked these web pages chose the same tag only 14%± 5% of the time. IUA as a
measure is sufficiently different than using the goodness of fit to a powerlaw distribution
of tags as a measure because it yields different results in this study, and is therefore a
complementary measure for characterizing a set of tag choices.
4.5.2 Modeling Tag Choices
We modeled 120 web pages for each of five tag choice strategies we implemented, described
in detail below. Each modeled web page was paired with one of 30 real web pages used in
Study One, and the number of users for each web page modeled was chosen to match the
real web page. In essence, we are simulating what would happen if the same set of users
bookmarked the real web page, but chose their tags according to one of our five hypothesized
strategies (and bookmarked it in a random order). To simulate a user choosing tags for a
web page, two choices have to be made. First, the computer model chooses how many tags
that user will apply to the web page. Second, the model chooses which specific tags will
be applied. These parameters are selected by the model for each web page based on the
distribution of parameters we found on del.icio.us.
The tags from the matched real web page are ordered from most-frequently used to
least-frequently used, with ties broken randomly; each tag is then mapped onto a number
according to its rank in the frequency distribution. When the random-number generator
produces a 1, this is mapped to the most-frequently-used tag, 2 onto the second most fre-
quently used tag, and so on. Any numbers larger than the number of tags on the matched
web page are left as numbers. For each user, the specific tags they choose depends on which
tag choice strategy is being modeled. The only difference between these strategies is in
specific tag choice; all other decisions (number of users, number of tags per user, etc.) are
identical. We implemented five different tag selection strategies in our computer model:
Zipf: Zipf’s law states that word frequency in most written works follows a powerlaw
distribution. Therefore, del.icio.us users might naturally choose their words from
this distribution (Newman, 2005). This could potentially account for Golder and
Huberman’s observation that the stable pattern in the tag frequency distribution for
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web pages bookmarked on del.icio.us is evident even for less common tags not popular
enough to be recommended in the del.icio.us posting interface (p. 206) (Golder and
Huberman, 2006). The model chooses random numbers from the base powerlaw
distribution until it has the required number of unique numbers. These numbers are
then mapped onto tags as described above.
Organizing: Users might favor tags that they had used previously. This strategy was de-
scribed in Study 1. Simulated users have a 50% chance of choosing tags according to
Zipf’s law, and a 50% chance of choosing tags they had used before. When choosing
tags they had used before, the model computes the overlap (set intersection) between
tags the user had ever used and tags that were ever applied to the matched web page.
It then randomly chooses among the tags in this overlap set. If that is not enough tags,
then additional tags are chosen randomly from the base powerlaw distribution.
Imitation-Urn: Imitation of other users’ tag choices might be achieved using a path-
dependent process, as described by Golder and Huberman (2006) in the Polya’s Urn
example. For users to imitate previous users’ tag choices, it is necessary for those
previous users to exist; the first few users who bookmark a web page have no one
to imitate. To handle this, the first 20 simulated users draw as described above for
Zipf and serve as ‘seeders.’ All users after the first 20 choose a tag from the current
empirical distribution of tags for the simulated web page. This means that if there are
two tags, ‘A’ and ‘B’, and ‘A’ has been used twice previously and ‘B’ only once, then
tag ‘A’ is chosen with probability 23 and tag ‘B’ is chosen with probability
1
3 . However,
to ensure growth of the vocabulary beyond that used by the initial 20 seeders, each
tag choice has a 10% probability of choosing a new, previously unused tag. This
probability was chosen to match the average empirically observed probability from
the del.icio.us data. The average web page in our original sample from del.icio.us has
a new tag probability of 10.5%±8.3%.
Imitation-Popular: Users might prefer to click on the tags that are suggested in the
del.icio.us posting interface. This was also hypothesized by Golder and Huberman
(2006) to be a plausible form of imitation, via biased sampling. Suggested tags
in the del.icio.us posting interface come in two forms: recommended and popular.
del.icio.us has not publicized their algorithm for choosing which tags to display in
the interface; however, we implemented a simple approximation in our model. We
proposed that the tagging system could simply recommend the N most popular tags
for that web page. Then users could randomly choose among those N tags. The model




























































































































































Figure 4.3 Tag frequency distributions for the real world data and strategies implemented in the
computer model on a log-log scale.
the remaining users choose randomly among the N = 5 most popular tags at that point.
If they need to apply more than 5 tags, then the remaining tags are chosen randomly
from the base powerlaw distribution.
Imitation-Random: As a counterpoint to the flavors of imitation described above, we
tested one final strategy. Rather than choosing randomly from the 5 most popular
tags as in the Imitation-Popular strategy, users choose uniformly from among all tags
previously used to that point (after the first 20 users have chosen tags according to
Zipf’s law).
4.5.3 Computer Model Results
One of the benefits of computer modeling was that the development process forced us to be
very explicit about what information users would need to follow a hypothesized strategy.
Golder and Huberman (2006) suggested that the powerlaw distribution of tags for a given
web page could arise from path-dependent choices. When trying to replicate these decisions
for our simulation, we found that this only works if a user chooses tags from the empirical
distribution at the time of decision. This is a very high information requirement for users;
they must know the exact proportions of existing tags to choose appropriately. del.icio.us
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Table 4.4 Measures of distributional equivalence and numerical identity.
Mean KS St.dev. KS Mean IUA St.dev. IUA
Real World 0.069 0.026 0.144 0.057
Zipf 0.080 * 0.011 ++ 0.374 *** 0.074 +++
Organizing 0.084 *** 0.029 0.182 *** 0.052
Im-Urn 0.139 *** 0.067 +++ 0.184 *** 0.056
Im-Popular 0.223 *** 0.149 +++ 0.317 *** 0.088 +++
Im-Random 0.386 *** 0.063 +++ 0.070 *** 0.042 +++
Wilcoxon test signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05
Levene test signif. codes: ‘+++’ 0.001 ‘++’ 0.01 ‘+’ 0.05
does not present this information in its interface; however we assume this knowledge for our
simulations with the Imitation-Urn strategy so that it models a truly path-dependent process.
4.5.4 Distributional Equivalence Measure
For each simulated web page, we fit the tag distribution produced by the model to a discrete
powerlaw distribution using maximum likelihood. We then conducted a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit test to see how well the simulated distribution fit a powerlaw.
A KS statistic ranges from 0 to 1; 0 means that the distribution is identical to a powerlaw,
and higher numbers indicate greater deviation from a powerlaw (0.22 is a bad fit). The
second and third columns (KS) of Table 4.4 show the mean and standard deviation of
the KS statistic for each strategy. We used a Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank-sum test with
Bonferroni correction to compare the set of KS statistics for each tag choice strategy (one
for each simulated web page) against the set of KS statistics for the real world web pages,
and found all comparisons to be statistcally significantly different than the null (powerlaw)
distribution. This is likely due to our large sample size for both the strategies modeled and
our real-world sample. Therefore, it is more instructive in this case to consider practical,
rather than statistical significance when interpreting the results of our analyses. In fact, in
light of our large sample sizes we can interpret the significance of these results to mean
that we can be confident the pattern of results we observed is unlikely to have occurred by
chance. We can then focus on the actual differences observed, which for some strategies
were large and for others were very small.
The mean KS statistic for the Imitation-Popular and Imitation-Random strategies indi-
cate that data generated in this way do not fit a powerlaw very well. Figure 4.3 illustrates
the tag distribution (on a log-log plot) for all five strategies on one simulated web page,
along with the paired real world distribution. The straight line on each plot represents the
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Figure 4.4 Shows the frequency distribution shape of KS statistics for real world data and modeled
tag choice strategies.
theoretical powerlaw distribution that best fit the data. The non-powerlaw nature of the three
Imitation-* strategies is noticeable compared to the nearly linear plots for the Organizing
and Zipf strategies, as well as the Real World data. However, the distributions based on the
Zipf and Organizing strategies fit as well as the real data from del.icio.us.
The mean KS statistic for the Imitation-Urn strategy is closer to that of the Real World,
Zipf, and Organizing tag distributions than the other two Imitation strategies’ distributions;
however, the standard deviation of the Imitation-Urn strategy was significantly different
from that of the Real World data using the Levene homogeneity of variance test. Figure 4.4
shows the density plot of KS statistics for each strategy; the narrow distributions clustered to
the left are visibly different from the wide distributions produced by the Imitation strategies.
We therefore conclude from our distributional equivalence measure that we can rule out the
three Imitation-* strategies as plausible processes that might give rise to the distributional
pattern we saw in our sample from del.icio.us.
Numerical Identity Measure We calculated the average inter-user agreement between
simulated users of each modeled web page, for each strategy. Table 4.4 also provides the
inter-user agreement means and standard deviations for each tag choice strategy, and for
the real-world data from del.icio.us. IUA ranges from 0 to 1 and represents how often two
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random users chose the same tag; higher numbers mean greater agreement. We again found
that Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank-sum tests with Bonferroni correction were significant for
pairwise comparisons between the Real World data and all tag choice strategies. Inter-user
agreement was much higher for the Zipf and Imitate-Popular strategies than observed in the
sample data from del.icio.us. The Organizing and Imitation-Urn strategies are negligibly
different in terms of practical significance, as they are well within one standard deviation
of the mean of the Real World data. They are also the only tag choice strategies for which
the Levene test for homogeneity of variance was not significant when compared with the
Real World data. From our numerical identity measure we can therefore rule out rule out the
following strategies as plausible processes that might produce inter-user agreement values
we saw in our sample from del.icio.us: Zipf, Imitation-Popular, and Imitation-Random.
4.5.5 Interpretation
Based on the two measures described above, we can make the following determinations
about the plausibility of each tag choice strategy producing data like that in our sample
downloaded from del.icio.us:
1. Zipf — rule out based on numerical identity
2. Organizing — cannot rule out
3. Imitation-Urn — rule out based on distributional equivalence
4. Imitation-Popular — rule out based on both numerical identity and distributional
equivalence
5. Imitation-Random — rule out based on both numerical identity and distributional
equivalence
4.5.6 Summary of Study 3
We were able to rule out all tag choice strategies implemented in our computer model, except
for the Organizing strategy. Our computer model allows us to go beyond the behavioral
trace data and assume different strategies for choosing tags. We used this model to look at
the large-scale tag choice patterns these strategies produce, rather than identifying patterns
and speculating on what might have caused them, as Golder and Huberman (2006) reported
in their paper. Our results corroborate and extend those from study 2, and indicate that the
most plausible hypothesis among those we tested is that most tag selections in del.icio.us
are governed by individual, idiosyncratic processes rather than a form of direct imitation.
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4.5.6.1 Limitations and Future Work
It is important to note that through this research we are only able to rule out competing
hypotheses. Data downloaded from del.icio.us are evidence which may be used to detect
potential tagging strategies, but we cannot make assumptions about what information users
may have seen and acted upon, or infer what a given user was thinking when making tag
choices. Therefore, we are not able to say with absolute certainty that users choose tags
according to their own personal organization scheme; nor can we determine whether popular
tags are chosen more often due to imitation, because they are topically relevant, or for some
as-yet unknown reason. The major weakness of the methods we have used that we cannot
make any claims about users’ perceptions, goals, or motivations that might shed more light
on tagging strategies. In reality, the same tag choice strategy might not be used by all users,
or even apply to all the tag choices of an individual user.
We also lack empirical evidence regarding the usefulness of tags for organizing, finding
and re-finding personal and shared information. These limitations leave ample opportunity
for future work in this area, including field studies of tagging behavior, measurement of
the effectiveness of tags for information management, and experiments which will allow
us to infer causal relationships between factors affecting tag choices and characteristics of
the resulting tag distributions. The research described in this chapter leads us to focus our
efforts on more rigorous investigations of the predictions of the Organizing hypothesis when
tags are used for personal and shared information management.
4.6 Summary and Implications for Design
We report the results of three empirical studies of the social bookmarking website del.icio.us.
in Study 1, we interviewed users of del.icio.us and found that they create bookmarks for per-
sonal organization reasons. This personal reason induces users to contribute information to
del.icio.us, which then makes the information publicly available as a beneficial side effect of
contribution. Other users of del.icio.us are then able to browse and discover this information.
However, user metadata (information about who bookmarked a webpage) is much more
useful to del.icio.us users than tag metadata because the collection of webpages associated
with a user is fairly uncluttered and focused on a topic, but the collection of webpages
associated with a tag has “too much noise” and suffers from many natural problems arising
from human language use. We explain this difference by bringing in the concept of incentive
alignment from economics; users have an incentive to produce uncluttered bookmarks, but
there is no corresponding incentive for preventing clutter in tags.
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In Studies 2 and 3, we focus on detecting patterns in tag choices on del.icio.us. We
used two different methods, logistic regression performed on sample data collected from
del.icio.us and computer modeling of tag choice strategies, to examine competing hypothe-
ses describing processes that might produce observed tag choice patterns. Our logistic
regression showed that users’ past tag choices had a large influence on future tag choices,
while the fact that a tag had been used before on a web page had very little influence. In ad-
dition, we were able to rule out all tag choice strategies implemented in our computer model,
except for the Organizing strategy, by comparing simulated data with data from del.icio.us.
In other words, our results indicate that the most plausible hypothesis among those we
tested is that tag selection in del.icio.us is primarily governed by individual, idiosyncratic
processes rather than a form of direct imitation. These results contradict both the hypotheses
presented in Golder and Huberman (2006) and the results of Sen et al. (2006), and suggest
that the potential for emergence of a socially-constructed vocabulary on del.icio.us due to
tag imitation is unlikely.
In Study 1, we described an incentive for users to contribute bookmarks and tags to
del.icio.us: personal organization of webpages that the user might want to return to. This
incentive is personal, not social, despite the fact that these contributions are made public as
a side effect. In Studies 2 and 3, we found evidence that this incentive does influence the
large majority of contribution decisions on del.icio.us. We believe that most users contribute
information to del.icio.us for personal reasons. Since most bookmarks and tags on del.icio.us
are contributed for this reason, we can look at how users consume information on del.icio.us,
and can connect their consumption behaviors to this incentive for production. In doing so,
we find that this incentive leads to user metadata that meets the consumption needs and
goals of del.icio.us users. But this incentive is insufficient to induce contributions of tags
that are useful when consuming information on del.icio.us.
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Chapter 5
Using a Minimum Threshold to
Motivate Contributions
5.1 Introduction
Five of the 10 most visited websites are social computing systems1, making Internet-scale
social computing systems some of the fastest growing websites right now. Social computing
systems collect, aggregate, and share user-contributed content, and therefore depend on the
contributions of users to function properly. Not all social computing systems succeed in
eliciting contributions; while Wikipedia has over 2.5 million articles and over 9 million
registered users2, its rival Citizendium (which runs the same MediaWiki software) only has
around 20,000 articles and approximately 8,000 registered users3.
Human users are intelligent beings and cannot be programmed to behave; system design-
ers need to provide incentives to encourage users to contribute. Users contribute primarily
information to social computing systems, but contributing information is costly. Contribut-
ing requires making the effort to go to the website and either typing in information or
clicking on information. Contributing also requires time to enter in the information, which
has an opportunity cost: time that could have been spent on other things. To overcome this
cost, social computing systems need to provide incentives that motivate users to voluntarily
choose to spend their time and effort contributing.
There are many different ways to motivate users to contribute to social computing
systems. For example, del.icio.us, a social bookmarking website, motivates contributions
by providing easy online access to bookmarks and allowing users to organize their own
1http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites, retrieved on March 14, 2009. The five social
computing systems are YouTube(3), MySpace(6), Wikipedia(7), Facebook(8), and Blogger(9).
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics, retrieved on March 14, 2009
3http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Special:Statistics, retrieved on March 14, 2009.
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bookmarks (Wash and Rader, 2007). Facebook, the popular social networking system,
motivates newcomer contributions of photographs by allowing other users to comment and
by providing numerous examples of their friends contributions (Burke et al., 2009). Authors
on Wikipedia are encouraged to contribute by having an automated robot suggest appropriate
pages that need work (Cosley et al., 2007). Users on GlassDoor, a site for salary comparison
data, must contribute information about their own salary to gain access to the aggregated
salary data of others4.
In this paper we analyze a generalization of this last mechanism for encouraging contri-
butions: a minimum threshold mechanism. This mechanism is technically simple: users
must contribute a minimum amount of information to the system in order to receive access
to the information from other users. While the mechanism is technically simple, how users
will react is not. We identify circumstances under which setting a minimum contribution
threshold for participation in a social information system will lead to an increase in breadth
of contribution (by causing a larger proportion of users to make a non-trivial contribution),
and cause the total quantity of contributions to increase.
In this chapter, Jeff MacKie-Mason and I develop a mathematical model of user behavior
and use it to predict how users of a social computing system will alter their contributions
when the minimum threshold mechanism is put in place. This type of model allows us
to better understand strategic interactions between users; how much Alice is willing to
contribute depends on what and how much is contributed by others, and their contributions
in turn depend on hers. For example, Ephrati et al. (1994) used mathematical modeling to
design a meeting scheduling system that users cannot manipulate. This method also allows
us to explicitly generalize our results to a whole class of systems rather than studying only
one specific system, and therefore provide constructive design suggestions for many similar
systems.
Implementation and testing are also important, but we limit our current contribution
to a theoretical analysis. Behavioral modeling provides a principled foundation for design
that extends across different settings. The predicted user behavior, because it involves large
numbers of users who have heterogeneous preferences and whose behavior depends on
the strategic choices of others, is sufficiently complex that it warrants rigorously derived,
testable predictions.
4http://www.glassdoor.com/about/learn.htm, retrieved on March 16, 2009
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5.1.1 Background on public goods
User contributions to a social media system can be seen as contributions, in the form of
information, to a single shared information pool. All users of the system have access to
this pool. This shared information pool has the properties of a public good (Samuelson,
1954). In particular, the pool is non-rivalrous since using the information pool does not
materially reduce the value of the pool to other people. To use a familiar example, once
National Public Radio broadcasts a program, consumption by one listener does not crowd
out consumption by other listeners. For information, nonrivalry is generally true because
the incremental costs of (digital) reproduction and distribution are approximately zero, and
thus multiple instances of the information can be “consumed” without “using it up”.
When public goods are created through voluntary contributions, they generally have
the problem of underprovision: users prefer to “free ride” and use the public good without
contributing, relying on other people to do the hard work of creating it (Samuelson, 1954).
Of course, if everyone prefers to free ride, then the information pool will not get established
in the first place. We see the free rider problem in social media: Adar and Huberman (2000)
found that almost 70% of users of a popular peer-to-peer system contribute nothing at all.
While Wikipedia has over 9 million registered users, only 166,066 (less than 2%) have
contributed effort in the last 30 days5. Of those who contribute to Wikipedia, 50% do not
return after their first day of contribution (Jian and MacKie-Mason, 2008).
Shared information pools in social media are also commonly non-exclusive; the in-
formation in the system is available to anyone anytime. The information contained on
Wikipedia, del.icio.us, and Twitter is available for free to anyone with a web browser and
a network connection. However, non-exclusivity is a design choice; social media systems
could technically exclude users from accessing the public information pool. This potential
for exclusivity opens up new opportunities for creating incentive mechanisms. The system
can threaten to exclude users who do not meet specific criteria, and if crafted appropriately,
this threat can encourage users to contribute more to the shared information pool.
Numerous researchers have looked at excludable public goods as a cost-sharing problem:
a group of people who benefit from a public good need to find an agreeable method of divid-
ing the cost of the public good (Moulin, 1994; Deb and Razzolini, 1999). In general, cost
sharing mechanisms are designed for providing a known, fixed amount of shared resource,
with cost shares allocated after the size is determined. This is not generally appropriate for
information pools: rarely is it sensible to decide in advance how much information is the
right amount, and then to require an individual to contribute his share. Cost sharing also
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics, retrieved on March 16, 2009
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strongly depends on the fact that money is a perfect substitute for itself; my $10 is the same
as your $10 when funding a bridge, but my information and your information might not be
equivalent. Also, it is difficult to “refund” information that has been contributed, making it
difficult to implement bidding-based mechanisms like that of Young (1998).
Bag and Winter (1999) propose one such mechanism. In it, all users submit a bid
containing the amount of money they are willing to pay and the total size of the public good
they want. The mechanism then chooses the set of users whose bids contain the amount of
money necessary to give everyone in the set their desired total size of public good. Everyone
outside of this set is excluded and their money returned to them. This mechanism might be
adapted to use information rather than money, but we would need to be able to specify the
size and composition of the pool without actually knowing the information already. This is
unrealistic in many circumstances, but if it were practical in some settings, this mechanism
ha desirable properties: it is efficient, stable, and order-independent.
Feldman et al. (2006) propose a related mechanism that is promising for some applica-
tions: encourage contributions by degrading the service quality to users who contribute little.
Degraded service is natural in their context (slower downloads in a peer-to-peer filesharing
system). When service quality is measurable, controllable and uniformly valuable to users,
degradation might serve as an effective motivation to contribute.
Mechanisms in this general family, including cost-sharing, degradation of service, and
the threshold mechanism we analyze below, are fundamentally related to another familiar
mechanism: pricing with exclusion. One way to create an encyclopedia is to pay authors to
write it, and then provide access to the information only to those who buy it. A degradation
or threshold mechanism requires users to “buy” access, but payment is measured in units
of effort, or of information content, but not money. Thus, our mechanism can be seen as
a contribution to an emerging literature on non-monetary mechanisms for social provision
of shared information pools. Non-monetary mechanisms are especially appealing if social
conventions rule out the use of pricing, or if the transaction costs of creating and enforcing a
pricing system would be prohibitive.
There may also be useful non-monetary methods to encourage contributions that do not
rely on excluding or degrading access. For example, Rashid et al. (2006) took a different
approach inspired by social psychology. They found that individual contributions on Movie-
Lens can be increased by displaying how valuable a potential contribution would be to other
users. This builds on their previous work (Ling et al., 2005) that found that contributions
increased when users are given information about the uniqueness of a potential contribution.
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5.2 Behavioral Model
To better understand, and make testable predictions about how users will respond to a thresh-
old exclusion mechanism, we developed a mathematical model of user behavior. We begin
with a set of potential users of an information pool. For simplicity we number these users
1,2, . . . ,N. Each user i is permitted to choose some amount of information to contribute; we
call this amount xi. We assume that there is a meaningful way for the system to measure the
quantity and quality of relevant information along a single dimension.
Users receive some value from having access to the information pool and the information
contributed by everyone else. It is neither obvious, nor trivial for our analysis, whether users
benefit directly from contributing their own information to the pool. After all, they already
have the information for their own use. For example, after collecting research on a topic in a
personal notebook or file, why make the effort to write it carefully for others and transfer it
to Wikipedia? On the other hand, when the information is in the pool, others may add value
to it, to the benefit of the original contributor. For example, others may correct one’s errors
in Wikipedia. Or, others may add value to a personal photo collection in Flickr, by adding
tags or comments.
To allow for either possibility, we model two types of information pools. First, informa-
tive pools are those in which information is collected, possibly automatically aggregated,
and then redistributed. Both del.icio.us and GlassDoor are examples of informative pools.
The important feature here is that the pool primarily functions as a way to aggegrate and
distribute information to its participants. For pools like this, adding my information to the
pool doesn’t increase the value I receives from the pool because I already knows my own in-
formation. Let x−i = x1 + · · ·+xi−1 +xi+1 + · · ·+xN be the sum of everyone’s contributions
to the information pool except user i.6 We represent the value of an informative pool by the
function vi(x−i). We assume that this function is increasing and concave; more information
is better, but as the pool gets larger each new piece of information is worth less.
When a user benefits directly from adding her own information to the pool because
others enhance its value, we call the pool collaborative. Wikipedia is a collaborative pool;
open source software is another example. We represent the value from a collaborative pool
with the function vi(X) where X = x1 + · · ·xN is the sum of everyone’s contributions.7 We
assume this function is increasing and concave. We encompass both models by specifying
value as vi(αxi + x−i), where α = 0 for an informative pool, and α = 1 for a collaborative
6To focus on our main point, we simplify by assuming that information can be measured in constant-quality
units, so that it is meaningful to sum xi and x j.
7Complementarities and substitutions between different information contributions may have much richer
structure, of course. We again simplify to focus attention on our main points.
108
pool. This seemingly small difference leads to qualitatively different predictions.
Contributing information is not costless. Depending on the information, and the target
information pool, contribution requires time and effort for some or all of data collection,
analysis, drafting, formatting, editing, annotating, and organizing. It is not material whether
these costs are denominated in money: they are foregone resources. In particular, we are
concerned with the opportunity cost: time used contributing to an information pool is not
available for the user’s most valuable alternative use of that time. This cost also depends
on the amount of information contributed. We represent the cost of contributing with the
function ci(xi). We assume that this cost is increasing in the amount of information con-
tributed, since contributing more information generally requires more time and effort. We
also assume that this cost is convex, which means that it gets increasingly more costly to
contribute information the more you contribute.
Combining the above sources of value and costs, we form a utility function, which is a
description of each user’s preferences. In this case, the user can choose xi, the amount of
information to contribute to the information pool, and the function describes how desirable
the outcome is based on that choice (and the choices of everyone else in the system). Higher
values of the function are more highly desired by the user, so a user will generally choose
the contribution level that maximizes his or her utility function:
Ui(xi) = vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (5.1)
This specification is very general and can describe the preferences of a wide variety of users.
By making only simple structural assumptions (e.g. more information is better), we can
apply this model to a large number of users for many different types of social computing
systems. This gives us the power to make general design recommendations that apply to all
social computing systems.
5.2.1 The voluntary equilibrium
We begin by calculating how much information each of the N users of the system will volun-
tarily choose to contribute. In particular, we search for a Nash equilibrium of contributions,
which is a level of contribution for each user such that no individual user will want to change
his or her contribution once they learn what everyone else is contributing. Nash equilibria
are a common tool for predicting behavior in game theory and decision theory because they
are stable: if everyone is making choices that match a Nash equilibrium, then no one will
want to change their choice and equilibrium will continue.
The Nash equilibrium for this system is different for the two types of information pools.
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For informative pools like del.icio.us, each user’s value from the pool only depends on other
users’ contributions and not on her own contribution. Therefore, whatever she chooses
to contribute will not increase her value from the pool (since she already know her own
information), but will increase her cost. Everyone will choose to contribute nothing: xi = 0
for all i. In equilibrium, an informative pool will not contain any voluntary contributions.
We know that many users may still choose to contribute for personal (non-strategic) reasons;
we explore this further near the end of this paper.
For collaborative pools like Wikipedia, the Nash equilibrium is more complex. Individu-
als gain some value from contributing to the pool because, in a collaborative pool, the sum
is greater than its parts. Fixing a typo in a Wikipedia article might be worthwhile because it
improves the quality of the whole article, or, alternatively, content added to the pool may
be more valuable to the contributor than keeping it to herself because the contributions of
others (complementary material, comments, edits and corrections) add value to it.
Let x̄−i be the total contribution in equilibrium from everyone other than user i. A
Nash equilibrium results when, given this amount contributed by other agents, no in-
dividual agent benefits from either increasing or decreasing her contribution a small
amount. Mathematically, all agents will be simultaneously in a Nash equilibrium if
∂vi(xi + x̄−i)/∂xi = ∂ci(xi)/∂xi for all i with xi > 0.
5.2.2 Not enough information
In 1954, Samuelson Samuelson (1954) pointed out that for public goods like this, relying
on voluntary contributions results in fewer contributions than we as a society would want.
This occurs because each user’s contribution provides value to all of the other users of the
information pool, but this value is not taken into account when that user is making his or her
contribution decision.
To formalize this, imagine that there is a “system planner” who can force users to
contribute any amount he wants. How much should he require each user to contribute?









vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (5.2)
This maximization balances the value of the information pool to everyone who uses the
system and the cost of contribution from each person. The system planner will cap contri-
butions when the additional benefits to everyone are no longer worth the additional cost
to the contributor. In a system with an informative information pool, the system planner
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will choose an optimal size of the pool and then assign contributions to those users with the
lowest total cost. For a collaborative pool the result is similar, but the system planner will
assign contributions to everyone whose marginal net benefit is above a threshold.8
The amount the system planner would assign to a user is different from the amount
that would be contributed voluntarily; each user will choose to cap his or her own contri-
bution when the additional value to himself (or herself) is not worth the additional cost
of contribution. Since the system planner is concerned with the benefits to everyone, and
these benefits are by definition (weakly) greater than the benefits to any one individual, the
system planner will choose higher levels of contribution than individuals will choose for
themselves.9 Consequently, the system planner would prefer an information pool that is
larger than the pool that is voluntarily provided; the voluntary pool is underprovided.
Evidence suggests that many social computing systems are underprovided; for example
Adar and Huberman (2000) found that almost 70% of users of Gnutella contribute nothing
at all.
5.3 Setting a Minimum Threshold
To combat this problem of underprovision in information pools, we explore a simple in-
centive to encourage users to contribute more information to the shared information pool:
require users to contribute at least a minimum amount of information to the shared pool
before they receive access to the rest of the information in the pool. This requirement is
intended as an incentive to induce users to contribute more; however users are not robots and
can make their own choices. Using this model, we describe users’ reactions to this incentive
mechanism.
We begin modeling this requirement by specifying a minimum threshold t. If a user
contributes at least t information, then they are given access to the information pool. If they
contribute less than t, then they are denied access and cannot benefit from the information in
the pool. In a minimum threshold system, each user’s utility function is now discontinuous:
Ui(xi) =
vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) if xi ≥ t−ci(xi) if xi < t (5.3)
8These results are standard and follow directly from the maximization of (5.2).
9Mathematically, the system planner will choose each xi such that ∑Nj=1 v
′
j(·) = c′i(xi). Each user will
choose xi such that v′i(·) = c′i(xi). vi(·) is non-negative, increasing and concave, so the sum of v′i(·) is always
weakly greater than any individual v′i(·). As ci(·) is increasing and convex, the system planner will raise xi to
compensate. Samuelson (1954)
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In order to better characterize differences among users, we assume that all of the users
can be ordered by their marginal net benefit of contribution. Users with a low marginal net
benefit of contribution will be given low indices, and users with a high marginal net benefit
of contribution will be given high indices. Mathematically, for any given level of contribu-
tion xi, we assume that ∂∂xi (vi(αxi + y)− ci(xi)) = αv
′
i(αxi + y)− c′i(xi) is increasing in i
for any constant y. This ordering must be the same for all values of xi. In particular, this
ordering must hold for xi = 1, meaning that users are ordered by the benefit of contributing
the first piece of information. The user who benefits the most from contributing one piece
of information will have the highest index. Also, for informative pools (α = 0) this is an
ordering based solely on cost; the user with the highest cost of contributing one unit of
information will have the lowest marginal net benefit and therefore the lowest index i = 1.
5.3.1 An exclusion equilibrium
When a system enforces a minimum threshold constraint, users will choose alter their
behavior accordingly. Some users may choose to increase their contributions, and others
may choose to decrease theirs. In this section we use our model to derive how users will
react to this incentive mechanism.
To begin, we calculate user i’s best response given that everyone else contributes x−i.
Define x0i (x−i) to be the level of contribution that user i would voluntarily choose to con-
tribute if there were no threshold and everyone else contributed x−i. This value is likely to
be non-zero for collaborative pools like Wikipedia (for the reasons mentioned above) but
will be zero for informative pools like del.icio.us since users receive no additional benefit
from contributing to the pool.
Lemma 5.1 Given the threshold t and everyone else’s contribution of x−i, user i would
choose one of three options:
x∗i =

x0i (x−i) if x
0
i (x−i)≥ t
t if x0i (x−i) < t and vi(αt + x−i)≥ ci(t)
0 if x0i (x−i) < t and vi(αt + x−i) < ci(t)
Proof Sketch (complete proofs available in Appendix D): If the user would naturally
contribute above the threshold, then she will continue to do so. If the user prefers to con-
tribute less than the threshold, then she must decide whether the benefit of accessing the
information pool is worth the higher cost of contributing enough information to meet the
threshold. If so, she will contribute the threshold; if not then she will leave the system, not
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receive access, and contribute nothing.
Lemma 5.1 describes each individual user’s best response once she knows every else’s
decision. However, this is insufficient to predict what will happen in such a system, since
when user i makes her choice, that changes the size of the pool, which then also might
change all of the other user’s choices. Next, we describe a Nash equilibrium for this system:
a stable point at which no one wants to change their decision once they see the final size of
the pool. In this equilibrium, users naturally sort themselves into three groups based on their
marginal benefits and costs. We ordered users such that users with high net benefits have a
higher index i.
Proposition 5.1 For a given threshold t, there exists a Nash equilibrium characterized by
(i0, i∗) such that users will choose:
x∗i = 0 if i≤ i0
x∗i = t if i
∗ > i > i0
x∗i = x
0
i if i≥ i
∗
Proof Sketch: Users with high net benefit — users with index i ≥ i∗ — want to
contribute more than the threshold in any case, and thus will do so. Users with low net
benefit — users with index i≤ i0 — will find that increasing their contribution to the thresh-
old level is not worth the increase in cost. They will stop using the system and contribute
nothing. Finally, the users in the middle with a moderate marginal net benefits will choose
to increase their contribution to the threshold level in order to continue receiving access to
the information pool.
The exact values of i∗ and i0 will change as t changes. This equilibrium looks different
for the different types of information pool. In particular, for informative pools like del.icio.us,
no one will naturally choose to contribute above the threshold. In equilibrium i∗ = N, and
everyone either contributes the threshold or stops using the system.
Because of the threshold, moderate benefit users will increase their contribution and
low benefit users will stop contributing and stop using the system. But in collaborative
pools, users with high marginal benefits will voluntarily contribute above the threshold.
These users are contributing in order to “top off” the pool; they make the pool slightly larger
because they benefit from the interactions between their contributed information and the
rest of the pool. As the pool gets larger, these users won’t need to contribute as much to get
a desirable size of pool:
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Lemma 5.2 In a collaborative information pool, everyone who voluntarily contributes
greater than t will alter their contribution in exactly the opposite direction as the overall
change in the size of the information pool.
Proof Sketch: By assumption, the value from the information pool is concave, which
means that a user values each additional piece of information in the pool less and less as
the pool gets larger. When one user observes others increasing their contributions, she will
value contributions to the pool slightly less, and will correspondingly slightly decrease her
contribution to lower her cost of contributing.
5.3.2 Will it work?
Some users increase their contribution and other users decrease their contribution, but it is
not clear which group is larger. Does setting a minimum threshold actually lead to more
contributions and a larger information pool? A very low threshold won’t cause many new
contributions but might drive people away. A very high threshold will drive many users
away but the ones that remain will all be contributing lots of information.
Setting a threshold has a larger effect on systems with many users. Since everyone must
contribute the threshold, more users means more people have increased their contributions,
leading to a larger information pool. Therefore, using a minimum threshold makes the most
sense on large-scale internet-based social computing systems.
Proposition 5.2 If t is less than some maximum t̄, then as long as the user population N
is large enough there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which everyone contributes at least t
information to the pool. Furthermore, if the pool is an informative pool, everyone is better
off than without a threshold. If the pool is a collaborative pool, welfare improves as long as
the voluntarily contributed pool is sufficiently small.
Proof Sketch: Consider the situation in which everyone contributes t information to the
pool. Everyone benefits from access to a pool of information (size Nt if it is an informative
pool, and larger for a collaborative pool). However, there is a strong individual incentive
to deviate; most users would rather contribute nothing (to reduce their costs) and free ride
on the contributions of others. The threat of exclusion works here as long as N is large
enough. Larger N means a larger and hence more valuable information pool, and being
excluded from this pool is a more substantial loss. However, at some point, having more
information in the pool doesn’t help and the value from the pool is at a maximum. If the cost
of contributing t is greater than this maximum, then further increasing the size of the pool
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won’t convince the user to contribute t. Therefore, this equilibrium only exists for small
enough thresholds.
For an informative pool, without a threshold all users free-ride and no one contributes to
the pool. The threshold t serves as a coordinating device, inducing all users to coordinate
and contribute exactly t. As long as everyone contributes, everyone is better off when they
spend the additional cost to gain access to the resulting large information pool.
For a collaborative pool, the voluntarily contributed pool has some value. A user might
be willing to still receive access to a threshold pool but be worse off overall by being forced
to increase their contribution (and hence, their costs). However, everyone benefits from
these extra contributions. As long as the voluntarily contributed pool is small, the increases
in value to everyone else makes these additional costs socially worthwhile.
5.3.3 Will it always work?
We showed in Proposition 5.2 that under fairly general conditions there is always a minimum
threshold that increases total system value for an informative pool. But, for collaborative
pools we guaranteed the existence of a welfare-improving threshold only when the total of
freely contributed information is sufficiently small. Can we not show that there is always
some threshold, perhaps small, that increases the value of a collaborative pool?
In a word, “no”. A minimum threshold is sometimes valuable, sometimes not. When
the pool size with no threshold is large, each additional piece of information isn’t worth as
much. Further increasing the size of the pool doesn’t add much value. Mathematically, this
is a result of our assumption that value is concave.
To illustrate why a threshold might not help, suppose there are two types of users: a
large group of ‘readers’ in which individuals contribute very little without a threshold, and
a small group of ‘writers’ that contributes considerably more per person. We might call
this the “Wikipedia case”. When a threshold is introduced, the readers will increase their
contributions up to the threshold because they want to retain access to the pool. These
contributions come at a cost; all of these users now have to spent more time and effort to
make the contributions. However, the pool is already very large (because of the writers), so
the additional contributions from the readers aren’t worth very much. If there are enough
readers who have to pay this additional cost, then overall system welfare may be lower even
though the pool is larger.
We suspect this might be the case for Wikipedia, a resource to which contributions are
high without any threshold. Imposing a threshold would inconvenience the vast majority of
users, who currently contribute little or nothing, yet plausibly might not increase the value
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of the pool much for others. Indeed, there is likely to be another source of loss: many users
may simply stop using Wikipedia rather than make the threshold contribution.
This example illustrates design advice from our analysis that can be applied across many
different settings: only consider using a minimum threshold to increase contributions when
the information pool would be small otherwise.
5.3.4 Adjusting the threshold
Maximizing the size of the information pool is not equivalent to maximizing its value.
Though users benefit from a larger pool, there is a cost incurred to create it: this tradeoff
ensures that the optimal size is less than the maximal size.
However, user value and user cost are not observable by system designers. There is one
formal link between pool size and pool value that may be helpful to system designers: an
increase in pool size is necessary (albeit not sufficient) for a threshold to increase value. In
fact, this relationship holds for any adjustments in threshold level, providing a pragmatic
check:
Proposition 5.3 If a system designer raises the threshold t and the total size of the informa-
tion pool decreases, then aggregate welfare has decreased. If a system designer lowers the
threshold t and the total size of the information pool increases, then aggregate welfare has
increased.
Proof Sketch: Raising the threshold causes everyone who is contributing the threshold
to incur a greater cost of contributing. Also, since it causes the total size of the information
pool to decrease, everyone receives less value from the pool. Finally, some users voluntarily
chose to be excluded, which means they are no longer receiving the benefits of the infor-
mation pool. All of these effects lead to a welfare decrease. The second statement is the
converse; all of these effects are reversed leading to a welfare increase.
Proposition 5.3 provides dynamic guidance for setting a threshold. As the system de-
signer changes the threshold, the effect of that change on the total size of the pool provides
hints about the (unobservable) total system welfare.
5.3.5 Who contributes?
Introducing a minimum threshold changes the distribution of contributors, and of their
contributions. Consider first an informative pool. From Proposition 5.1 we know that
contribution breadth increases: more users will contribute than would in a strictly voluntary
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equilibrium. This is also true in a collaborative pool; more users will contribute at least t
information than would in a voluntary equilibrium.
We can also characterize the change in contribution depth in a collaborative pool. Two
groups of users reduce the depth of their contributions: First, those with the lowest net bene-
fits reduce their contribution to zero and leave the system. Second, those with the highest
net benefit were already contributing more than the threshold so there is no direct pressure
on them to increase their contribution. However, by Lemma 5.2, because they benefit from
content others contribute, these users will slightly decrease their contributions.10 Those in
the intermediate range of net benefits increase their contribution to exactly the threshold t.11
One interesting implication of the analysis of contribution depth is that setting a min-
imum threshold decreases contribution inequality: low contributors increase, and high
contributors decrease, their contributions.
5.3.6 Summary of behavioral analysis
We have found that under rather general circumstances, a well-chosen threshold can improve
the social value of an informative pool. For collaborative pools, the desirability of a threshold
depends on several factors, which complicates the designer’s task, in ways that the formal
analysis can characterize helpfully.
One critical finding is that for an increase in the threshold t to be an improvement, it is
necessary (but not sufficient) that the total size of the pool be greater at the higher threshold.
When an increase in welfare occurs, it is due solely to an increase in contributions from those
who are contributing precisely the threshold amount (those “bound” by the mechanism).
These users have intermediate net benefits of contributing. Those with high benefits are
already contributing more than the threshold amount, and they in fact reduce their total
contributions. Those with low benefits leave the system, thus reducing their (in any case,
small) contributions. One qualitative implication of this result is that for a threshold to be
beneficial, the number of people who increase their contributions to reach the threshold must
be sufficiently large compared to the number who exit the system.
Not only must there be a large enough group who are induced to increase their contribu-
tions, but the size of the pool when there is no minimum threshold must not be too large or a
threshold will not be beneficial. The system loses value from those participants who exit
10This only happens when the total size of the pool increases. However, by Proposition 5.3, no system
would want to introduce a threshold if it leads to a smaller pool.
11Formally, there will be some value of i, call it iu, such that for all users i > iu (high net benefits), contribu-
tions decrease, and in general this will include some users in this intermediate group who give the threshold
amount t. These are users who would freely contribute more than t, but when a threshold increases the size of
the pool reduce their contributions to t.
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rather than meet the threshold. Those doing the extra contributing are bearing additional
costs to create the larger pool. Therefore, the benefits to those who receive access must
be reasonably large for the overall value of the system to increase. But if the no-threshold
pool size is already large, then the gain will be modest, and will not offset the additional
contribution costs and the value lost by users who exit.
A related implication is that a threshold mechanism is more likely to be beneficial if
there aren’t too many who opt out. We have assumed that the cost of letting users access the
pool once it is created is approximately zero. There is always an increase in social value
from letting all users access an existing pool. The threshold mechanism excludes some users
to create an incentive to contribute content, but the value those users would have received
from access is a pure social loss that offsets the value of increased content. In a social
computing service in which much of the value comes from a large number of low-value
users, a threshold mechanism may be ill-advised, because more value will be lost from these
many excluded users than is gained by the remaining users.
From this last point we can see a deep connection to a fundamental result in the pricing
of information goods. When an information good costs resources (e.g., effort) to create, but
can be costlessly reproduced and distributed thereafter, charging a price to access or use
the good is a common way to recover the costs of creating it. Yet, charging a price creates
qualitatively the same tradeoff as the minimum threshold mechanism: it excludes those who
get value from the good, but not enough value to be willing to pay the access price. Market
pricing for information goods may increase social value (more goods are created in the first
place), but at a cost of the value lost by excluding those not willing to pay.
These findings are very general and apply to many different systems, though they are
limited by the assumptions we made in deriving them. One advantage of mathematical
modeling is that the assumptions are explicit, so that one can check if they hold in any given
system, and revise or extend the modeling to obtain testable predictions for those differing
circumstances.
5.4 Private Value
Users can receive value from their information in two different ways. First, users receive
value from having their information in the pool because, for example, contributions by
others improve one’s own information, and thus add value to it; we modeled this value
above, and will now refer to it as the social value. Second, though we have focused on
information pools, users might receive value directly from putting their information in the
system, independent of any contributions by others. For example, users of del.icio.us value
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it in part for its use as a stand-alone, web-accessible personal bookmarking tool (Chapter 4).
We call this non-social benefit from contributing the private value, pi(xi), and assume that it
is weakly concave (and increasing) in the amount of information contributed. Note that this
value might be zero: for example, if a user does not receive any independent benefit from
including their information in the information system.
This private value includes all types of motivation not dependent on others’ contribution,
including many social motivations: personal benefits from from social interactions, expected
benefits from meeting new people, and warm glow from being altruistic. We do not make
assumptions on how people derive value. Rather, we assume this value has a specific
structure: value increases as you increase contributions, but each additional contribution is
worth less (concavity). Any source of value consistent with this structure (social motivations,
etc.) is covered by the model.
Recognizing this value in the utility function, optimizing users will choose xi to maxi-
mize:
Ui(xi) = pi(xi)+ vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (5.4)
Even if there is no information pooling, or if there are no other contributors, a user will
naturally choose to contribute some amount of information for its private value.12. We call
this level of contribution x̂∗i , the private contribution.
For an informative pool, there are two possible ways this private value affects a mini-
mum threshold equilibrium. First, it is possible that x̂∗i > t; user i might want to voluntarily
contribute above the threshold for purely private reasons. If that is the case, then user i will
contribute exactly x̂∗i .
The other possibility is that x̂∗i ≤ t. In this case, the personal benefits serve to mit-
igate some of the costs associated with contribution. This can be seen by defining a
new cost function ĉi(xi) = ci(xi)− pi(xi). With this, the utility function then becomes
Ûi(xi) = vi(αxi + x−i)− ĉi(xi), which has the same form as the utility function we used
earlier. For all levels of contribution xi ≥ x̂∗i , this new cost function is increasing and convex
but strictly smaller than the original cost function ci(·). When x̂∗i ≤ t, user i can retain
pool access by contributing t, but now would do so at a lower absolute and marginal cost.
Therefore, with private benefits, more users will contribute the threshold t and fewer users
will choose to leave the system.
For collaborative pools, there is one additional effect. Users who already contribute
above the threshold will contribute even more due to the private value. Users who would
12To find the private contribution, delete the social value v(·) and maximize expression 5.1. The contribution





. It is unique because of the concavity/convexity assumptions on
these functions; c.f. Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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have contributed the threshold without private value may want to increase their contributions
above the threshold.
5.4.1 Blocking private use
When a user is excluded, should he also be excluded from accessing his own private infor-
mation? For example, if I am excluded from accessing del.icio.us, should I still be able to
see my own bookmarks? Mathematically, in our model, this is the difference between an
excluded user receiving pi(·)− ci(·) and the user only having cost −ci(·).
Unfortunately, the answer is “it depends.” If the system gives all users access to their
private contributions even if they are excluded from the rest of the pool, some users who
otherwise would have stopped using the system will instead use the system privately. These
users will not have access to the full information pool, but their contributions can still be
added to the pool for the benefit of everyone else. These benefits to every one can make it
worthwhile for a system to allow users to access a private version of the system that does
not include access to the full pool.
However, when the cost of contributing the threshold is very large, some users who
would normally contribute the threshold will instead choose to use the private version of the
system. These users end up contributing less information to the information pool, potentially
leading to a small information pool and lower total system welfare. When deciding if a
private version of the system should be offered, system designers need to assess which of
these effects is larger: are the increased contributions from private users enough to offset the
lost contributions from users who would otherwise contribute the threshold?
5.5 Discussion
There are several practical considerations for applying this mechanism in a social computing
system. Here we discuss a few of them:
5.5.1 Quality
This mechanism focuses on the quantity of contributions to an information pool, but often
contribution quality is as important or even more important. A threshold changes the distri-
bution of contributions and thus might change the distribution of quality. In addition, if users
can choose the quality of their contribution, a threshold might also (perhaps perversely)
affect the quality choice contributors make.
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First consider the change in the distribution of contributions: users with low to moderate
net benefits contribute more information than they would voluntarily. Suppose, for example,
that the cost of contribution is positively correlated with quality. This might hold because
experts have a higher opportunity cost (they have better things to do with their time). If
this assumption holds, then using a minimum threshold will induce more high-quality
contributions and might reduce the low-quality contributions.
However, if users can choose the quality of their contributions, then they are likely to
choose lower cost (easier) contributions. For example, if del.icio.us required a minimum
number of bookmarks, users bound by this requirement might simply bookmark the first t
websites they find, regardless of their quality.
Depending on the specifics of the information system, the designer might employ any
of several quality control mechanisms. One is to include some measure of quality in the
threshold measurement. For example, Wikipedia could set a threshold of t edits to articles
that are not reverted within 2 weeks. This ensures a minimum quality level for contributions.
Another method of ensuring quality is to use a secondary mechanism that induces higher
quality contributions. For example, Amazon.com asks its users to rate with up to 5 stars the
quality of each of its user-contributed reviews. It then provides public recognition for users
whose reviews are rated highly.
5.5.2 Measurement
To model this mechanism we assumed that there exists a meaningful way to measure the
quality-adjusted quantity of information contributions along a single continuous dimension,
x. In order to implement this mechanism in an actual social media system, we do not need a
continuous measure of quantity. A binary measure of whether the contribution is “enough”
— if it meets or exceeds the minimum threshold — is sufficient. For example, the GlassDoor
service doesn’t measure how much salary information a user contributed: if she contributes
at all she is granted access to the site. One implication of our analysis, since we predict
that many users will contribute exactly the minimum necessary, is that it is important to set
the threshold such that the including the minimum contribution in the information pool is
actually useful to other users.
5.5.3 Authentication
Excluding users who do not contribute enough depends on being able to identify them. This
usually is done by requiring that users create accounts before accessing the information pool.
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This is an additional cost of contribution, and might reduce use of the system (Gazzale and
MacKie-Mason, 2008).
5.5.4 Bootstrapping
Another practical problem is the bootstrapping problem: how does the system react to new
users before they have had an opportunity to contribute? This is important for two reasons.
First, social computing systems are often an experience good; users need to experience
the information pool to know how valuable it is to them so they can make an informed
choice. Second, users often learn how to contribute by mimicking the contributions of others.
Without being able to see others’ contributions, new users will not know the appropriate
social norms and conventions for the system.(Burke et al., 2009)
For these two reasons, it may be beneficial to implement an “introductory” period during
which users can see and interact with the system without meeting the threshold constraint.
At the end of the period the system can enforce the threshold. With such a practice, au-
thentication is not sufficient: the system designer must now address the problem of “cheap
pseudonyms” (Friedman and Resnick, 2001): users who create new accounts with a new
“introductory” periods to avoid the threshold requirements.
5.6 Using a Minimum Threshold Mechanism
Most social computing analysis is at an individual level: e.g. lurkers are valuable (Nonnecke
et al., 2006). In this study, we look at aggregate patterns, where it makes sense to ask about
design tradeoffs across individuals: when is it worthwhile to lose the lurkers in order to gain
more contributions from the remaining users?
An example will help illustrate this tradeoff. Facebook uses a minimum threshold. To
access Facebook, you must 1) create an account, and 2) contribute a list of friends (your
social network). Facebook doesn’t have true lurkers; everyone contributes something. Face-
book presumably made the decision that the increased contibutions (knowing everyone’s
social network) allowed them to create enough extra value for their remaining users that
it was worth losing the lurkers. Twitter made the opposite decision and does not have a
minimum threshold.
We characterize this design tradeoff in concrete terms, and provide advice, summarized
below, on when this tradeoff is worthwhile. We explicitly model the value from lurkers and
consider it a loss when they can no longer access the system. We then ask *when* that loss
is worthwhile. By looking at system-level properties, we are able to understand potentially
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valuable tradeoffs that individual-level analyses miss.
The Facebook example also illustrates another useful point. Everyone who remains in
the system will have contributed at least the minimum. If the threshold is chosen carefully,
the system can take advantage of the knowledge that everyone contributes this information.
On Facebook, everyone has to contribute social network information. Facebook is then
designed to take advantage of the fact that all Facebook users have provided their social
network information to the system; many features such as the privacy controls assume the
existence of contributed social network information. This well-chosen threshold enables
many useful features.
Because there is an unavoidable tradeoff, not all social computing systems will benefit
from using a minimum threshold. Our analysis above characterizes how users will react to a
system which uses this mechanism. We now use this information to provide concrete design
guidance for using the minimum threshold mechanism. A social computing system should
consider using the minimum threshold mechanism when:
• There are a large number of users in the system.
• Without an explicit mechanism, users contribute very little.
• Having more users contributing is more important than greater contributions from
each user.
When using the minimum threshold mechanism,
• Users with high costs of contributing and low benefits of access will stop using the
system.
• Setting a minimum threshold increases the breadth of contribution — more users
contribute — but potentially sacrifices depth of contribution.
• Systems with an informative pool will see a greater increase in contributions than
systems with a collaborative pool.
Finally, to use the minimum threshold mechanism,
• Watch the size of the pool as you change the threshold to know if the change helped.
• Set the threshold so that the minimum contribution has value to others, since most
users will contribute exactly the minimum.
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• Think carefully about whether to allow users to use the system privately (with access
only to their own private contributions) when they are excluded from the rest of the
system.
Even though it is costless to let everyone access an information pool and benefit from its
contents, we are frequently better off to use an excludable public goods rule that imposes
a minimum contribution. The reason is simple: without this incentive, participants will
undercontribute, and fully or partially free-ride on the contributions of others. Exclusion is
a knob the designer can turn to adjust the tradeoff between the benefits of inducing more




Improving the Design of the Social
Firewall
In Chapter 1, I introduced an idea for a technology I called a social firewall: a socio-technical
system that allows users to share information with each other about security-related firewall
decisions. Firewall decisions are technically simple; the user chooses whether specific
technical actions (such as allowing an application to access the network) should be Allowed
or Denied. Designing such a system is difficult, at least partially because it depends critically
on how its users behave. I discussed a number of different behaviors are are important to
the success of such a system: contributing information, ensuring quality, preventing mali-
ciousness, enabling collaboration, bootstrapping the initial pool of users, and encouraging
end-user innovation. In this dissertation I have focused on the first, and most important, of
these behaviors: encouraging users to contribution information to the system.
Encouraging contributions is not simple; contributing information requires time and
effort. This time and efforts is required for some or all of: data collection, analysis and
understanding, drafting, editing, annotating, and organizing. It also requires the contributor
to possess some information that he or she feels would be useful to the community created
by the system, and be confident enough in that information to be willing to contribute it. As
a result of these challenges, many users would prefer to use the system as a consumer, but
free ride on the contributions of others and not spend their energy making new contributions.
Unfortunately, if most of the users of the system feel this way, little information will be
contributed and the system will not be very useful.
In this dissertation, I have sought to understand some ways that the technical design of
socio-techincal systems influences the resulting user behavior. In this chapter I summarize
what I learned and apply it to improve the design of a social firewall.
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6.1 Design for Information Sharing
One fundamental design question for a social firewall is “What information should be
shared?” A very simple social firewall would take a standard personal firewall system and
augment it by sharing the Allow/Deny decisions that are made by users. Such a system
could simply display aggregate information about how other users have made the same
decisions; for example, it could display something like “80% of the users have chosen
Allow.” However, as I discussed in Section 2.3.4, this has a major problem: information
cascades. Once a few people choose one way, it is rational for everyone that follows to
follow the crowd, even if they privately believe the crowd is incorrect, and even if the crowd
has made a bad choice. Goecks et al. (2009) independently discovered this problem, but did
not present a solution.
Fortunately, the theory about information cascades provides some guidance for avoiding
them. Cascades happen because each individual only observes the decisions of previous
people, but not the outcomes; i.e. they never find out if the decisions were good decisions.
One way to avoid cascades is to share not just decisions but outcomes (Bikhchandani et al.,
1998): did this decision lead to a security incident, and did the decision lead to the user
not being able to use the computer as they wanted to? Unfortunately, outcome information
about security incidents is hard to come by; it is difficult to prove that no security incident
happened, and even when it does, it is difficult to pinpoint the one security decision that
enabled it. So sharing outcome information is infeasible.
The other feature leading to information cascades is the fact that there are a small
number of discrete options. Each user has to choose between Allow and Deny. I can avoid
information cascades by using a form of contribution that permits arbitrary information
to be conveyed: textual comments. I propose that a standard personal firewall should be
augmented with the ability to contribute free-text comments on each of the security decision
popups. Those comments will then be displayed for other users in the future who receive
the same popup on their computers, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. To achieve this, there should
be a central server that collects contributions from everyone, and that can be queried for
relevant comments for each popup by the personal firewall system.
6.2 Lessons about Home Computer Users
Free-text comments seem like a good solutions to the information cascades problem; but
will they work? Are home computer users capable of contributing useful comments that
help other users? The results of my study of home computer users in Chapter 3 indicate that
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   Please enter comments below: 
Deny Allow 
xyz.exe is a good program 
and it needs to access that 
xyz.exe is a good program 
and it needs to access that 
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   Please enter comments below: 
Deny Allow 
Figure 6.1 Diagram of the main interaction in a social firewall
users are likely to be able to contribute at least some useful information for each other, and
that those contributions might be useful to others.
Home computer users conceptualize computer security threats in multiple ways; conse-
quently, users make different decisions based on their conceptualization. In my interviews,
I found four distinct ways of thinking about malicious software as a security threat: the
‘viruses are bad,’ ‘buggy software,’ ‘viruses cause mischief,’ and ‘viruses support crime’
models. I also found four more distinct ways of thinking about malicious computer users as
a threat: thinking of malicious others as ‘graffiti artists,’ ‘burglars,’ ‘internet criminals who
target big fish,’ and ‘contractors to organized crime.’
Each different mental model induces user to focus on different types of defenses; for
example the ‘viruses cause mischief’ model is the only that induces users to make regular
backups of data because these users believe that a virus might randomly delete something
important. If other users were to be exposed to this conceptualization of viruses, then
they too would hopefully see the value in regular backups and begin following that advice.
Because the folk models differ in their security proscriptions, exposure to and understanding
of multiple models of threats may induce users to undertake more precautions. In this
small study, the few users who possessed multiple models of threats undertook all of the
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precautions that would help protect against any threat in their models. In other words, they
used an OR model of security: if security advice protected against Threat 1 OR Threat 2,
then they followed it.
While the home computer user study is rigorous, I did not use a generalizable sampling
method. I am able to describe a number of different folk models, but I cannot say how
prevalent each model is in the population. I also cannot say if my list of folk models is
exhaustive; there may be more models than I describe. It is possible that some of the models
I describe are extremely common in the general population, and information sharing would
not help among people with these common models. It is also possible that some of the
models are extremely rare; information sharing should be encouraged for holders of these
models when they are found.
6.2.1 Design suggestions
One goal of this research was to discover information that could be applied to designing
better security technologies. To this end, I provide an example of how this information can
provide some potentially useful design suggestions for a social firewall.
From this study, I better understand the value of textual comments in a social firewall.
My respondents described making security-related decisions by applying their current un-
derstanding (their mental model) to better understand the risks involved. In addition to
the decision, textual comments allow the user to convey reasons for making that decision,
including relevant parts of their mental model(s). This is important because my respondents
indicated that they intentionally ignored security advice that seemed irrelevant to their
understanding of the risks; users would likely also ignore advice from others that did not
include an understandable explanation. Users can also use textual comments to tell the
stories that inspired certain security decisions. For example, they can tell a story about how
a specific Deny decisions might have caused some application to stop working.
Additionally, I have learned from this study what type of information might be influential.
Users are likely to get the most value out of comments that explain folk models. Such
comments can help users understand why a particular decision is important by helping
them to understand the security threat that the decision addresses. For example, users who
think that all hackers are Graffiti-type could benefit from being exposed to the idea that
hackers might steal information for identity theft. This could cause them to take additional
precautions, like using anti-virus software. The system could specifically prompt users to
contribute information about “what threat does this decision address?”
I suggest that the contribution interface (the security popup) have two separate text
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boxes: 1) what threat the security decision affects, and 2) how that decision helps protect
against that threat. By prompting users for these two pieces of information, the system
will encourage users to contribute information from their mental model of threats. This
information can then be used by other users to make Allow / Deny decisions.
6.3 Lessons from the Delicious Study
From the social bookmarking website del.icio.us, I learned in Chapter 4 that even when users
contribute for only individual, non-social reasons, a social information system can succeed
in producing a broadly-useful pool of shared information. Users of del.icio.us contribute
bookmarks and tags for personal organization. The system then shares these contributions
by default by making them publicly accessible as a side effect. The design of del.icio.us
ensures that the contributed bookmarks are useful to others through incentive alignment:
users are encouraged to limit and focus their bookmark choices to maintain their personal
organization, and consequently, these limited, focused collections of bookmarks are useful
to others.
Del.icio.us is only a single case study; the side effect mechanism it uses will not neces-
sarily work for other social computing systems. However, it does illustrate the feasibility
of this mechanism: it has worked for one specific social computing system. Most of the
concrete findings come from the small sample qualitative study, but my description of the
mechanism relies on the assumption that the trends found in that study are widespread on
the site. I did verify that tags are commonly applied for personal organization reasons, but I
did not verify that bookmarks are regularly chosen for personal reasons. If some of findings
are highly idiosyncratic to my sample, then the description of the side effect mechanism
might not hold true for del.icio.us.
6.3.1 Design suggestions
Private, individual reasons to contribute can be powerful motivators. Engineering a system
to provide private benefits from contribution, and then making those contributions public as
a side effect, can be an effective method of inducing users to share information electronically.
To apply this mechanism to design a social firewall, we must provide users with a private,
personal reason to contribute information that is aligned with the needs of other users when
they consume that information.
I propose creating a supplemental interface where users can return and revise their
security decisions easily. This interface allows users to better manage their own security.
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A number of the respondents in the home security study who had used personal firewall
systems expressed concern with choosing Deny; they felt that the decision was irreversible
(or at least difficult to reverse) and didn’t know what would break. Providing an interface
where they can sort through previous security decisions and make changes might help with
this problem.
This interface can also display the information the computer user has contributed about
why he or she made that particular decision; both information about the threat and informa-
tion about how that decision helps with the threat. By having this information available, users
can better revise security decisions because they know more about what they were thinking
when the original decision was made. This is a private reason to contribute information; the
user can help his future self revise security decisions.
The contributed information can also be sent to a central server and made available
to other users who are faced with similar decisions. This is the side effect mechanism;
users contribute information for private reasons but the information is made public as a
side effect. This design also properly aligns the contribution incentive with the needs of
consumers. Users contribute the semi-structured information that will help them most revisit
their decisions. This information will also be able to help others because the purpose is the
same: understanding why the decision was (or should be) made in a certain way.
6.4 Lessons from the Minimum Threshold Study
Setting a minimum threshold has the potential increase the amount of contribution from
a number of users of a social computing system. But, my analysis of this mechanism in
Chapter 5 demonstrates that this mechanism has a tradeoff: some number of low marginal
value users refuse to contribute and leave the system altogether, no longer able to receive
any benefit from the system. Understanding this tradeoff is the core of understanding when
to use a minimum threshold.
There are identifiable circumstances under which setting a minimum contribution thresh-
old for participation in a social information system will lead to an increase in breadth of
contribution by causing a larger proportion of users to make a non-trivial contribution, and
cause the total quantity of contributions to increase. Minimum thresholds are best used
when breadth of contribution (number of users contributing) is more important than depth
of contribution (how much each user contributes). This mechanism also works best when
there are many users in the system, since large numbers of users all contributing create more
value from accessing the system, and thus provide a stronger incentive to contribute the
minimum in order to gain access. Additionally, a minimum threshold system will have a
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stronger effect in an informative pool than a collaborative pool.
The largest issue with my analysis of minimum thresholds is that it is a theoretical
model; I have no empirical data to validate my claims. The model is predicated on the
strong assumption that users will behave rationally. The Nash equilibrium solution concept
assumes a static equilibrium, but in practice users choose their contributions over time. I
believe that the Nash equilibium is a good first approximation of human behavior in strategic
settings; however, it is very important to validate Nash equilibrium predictions with real
world data since users often deviate from fully rational behavior.
6.4.1 Design suggestions
A social firewall, as discussed so far, forms an informative information pool. Users do not
collaborate with each other; having one’s own information in the pool doesn’t necessarily
encourage others to build on it. This is a favorable condition for using a minimum threshold.
Previously, I suggested that it might be beneficial to expose home computer users to
different types of folk models of security threats; this exposure might encourage them to
recognize more security threats, follow more security advice, and exert more effort securing
their machines. Since a social firewall has contributions from home computer users rather
than experts, I suspect that it would be more beneficial if a wide variety of users contribute
rather than having a small number of users contribute. My analysis Chapter 5 suggests that
a minimum threshold system would increase the breadth of contribution by encouraging
more users to contribute. This is one way to achieve this variety.
The Facebook example illustrates one good way of implementing a minimum threshold:
have a mandatory information contribution that happens at signup. For a social firewall, one
strategy that might work is to have each user choose one security decision from a list of
common security decisions, and contribute answers to the two questions in every security
prompt (listed above): 1) what threat does this security decision address, and 2) how does
this security decision address the threat. Basically, users get to make a contribution to one
popup of their choice. This is the minimum contribution required to gain access to the
system.
Providing a list of possible security decisions ensures that users comment on decisions
which could benefit from additional comments. But allowing users to choose from a list
allows users to choose to contribute information that they feel strongly about, or feel knowl-
edgeable about. This will hopefully help increase the quality of the contributions. However,
as discussed in Chapter 5, some additional quality check should be done to ensure that users
aren’t just typing gibberish. If the final design of the social firewall includes some sort of
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comment rating system (like Amazon’s thumbs-up/thumbs down), then maybe access can
be revoked if a user’s contributions receive too many negative ratings.
Since the mandatory-contribution-at-signup system is an instance of a minimum thresh-
old, my analysis in Chapter 5 states that this will increase the breadth of contribution by
getting many different users to make contributions about a number of different security
decisions. And since users are allowed to choose a decision to comment on, the comments
are likely to be well-informed and well-explained (or at least better informed than other
comments from that same user). By requiring them to comment on both of the points
listed above, users are forced to explain their mental model of the threats they face. Since
we are getting a wide variety of these explanations, subsequent users who see all of these
comments will be exposed to many different ideas about the threats they face; this should
help encourage them to make more secure decisions.
6.5 Going Forward
In this dissertation I focus on the primary behavioral concern in designing a social firewall:
inducing users to contribute information that home computer users will be able to use to
make better security decisions. The findings in Chapters 3-5 all apply beyond designing
a social firewall. Chapter 3 describes the folk models that home computer users apply to
making security decisions. This knowledge can be used to design better user education and
better security systems. Chapters 4 and 5 describe general mechanisms that may apply in
many different types of social computing systems. Both the side effect mechanism and the
minimum threshold mechanism can be used on almost any social computing system; my
analysis helps to understand how to use them and when they should be used.
There are many more mechanisms for inducing contribution than the ones I discussed
in this dissertation. These two mechanism do not work in every situation for every social
computing system; much work is still needed to identify more complementary mechanisms
for inducing contributions. However, I have identified two mechanisms that are general
enough to work in most social computing systems, practically simple enough to be included
in the current system, and powerful enough to make a difference in contributions.
There are still many important behavioral considerations that need to be addressed for a
social firewall to be successful. If these mechanisms are successful in inducing contributions,
then the next important challenge will be to address quality. Contribution and quality cannot
completely be separated; these design suggestions above also focus on how to induce the
type of contributions that will be most helpful. This is one important aspect of quality.
Quality is important because it is usually impossible to display all of the relevant contri-
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butions at one time. Some subset of contributions must be chosen for display. There are
a number of possible ways to deal with this: Amazon.com uses a “thumbs up” system for
allowing users to indicate which reviews are most valuable; Slashdot uses a meta-moderation
system where random users are given points which they can use to vote a few contributions
as helpful (Lampe and Resnick, 2004). Designing mechanisms to deal with quality is an
important issue in designing social computing systems like a social firewall.
In addition to quality, mechanisms need to be designed for all of the behavioral chal-
lenges listed in Section 1.3.1: user retention, collaboration, preventing maliciousness,
bootstrapping, and end-user innovation.
In this dissertation I also illustrate an incentive centered design approach to the design
of social computing systems. I focused on identifying the behaviors that would be most
beneficial to solving a specific problem (botnets), and then I worked on designing technology
that would elicit those behaviors. I believe that this approach is a valuable way to design
complex socio-technical systems to solve practical, real-world problems.
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Appendix A
Interview Guide for Folk Models Study
The study was divided into two rounds. The first round was more exploratory. In this round,
I asked a wide variety of questions about how users manage their security. In the second
round, I focused in on three specific aspects of security: viruses, hackers, and identity theft.
A.1 Round 1
Below is a copy of the basic interview questions from round 1. I took a printout of this
sheet with me on each interview, and used it to make notes about interesting observations,
followup questions, and any other notes to myself.
This list of questions is very broad, and mostly intended to prompt users to talk about
the security. I used it primarily to find out what kinds of threats users noticed, and how they
dealt with those threats.
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Folk Models of Security -- Specific Questions 
Background and Demographics
• What do you do for a living? 
• Do you own a computer? 
• What type?  What does it run? 
• What do you use it for? 
• Email?  Surfing web?  Games?  Work?
• Do you use a computer at work? 
• What kind? 
• What do you use that for? 
• When you have problems with your computer, 
what do you do?  Call someone?  Who?
General Problems
• What different types of security problems exist 
in computers? (Write them down) 
• For each type of problem:
• Can you elaborate? 
• Who does it? 
• What kind of person is behind it?  
• Do you have any idea why they do it? 
• What are some ways you have of stopping 
it? 
• How does that work? 
• What do you have to do to make it work? 
• Is there any way around it? 
• Are there any other information security 
problems you can think of?
Specific Threats
• Viruses + Worms
• Do you know what a computer virus is? 
• How do you get a computer virus? 
• Can others get a computer virus from 
you?
• What happens when you get one? 
• How do you get rid of a computer virus? 
• Have you ever had one? 
• How are viruses created?  Why?
• Targeted Attacks
• Do hackers ever try to break into your 
computer? 
• Why would they do this?  What would they 
gain? 
• How do they break in? 
• Why do they break in?  Are they looking 
for something?
• What do they do once inside? 
• How can you stop them? 
• Have you ever had this problem?
• Trojans / Downloaded programs (including 
spyware and adware)
• Can programs you download from the 
Internet ever do something bad? 
• What do you mean by bad? 
• What kinds of programs will do this? 
• What exactly do they do? 
• Why do they do this? 
• How do you stop them? 
• Have you ever had one? 
Defenses
• Passwords 
• Do you have a password for your computer? 
• Why? 
• Do you ever change it?  Why? 
• Why are passwords necessary? 
• Do you have other passwords? 
• Any problems with so many? 
• Is it OK to write them down?  Give them to 
others?  Why or why not? 
• Updates 
• Do you ever update your operating system? 
• Are the updates automatic? 
• Do you ever update other applications / 
programs on your computer? 
• Do you just buy new versions, or are you 
aware of smaller updates like patches? 
• Do you have any other security software 
installed? 
• Firewall? 
• Do you ever interact with it?   How? 
• How do you decide if its OK?
• Anti-virus? 
• Has it ever caught a virus? 
• What do you do when it does?
• Anti-spyware? 
• Has it ever found anything? 
• What do you do when it does? 
• If not, have you considered security 
software?   Why didn't you?
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A.2 Round 2
In the second round of interviews, I used a revised list of questions based on what worked
and didn’t work in the first round. I augmented this list with three scenarios. These scenarios
were intended to 1) provide a hypothetical instance of a security problem to better understand
how users would react, and 2) challenge the users mental models and see how they resolve
the challenges. Below I include both the revised list of questions and the scenarios.
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Scenario 1:
A friend you trust calls you to tell you that a ‘hacker’ has compromised your computer.
• What would be going through your head as they tell you this?
• Would you believe them?
• Would this surprise you?
• What do you think would happen to your computer?
• What is your best guess as to why the hacker would do this?
• (followup this -- what information is he looking for?  would he find it?)
• What is your best guess who it would be?
• what kind of person?
• What is your best guess as to how they were able to access your computer?
• What would you do about it?
Your trusted friend tells you that the hacker left a program running on your computer.
• Would you believe him/her?
• Would this surprise you?
• What is your best guess about what this program does?
Scenario 2:
After briefly using your computer to check his or her email, a friend you trust tells you 
that you have a virus on your computer that was written by the Russian mafia.
• What would be going through your head as they tell you this?
• What do you think this virus would do?
• Why?
• What is your best guess as to how you got this virus on your computer?
• Is this different from other viruses you have had or heard about?
• How so?
Scenario 3:
You receive a call from the police.  They tell you that they have evidence that you have 
been the victim of identity theft.
• What would be going through your head as they tell you this?
• What do you think they mean by “identity theft”?
• What would you do about it?
• What would be your best guess as to who this criminal would be?
• What would be your best guess as to how the criminal got the information needed?
The police inform you that someone has been using your main credit card.
• Do you think that this is “identity theft”?
• What would you do about it?
• What would be your best guess as to who this criminal would be?
• What would be your best guess as to how the criminal got the information needed?
The police also inform you that this person has applied for and received a large loan in 
your name.
• Do you think that this is “identity theft”?
• What would you do about it?
• What would be your best guess as to who this criminal would be?
• What would be your best guess as to how the criminal got the information needed?
Home Security Interview Study: Questions
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Home Security Interview Study: Questions
Background Questions
• What do you do for a living?
• Do you use a computer for that?
• What kinds of things do you use it for?
• You have a computer at home?
• What type of computer is it? (Mac/PC)
• What kinds of things do you use it for?
• Does anyone else use it?
• Can you think of any problems you have had 
recently with your computer?
Viruses
• Have you ever had a virus on your computer?
• Can you describe what happened?
• When?
• What did it do?
• How did you know it was a virus?
• How did you fix it?
• Do you know where it came from / how 
you got it?
• Do you know how the virus was created?
• What do you think the virus was trying to 
do?
• Do you know anyone who has had a virus?
• Same questions as above
• Are you worried about viruses on your 
computer?
• What are you worried viruses will do?
• What else can viruses do?
• What do you do about it?
• Is your A/V up to date?
• Does it ever pop up and say anything?
• What makes places seem unhygenic?
• If you got a virus, how would you know?
• Where do you think the virus came from?
• Why do you think it was made?  (Does 
this question even make sense to the 
user?)
Hackers
• Have you ever had a problem with hackers?
• If so, can you describe it?
• What happened?
• Who did it?  Why?
• How was it detected?  fixed?
• Do you know anyone who has had a problem 
with hackers?
• Are you worried about hackers?
• Why?
• What do you think they will do?
• What else can they do?
• What can you do about it?  Are you doing 
about it?
• Do you think you will have a problem with 
hackers?
• Why or why not?
• What do you do to protect yourself?
Identity Theft
• Do you shop online?
• Can you remember the last time you 
shopped online?  How did you pay?  What 
information did you provide?
• Do you provide your CC# in general?   
Address?
• Are you worried about that?
• What would make you not want to give 
out that information?
• Do you bank online?  taxes online?
• Do you do financial stuff on your computer at 
all?
• Are you worried about Identity Theft?
• Who are you worried about getting your 
info?
• Who is safe to give your info to?  How can 
you tell?
• How can they get your personal info?
Integration Questions (last)
• Are all hackers looking for identity 




Intermediate Analysis of Folk Models of
Home Computer Security
B.1 Interpreting the Facets in Table 3.2
B.1.1 Viruses
B.1.1.1 Creator
There are a couple different understandings of how viruses are created. There are some
interesting overlaps between people’s ideas of virus creators and of hackers.
No creator Viruses are like biological viruses in that there is no explicit creator. They just
exist, or are created accidentally by computer programmers. Respondents will acknowledge
that they must have been created by someone, but never thought about who that is. Often
these types of viruses do not have a purpose, they just have effects on computers. Much like
a cold virus doesn’t have a purpose, but causes various symptoms that are annoying.
Mischievous Individual Viruses are created by people who are being mischievous. These
are usually technically talented, misguided teenagers. The motivation of these individuals
for writing viruses is ”sheer sport” (Lorna) or ”who want to hurt people for no reason.”
(Dana) A slightly different but related motivation is writing viruses as part of ”learning
about the internet” (Jack) or ”as a technical challenge” (Floyd).
Professional Criminal Viruses are created by one or more people who are basically pro-
fessional criminals. People talk about ”massive hacker groups” (Hayley) Often respondents
talked about viruses being created to steal personal info (presumably for ID theft reasons).
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Others believe that they were created for a purpose, but don’t necessarily know enough to
know what that purpose is. (Hayley) Usually, ”making money” is the believed goal of the
created, though occasionally they presume a goal of ”taking down the government”.
B.1.1.2 Effects they have
Most users didn’t distinguish between different types of computer viruses. All viruses they
got had a chance of having effects from a specific list. There are a couple different ways of
thinking about the effects of viruses that reveal a lot about the underlying mental model of
viruses.
Errors, Bugs, and Crashes Viruses are basically poorly-written software. They might not
have been created intentionally, but they are badly written and their effects are exaggerated
versions of normal software bugs. These effects occur mostly randomly. Sometimes the
computer will get slow. Sometimes the computer will crash, or a program will crash (”boot
me out” of applications (Erica)). It might accidentally delete or ”wipe out” information
(Christine and Erica) or delete system files (Jack). Overall, the computer ”doesn’t function
properly.” (Erica)
Mischievous Problems Viruses are programs that cause mischief. The effects of viruses
are mostly there to be really annoying. Displaying a skull and crossbones (1st round).
Downloading pornography. (Lorna) Viruses can cause a bunch of popups. Deleting files
and programs, or causing the computer not to boot are also in this category, but are more
intentional effects rather than accidents. (Floyd) Despite being intentional, the respondent
still thinks they are done “for no reason.” (Floyd)
Facilitating Crime Viruses are intentionally placed on computers to facilitate some sort
of criminal activity. Most of the time respondents talked about viruses that steal personal or
financial information. Some users talk about viruses being ”automatic” ways of collecting
this information. (Irving) Some users would use the term “Spyware” here, but most did not.
This also covers when people talk about popups as advertising? (Floyd?)
Focus on Visible Outcomes without Thinking About How and Why A number of
users focused their comments primarily on effects that would effect the usefulness of the
computer to them. They would only talk about effects that caused major interruptions, such
as crashing, data loss, slowness, or popups. If it didn’t effect their direct use of the computer,
then they didn’t think about it. Some users seemed to be cognizant of this; Lorna says there
140
might be “hidden ones” and Gail says “If it wasn’t an annoying virus I wouldn’t know.”
Others seemed to presume either that the only effects were user-visible (Christine says “I
guess I would know, wouldn’t I?”) or that any non-user-visible effects didn’t really matter.
B.1.1.3 Transmission and Prevention
The final major category of differences regards how viruses are transmitted, “caught,” and
prevented. First, everyone assumes that no one gets viruses intentionally; it must be a
mistake to get a virus.
Active Mistakes For some people, the main way you get viruses is by actively clicking
on the virus or downloading the virus. You might not know that it is a virus, but you have
to actively put it on your computer. The most common way this is stated is that viruses
come from email attachments; you have to open the attachment (aka run the virus) to be
infected. Often these emails come from people you don’t know. (Irving) Erica talks about
how if you download games you can get a virus. This might be similar. Lorna talks about
clicking on bad links in websites and believes this is more dangerous because she knows
how to recognize bad emails but not bad links.
Passive Mistakes If you are hanging out in the bad parts of the Internet, than you can
accidentally pick up a virus. For these people, there is no specific action that gets you a
virus; you are just more susceptible to them if you go to shady websites. Downloading a
game or going to “the FaceBook” or “the MySpace” (Dana) is also included. Floyd believes
it is related to cookies, which are another thing that are automatically put on your computer
by websites.
They Just Happen No one mentioned that viruses just happen. Despite the fact that many
real viruses right now spread automatically without human intervention, exploiting bugs
in listening software; all of the major viruses in the news recently have been of this type.
Despite this, many people seemed to know that keeping all your software up to date is
important. I don’t think they could have told me exactly why, but they know it is important
for stopping viruses.
B.1.1.4 Sources
There are various places from which you can get viruses:
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Emails Viruses come from emails. These are usually suspect emails from people you
don’t recognize. Some users believe you need to open the email, or open the attachment
on the email, to be infected by the virus. Users who see email as a source of viruses often
repeat the security lesson “don’t open attachments from people you don’t recognize” or
“don’t open attachments you weren’t expecting.”
Web Pages Viruses come from visiting web pages. One person things frequently places
like “the FaceBook” and “the MySpace” will likely lead to getting a virus. People who
feel this way thing that just going to a web page will lead to contracting the virus. Most
people feel that business webpages are OK, and more morally ambiguous webpages (like
pornography or other entertainment webpages) are more likely to lead to infection. Most
respondents also believed that a “secured” website would not lead to a virus. However, one
respondent (Gail) acknowledged that at some sites “maybe the protection wasn’t working at
those sites and they went bad.” Infection here is very passive and comes from visiting the
website.
Downloads / Files Some viruses must be downloaded in order to get onto your computer.
Therefore, by avoiding downloading files or program, a person can avoid being infected
by those viruses. Often people talk about download games as a particularly risky activity
because it might come with a virus.
B.1.2 Hackers
The word ‘hacker’ is a generic term that most respondents use to describe a computer
criminal.
B.1.2.1 Identity
Different respondents had very different ideas of who hackers were. These are usually
stereotypes of the type of person they believe is most likely to be a hacker.
Mischievous Technical Individual Hackers are individuals with strong technical skills
but ”a little unethical.” (Christine) Sometimes they are envisioned as college-age ”computer
science types.” (Kenneth) People with this model focus on two features: strong technical
skills and the lack of proper moral restraint. Strong technical skills provide the motivation;
hackers do it ”for sheer sport” (Lorna) or to demonstrate technical prowess (Hayley). Lack
of moral restraint is what makes them different than others with technical skills; hackers
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are sometimes described as people as maladjusted individuals who “want to hurt others for
no reason.” (Dana) Respondents will describe hackers as ”miserable” people. They feel
that hackers do what they do for no good reason, or at least no reason they can understand.
Hackers are considered lone individuals.
Professional Criminal Hackers are criminals that happen to use a computer to commit
crimes. Other than the computer as a method of operation, they are similar to most other
criminals: They are motivated by some sort of financial gain; they can do what they do be-
cause they lack morals. Frequently this is associated with some form of ID theft. Sometimes
but not always hackers can be part of some criminal group.
Anyone Hackers could be anyone. Often the respondent hasn’t thought a lot about who
hackers are, but doesn’t have pre-conceived notions. They could be any kind of person.
Sometimes they are described as having some amount of computer skill, but that is all they
describe.
B.1.2.2 Behavior: What Do Hackers Do?
Hackers undertake many different activities as part of their hacking. Different respondents
had very different opinions about what it was that hackers did.
Looking for Secrets Hackers break into computers to look for secrets. For example,
hackers may be looking for information for industrial or governmental espionage purposes.
(Christine) These are secrets that the hackers are not supposed to have. It is unclear why
hackers would want this information; respondents don’t really think about how this in-
formation benefits the hackers (i.e. sold? used directly?). Subjects with this model feel
that hackers would not target them because they do not have any secret information worth
looking for.
Targeting Big Fish Hackers break into computers to look for information that can be
directly used for financial gain. Looking for bank information like account numbers and
passwords is common. Looking for credit card information is also common. Hackers
specifically target the computers of people who have lots of money (the ‘big fish’), and the
respondent feels that they don’t have enough money to be a target. ”Maybe if I had a lot
of money” (Floyd) they would be a target. Another thing that they might be looking for
is usernames / passwords to places like Amazon which they can use to spend your money.
This doesn’t cause harm to the computer.
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Targeting Databases Hackers are looking for information that can be directly used for
financial gain like credit card numbers or bank account information. However, the best place
to go to get this is large databases of this information. Therefore, hackers go after places like
Amazon.com or hacking into banks. Since each respondent has only a single person’s (or
single family’s) worth of financial information on their computer, it is not worth breaking
into their computer. This doesn’t cause harm to the computer.
Random Financial Theft Hackers are looking for financial information. However, they
either don’t target specific individuals or they do so but poorly. One respondent talks about
how he might be a victim ”by accident.” People with this model are concerned about their
computer being broken into by a hacker looking for financial information, and take steps to
prevent it. This doesn’t cause harm to the computer.
Break stuff Hackers are mischevious individuals who like to cause havoc. They inten-
tionally break things on your computer and put viruses on your computer. They might use
your computer to send malicious emails or to use your IM client to send taunting messages
to your friends. This frequently causes harm to the computer. There is no targeting here;
hackers just break into whatever computer they can find and spread havoc. Because the
hacking is random and causes damage, it is worth trying to prevent the attacks that cause
lots of damage. (One subject talked about using his IM, and it wasn’t bothering him enough
to stop it.)
B.1.2.3 Prevention and Response
There are many way to deal with the hacker threat, and different users felt different needs to
deal with it.
Trust in the Software For some people, an “anti-virus” program is really a catch-all
security solution. it protects against hackers. People who believe this often put their trust in
this software to protect them from attacks, or at least notify them of attacks. Others call this
software a “firewall,” but the effect is the same.
Passwords Passwords are an essential security tool to help protect against hackers. Pass-
words can protect access to important websites like bank accounts and Amazon.com.
Regularly changing passwords is important so the hackers can’t guess them. If you have a
problem, you should change your passwords for protection.
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Care on the Internet Hackers can find out about you from various websites on the Inter-
net, so it is important to be careful. ”All they need is an email address” to break into your
computer. Don’t distribute your information over the internet, whether that is email address
or personal info (name, postal address, etc.). Don’t go to useless websites. Some people
take this so far as to always log out of websites they visit and to delete cookies regularly.
Hackers are like Viruses Hackers get into you computer much like viruses do. Therefore,
don’t download applications if you don’t trust the source, and don’t open suspicious emails.
Keep Targeted Information Off Computer Hackers break into computers to look for
specific information like financial information. Therefore, you reduce the temptation for
hackers to break in if you don’t ever put that kind of sensitive information on your computer.
Don’t put your credit card number or social security number into the computer at all, and
the hacker won’t want to break in to get it.
Futility Hackers can always get in if they really want to; there is no way to stop them. “If
they are going to get in, they’re going to get in.” (Hayley) There isn’t anything you can do
to stop a dedicated hacker, except maybe turning off the computer.
Trust in Institutions Trust large institutions to get security right. For example, you can
give your information to your bank because your bank is a large institution that has a strong
reason to be secure. Respondents with this belief don’t really know how the security works,
and don’t care. They just know that the institutions will get it right.
B.1.3 Relationships
This section looks at the relationships among the major concepts.
B.1.3.1 Viruses and Hackers
This section looks at the relationships between the respondents’ idea of “hacker” and their
idea of “virus”.
Viruses are Tools of Hackers Viruses are intentionally created by hackers, and serve to
further the goals of the hacker. For the most part, there isn’t much distinction here; hackers
and viruses both can break into computers. Hackers make viruses, and viruses serve the
145
purposes of hackers. Often hackers will install viruses onto people’s computers. Though not
all software that a hacker installs is necessarily a virus.
Completely Separate Hackers and viruses are completely separate entities. Viruses may
be created by people, or may just happen, but being hacked and getting a virus are very
different. Hackers break in and do stuff on your computer, and then leave. (Lorna even
thinks that hackers would need to be in front of a computer to run things, so she is confused
how hackers work.) Viruses “infect” your computer and get into things. They stick around
longer and can cause more problems. Often when faced with a virus with a known creator,
the respondent really interprets it as a hacker tool rather than a virus. Also, Irving believes
that viruses have different agency, and don’t necessarily work at the behest of a hacker. “The
hacker is an individual hacking, while the virus is a program infecting. So it’s a difference
between something automatic and more personal.” Hackers intentionally do some actions
on a computer to further their own goals. Where viruses are programs that automatically do
actions.
Haven’t Thought About It A number of respondents indicate that they had never thought
about the relationship between viruses and hackers before. When prompted about how or
why viruses are created, they might respond “Haven’t the faintest idea” (Kenneth). They
start out thinking they are completely separate. Usually, though, this changes throughout the
interview; respondents realize that hackers are an obvious potential creator of viruses, and
then state so. They then go on to describe a slightly different model of the relationship that
is less independent. This realization is often described as a guess; for example Dana says “I
guess if they hack into your system and get a virus on there, its gonna be the same thing.”
B.2 Folk Models of the 33 Participants
Table 3.3 shows which models each of the 10 participants in Round 2 use. Below, I provide

























































































































































































































































Full Results of Logistic Regression
[[1]]
A List Apart: Articles: Alternative Style: Working With Alternate Style Sheets
http://www.alistapart.com/stories/alternate/
0ce30dff2f6a9e9c6c753d4946f538a9
Total Number of Users of Site: 395
Number of Users in Fit: 395
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.46973 0.15626 -41.4039 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.16655 0.18286 -0.9108 0.36239
used.byUserTRUE 3.76397 0.20516 18.3461 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.57796 0.22498 -2.5689 0.01020 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classcss 6.14489 0.18985 32.3673 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdesign 4.11294 0.17730 23.1979 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.78741 0.24457 15.4861 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classjavascript 3.76703 0.17579 21.4294 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdev 2.98115 0.22628 13.1747 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesign 2.73236 0.18983 14.3939 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classstylesheet 2.67296 0.34518 7.7437 9.659e-15 ***
tag_classswitcher 2.56177 0.36140 7.0886 1.355e-12 ***
tag_classhtml 2.48451 0.21542 11.5334 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classalternate 2.44257 0.39081 6.2501 4.102e-10 ***
tag_classweb 2.34598 0.20563 11.4089 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classstyle 2.32592 0.34946 6.6557 2.820e-11 ***
tag_classstylesheets 2.29659 0.39859 5.7618 8.325e-09 ***
tag_classstyleswitcher 2.09305 0.44563 4.6968 2.642e-06 ***
tag_classtutorial 1.76898 0.23866 7.4120 1.244e-13 ***
tag_classhowto 1.54644 0.26882 5.7528 8.777e-09 ***
tag_classtutorials 1.44059 0.30985 4.6493 3.330e-06 ***
tag_classaccessibility 1.41654 0.36668 3.8631 0.0001119 ***
tag_classxhtml 1.25694 0.35172 3.5737 0.0003519 ***
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tag_classprogramming 1.08749 0.28725 3.7858 0.0001532 ***
tag_classdevelopment 1.03605 0.34107 3.0377 0.0023842 **
tag_classtech 0.93826 0.43632 2.1504 0.0315259 *
tag_classreference 0.90484 0.27729 3.2631 0.0011020 **
tag_classcode 0.86912 0.42409 2.0494 0.0404240 *
tag_classarticle 0.74539 0.45798 1.6276 0.1036131
tag_classweb2.0 0.70087 0.33780 2.0748 0.0380043 *
tag_classblogs 0.49731 0.42830 1.1611 0.2455835
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.54896 +- 0.74091
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 5517 on 5.29e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 5581




Lambda_p: 0.2322 (d= 8.172 ; p-value: 3.03e-16 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6071 (d= 30.21 ; p-value: 1.966e-200 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.5066 (d= 22.38 ; p-value: 5.827e-111 ) (for selection models)





css webdesign system:unfiled javascript webdev
Never Used 0.4194954 0.08652695 0.06402465 0.06281392 0.02963893
Used Only On Site 0.3795651 0.07423755 0.05473973 0.05369451 0.02520637
Used Only By User 0.9689050 0.80331876 0.74680502 0.74293127 0.56841463
Recommended Tag 0.9367082 0.65985826 0.58349555 0.57853334 0.38482484
design stylesheet switcher html alternate
Never Used 0.02326253 0.02195032 0.01968605 0.01824908 0.01751264
Used Only On Site 0.01976415 0.01864551 0.01671632 0.01549270 0.01486580
Used Only By User 0.50664739 0.49179735 0.46406276 0.44491017 0.43457733
Recommended Tag 0.32785262 0.31489818 0.29141909 0.27572601 0.26742938
web style stylesheets styleswitcher tutorial
Never Used 0.01592598 0.01561460 0.01517011 0.01241100 0.00900657
Used Only On Site 0.01351565 0.01325076 0.01287268 0.01052696 0.00763534
Used Only By User 0.41101174 0.40616404 0.39910950 0.35143937 0.28154953
Recommended Tag 0.24893712 0.24520518 0.23981729 0.20469203 0.15692434
howto tutorials accessibility xhtml programming
Never Used 0.007222615 0.006501849 0.006348313 0.00541695 0.004576437
Used Only On Site 0.006121311 0.005509837 0.005379599 0.00458970 0.003877046
Used Only By User 0.238790117 0.220083415 0.215982746 0.19018238 0.165441882
Recommended Tag 0.129675755 0.118189813 0.115706002 0.10035105 0.086054746
development tech reference code article
Never Used 0.004347976 0.003944520 0.003815361 0.003681995 0.003254879
Used Only On Site 0.003683371 0.003341377 0.003231904 0.003118868 0.002756895
Used Only By User 0.158461230 0.145852181 0.141737647 0.137448379 0.123426507
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Recommended Tag 0.082094253 0.075020151 0.072733657 0.070361396 0.062686057
web2.0 blogs Other
Never Used 0.003113565 0.002541588 0.001547240
Used Only On Site 0.002637144 0.002152499 0.001310175
Used Only By User 0.118689059 0.098993698 0.062633799
Recommended Tag 0.060120095 0.049596770 0.030760703
[[2]]
London Underground History - Disused Stations on London’s Underground
http://underground-history.co.uk/front.php
1b33100ce08e52df31cbf3ad4c7ed801
Total Number of Users of Site: 369
Number of Users in Fit: 369
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.295967 0.136206 -46.2238 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.336526 0.167991 -2.0032 0.04515 *
used.byUserTRUE 3.225885 0.179328 17.9887 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.050057 0.203441 -0.2461 0.80564
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classlondon 6.33395 0.16855 37.5793 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classunderground 6.20902 0.16603 37.3972 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtube 5.23681 0.17420 30.0618 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classabandoned 5.12837 0.17970 28.5379 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhistory 4.71467 0.17685 26.6590 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.08762 0.22483 18.1808 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classuk 3.93275 0.20095 19.5708 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtravel 3.35706 0.18880 17.7807 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsubway 3.13183 0.26311 11.9029 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classurban 2.75051 0.24560 11.1992 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classarchitecture 2.69069 0.21681 12.4102 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classstations 2.50327 0.38223 6.5492 5.785e-11 ***
tag_classtrain 2.30739 0.35536 6.4932 8.405e-11 ***
tag_classcities 2.22978 0.34183 6.5231 6.888e-11 ***
tag_classdisused 2.19067 0.44572 4.9149 8.884e-07 ***
tag_classphotography 2.17302 0.21243 10.2295 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtransportation 2.15974 0.36868 5.8580 4.685e-09 ***
tag_classphotos 2.12492 0.22885 9.2852 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classengland 2.10894 0.37569 5.6135 1.983e-08 ***
tag_classexploration 2.07942 0.40487 5.1361 2.806e-07 ***
tag_classtrains 2.07387 0.37684 5.5033 3.727e-08 ***
tag_classtransit 1.89631 0.45402 4.1767 2.958e-05 ***
tag_classcool 1.77426 0.26414 6.7171 1.854e-11 ***
tag_classreference 1.43518 0.23029 6.2321 4.603e-10 ***
tag_classtransport 1.42647 0.46084 3.0953 0.0019659 **
tag_classfun 1.10763 0.28603 3.8724 0.0001078 ***
tag_classinteresting 0.44898 0.45050 0.9966 0.3189497
tag_classnetwork 0.34922 0.44939 0.7771 0.4370954
---
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Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.54614 +- 0.73902
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 6846 on 5.79e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 6912




Lambda_p: 0.1049 (d= 4.03 ; p-value: 5.587e-05 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.541 (d= 29.39 ; p-value: 6.857e-190 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.2951 (d= 12.82 ; p-value: 1.203e-37 ) (for selection models)





london underground tube abandoned history
Never Used 0.5094940 0.4782770 0.2574703 0.2372905 0.1706115
Used Only On Site 0.4259131 0.3956860 0.1985018 0.1818121 0.1281042
Used Only By User 0.9631682 0.9584706 0.8972215 0.8867829 0.8381579
Recommended Tag 0.9467119 0.9400462 0.8557145 0.8418036 0.7786819
system:unfiled uk travel subway urban
Never Used 0.0990032 0.08602065 0.05026330 0.04053768 0.02804611
Used Only On Site 0.0727715 0.06298830 0.03642357 0.02929325 0.02019369
Used Only By User 0.7344922 0.70321701 0.57125550 0.51543106 0.42077969
Recommended Tag 0.6527053 0.61682200 0.47511855 0.41949675 0.33044856
architecture stations train cities disused
Never Used 0.02646067 0.02203818 0.01818907 0.01685378 0.01621778
Used Only On Site 0.01904346 0.01584046 0.01305937 0.01209602 0.01163743
Used Only By User 0.40627317 0.36197339 0.31806191 0.30147204 0.29329974
Recommended Tag 0.31734999 0.27820302 0.24062129 0.22672772 0.21994361
photography transportation photos england exploration
Never Used 0.01593863 0.01573154 0.01520146 0.01496408 0.01453516
Used Only On Site 0.01143621 0.01128694 0.01090497 0.01073395 0.01042500
Used Only By User 0.28965560 0.28692897 0.27985912 0.27664990 0.27078218
Recommended Tag 0.21693112 0.21468218 0.20887103 0.20624271 0.20145243
trains transit cool reference transport
Never Used 0.01445578 0.012132590 0.010753549 0.007684838 0.007618711
Used Only On Site 0.01036783 0.008695817 0.007704367 0.005500954 0.005453516
Used Only By User 0.26968634 0.236174529 0.214868893 0.163159327 0.161973749
Recommended Tag 0.20056000 0.173596181 0.156777117 0.116965011 0.116068543
fun interesting network Other
Never Used 0.005550303 0.002880274 0.002607519 0.001840333
Used Only On Site 0.003970586 0.002058923 0.001863802 0.001315144
Used Only By User 0.123201930 0.067792724 0.061753617 0.044358359
Recommended Tag 0.087142468 0.047079950 0.042801260 0.030570706
[[3]]




Total Number of Users of Site: 161
Number of Users in Fit: 161
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.27809 0.22554 -23.4023 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.71276 0.28417 -2.5082 0.01213 *
used.byUserTRUE 2.36807 0.31817 7.4428 9.855e-14 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.85931 0.36375 2.3623 0.01816 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classbeos 6.11850 0.28254 21.6552 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classos 5.96133 0.29315 20.3352 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhaiku 5.35156 0.28567 18.7332 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classopensource 4.00121 0.29886 13.3881 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classopen-source 3.35136 0.35751 9.3740 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesktop 2.94076 0.33064 8.8941 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 2.49620 0.30115 8.2890 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 2.25063 0.47923 4.6963 2.649e-06 ***
tag_classgeek 1.44592 0.40107 3.6052 0.0003119 ***
tag_classfree 1.34736 0.36034 3.7391 0.0001847 ***
tag_classsystem 1.33802 0.51131 2.6169 0.0088745 **
tag_classtech 1.10165 0.42988 2.5627 0.0103855 *
tag_classunix 0.78757 0.45223 1.7415 0.0815879 .
tag_classfreeware 0.45829 0.47834 0.9581 0.3380234
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.73365 +- 0.85653
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2033 on 8674 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2071




Lambda_p: 0.2086 (d= 5.085 ; p-value: 3.681e-07 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5773 (d= 19.85 ; p-value: 1.082e-87 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4922 (d= 15.27 ; p-value: 1.233e-52 ) (for selection models)





beos os haiku opensource open-source
152
Never Used 0.6985516 0.6644615 0.5183598 0.2180813 0.12711277
Used Only On Site 0.5318693 0.4926206 0.3454076 0.1202947 0.06663965
Used Only By User 0.9611521 0.9548390 0.9199407 0.7486051 0.60857771
Recommended Tag 0.9662691 0.9607535 0.9300911 0.7751693 0.64287968
desktop software system:unfiled geek free
Never Used 0.08807861 0.05831058 0.04620088 0.02120333 0.01925154
Used Only On Site 0.04521385 0.02946479 0.02319809 0.01050934 0.00953236
Used Only By User 0.50768571 0.39799590 0.34087781 0.18784159 0.17326592
Recommended Tag 0.54420739 0.43357612 0.37452856 0.21122633 0.19527240
system tech unix freeware Other
Never Used 0.019075880 0.015120997 0.011090464 0.008003836 0.005076276
Used Only On Site 0.009444528 0.007471244 0.005468447 0.003940269 0.002495299
Used Only By User 0.171931311 0.140835831 0.106934072 0.079312202 0.051660510
Recommended Tag 0.193808019 0.159518118 0.121756508 0.090694717 0.059330316
[[4]]
affiliates homepage | Spread Firefox
http://www.spreadfirefox.com/?q=affiliates/homepage
34d1d5e34c5a7665d8be3f10ba08e82b
Total Number of Users of Site: 214
Number of Users in Fit: 214
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.58732 0.16035 -34.8441 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -1.09860 0.21409 -5.1314 2.876e-07 ***
used.byUserTRUE 2.82514 0.21869 12.9184 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.53306 0.26544 2.0082 0.04462 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classfirefox 6.26484 0.23792 26.3317 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classbuttons 4.97129 0.24542 20.2561 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.43079 0.28025 15.8100 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmozilla 3.96183 0.26909 14.7230 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classbrowser 3.59097 0.28083 12.7871 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classaffiliates 2.82902 0.43328 6.5292 6.611e-11 ***
tag_classresources 2.75852 0.34783 7.9306 2.182e-15 ***
tag_classbutton 2.65387 0.39749 6.6765 2.447e-11 ***
tag_classbanner 2.58742 0.43615 5.9324 2.985e-09 ***
tag_classmarketing 2.57353 0.36982 6.9588 3.431e-12 ***
tag_classinternet 2.22449 0.32144 6.9203 4.507e-12 ***
tag_classthunderbird 2.22344 0.40739 5.4578 4.820e-08 ***
tag_classlogo 1.90900 0.43237 4.4152 1.009e-05 ***
tag_classweb 1.89287 0.31025 6.1010 1.054e-09 ***
tag_classwebdev 1.47979 0.48438 3.0550 0.002250 **
tag_classicons 1.38447 0.44806 3.0899 0.002002 **
tag_classcommunity 1.07780 0.48536 2.2206 0.026378 *
tag_classopensource 0.66679 0.43613 1.5289 0.126294
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
153
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.72185 +- 0.84962
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2945 on 2.373e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2991




Lambda_p: 0.1293 (d= 3.066 ; p-value: 0.002171 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5544 (d= 18.58 ; p-value: 4.642e-77 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3341 (d= 9.089 ; p-value: 9.953e-20 ) (for selection models)





firefox buttons system:unfiled mozilla browser
Never Used 0.6631848 0.3506861 0.23929906 0.16444888 0.11958711
Used Only On Site 0.3962574 0.1525644 0.09490793 0.06156645 0.04331608
Used Only By User 0.9707634 0.9010654 0.84139145 0.76846292 0.69610075
Recommended Tag 0.9496513 0.8380213 0.75083626 0.65342121 0.56543692
affiliates resources button banner marketing
Never Used 0.05961978 0.05578777 0.05052492 0.04743047 0.04680709
Used Only On Site 0.02069603 0.01931443 0.01742885 0.01632655 0.01610506
Used Only By User 0.51670555 0.49908695 0.47295182 0.45642228 0.45297969
Recommended Tag 0.37784777 0.36142312 0.33763777 0.32293969 0.31991137
internet thunderbird logo web webdev
Never Used 0.03347762 0.03344365 0.024642736 0.024258134 0.01618225
Used Only On Site 0.01141405 0.01140220 0.008351523 0.008219037 0.00545296
Used Only By User 0.36872665 0.36848221 0.298766708 0.295399559 0.21714509
Recommended Tag 0.24913632 0.24893990 0.194862621 0.192345283 0.13611704
icons community opensource Other
Never Used 0.014732669 0.010884011 0.007242426 0.003731089
Used Only On Site 0.004959647 0.003654554 0.002425877 0.001246809
Used Only By User 0.201378394 0.156517315 0.109546069 0.059402833
Recommended Tag 0.125292114 0.095356949 0.065318734 0.034632592
[[5]]
PayPalSucks.com is where you will learn about the PayPal Class Action Lawsuit, Abuse,
Fraud &amp; evil behind the PayPal system!
http://www.paypalsucks.com/
36a351c9102416c3e36c99ed564ceaa5
Total Number of Users of Site: 122
Number of Users in Fit: 121
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.17940 0.23897 -21.6739 <2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.40829 0.26686 -1.5300 0.1260
used.byUserTRUE 3.13964 0.32446 9.6764 <2e-16 ***
154
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.14750 0.36970 -0.3990 0.6899
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classpaypal 5.43211 0.27399 19.8263 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmoney 3.86593 0.30218 12.7934 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.75990 0.31770 11.8349 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsecurity 3.33207 0.29379 11.3417 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classebay 3.05844 0.31796 9.6191 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classprivacy 3.00494 0.31556 9.5226 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfinance 2.89634 0.33115 8.7464 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classonline 2.74391 0.34964 7.8477 4.237e-15 ***
tag_classinternet 1.20634 0.39303 3.0693 0.002145 **
tag_classshopping 0.80203 0.46129 1.7387 0.082095 .
tag_classweb 0.52571 0.42621 1.2334 0.217408
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.84753 +- 0.92061
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1600 on 7122 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1632




Lambda_p: 0.07602 (d= 1.441 ; p-value: 0.1496 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5148 (d= 13.78 ; p-value: 3.363e-43 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3649 (d= 8.437 ; p-value: 3.246e-17 ) (for selection models)





paypal money system:unfiled security ebay
Never Used 0.5628436 0.2119072 0.1947404 0.13618646 0.10707651
Used Only On Site 0.4611837 0.1516451 0.1385022 0.09486573 0.07383318
Used Only By User 0.9674646 0.8613052 0.8481473 0.78453767 0.73471600
Recommended Tag 0.9446199 0.7808087 0.7621232 0.67623448 0.61370071
privacy finance online internet shopping
Never Used 0.10206703 0.09253549 0.08050590 0.01846829 0.012402607
Used Only On Site 0.07025659 0.06348564 0.05500362 0.01235395 0.008279512
Used Only By User 0.72415667 0.70194526 0.66910663 0.30292264 0.224831709
Recommended Tag 0.60094078 0.57463565 0.53702189 0.19953437 0.142642174
web Other
Never Used 0.009436491 0.005599839
Used Only On Site 0.006293161 0.003729700
Used Only By User 0.180339450 0.115091034
Recommended Tag 0.112063204 0.069425396
155
[[6]]
OS X Maintenance And Troubleshooting
http://www.macattorney.com/ts.html
3969c4fca4f1a80d89a3c024609731c3
Total Number of Users of Site: 282
Number of Users in Fit: 282
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.88907 0.16840 -34.9699 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.55956 0.19733 -2.8357 0.004573 **
used.byUserTRUE 3.10638 0.23238 13.3678 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.15095 0.25453 -0.5931 0.553137
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classmaintenance 5.50074 0.19121 28.7680 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classosx 5.02462 0.19533 25.7244 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmac 4.68803 0.19535 23.9977 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtroubleshooting 4.58733 0.21253 21.5846 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmacosx 4.12309 0.22970 17.9501 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.39128 0.30449 11.1376 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classapple 3.13999 0.21914 14.3286 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhelp 2.59666 0.32946 7.8817 3.230e-15 ***
tag_classreference 2.51407 0.21440 11.7262 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmacintosh 2.26490 0.35983 6.2943 3.087e-10 ***
tag_classsafari_export 2.12356 0.42486 4.9983 5.784e-07 ***
tag_classadmin 2.05456 0.43415 4.7323 2.220e-06 ***
tag_classhowto 2.02279 0.26291 7.6939 1.427e-14 ***
tag_classrepair 1.90270 0.40825 4.6606 3.153e-06 ***
tag_classsysadmin 1.67504 0.43140 3.8828 0.0001032 ***
tag_classtools 1.66413 0.26826 6.2034 5.525e-10 ***
tag_classsoftware 1.29758 0.27505 4.7175 2.387e-06 ***
tag_classsupport 1.18868 0.47128 2.5222 0.0116609 *
tag_classtutorial 1.15284 0.30899 3.7310 0.0001907 ***
tag_classtips 1.04985 0.33915 3.0955 0.0019647 **
tag_classutilities 1.01392 0.45710 2.2181 0.0265447 *
tag_classtech 0.72929 0.43298 1.6843 0.0921158 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.54262 +- 0.73663
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 4244 on 2.817e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 4298





Lambda_p: 0.1935 (d= 5.88 ; p-value: 4.104e-09 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5836 (d= 25.06 ; p-value: 1.27e-138 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4227 (d= 15.28 ; p-value: 1.014e-52 ) (for selection models)





maintenance osx mac troubleshooting macosx
Never Used 0.4041204 0.2964111 0.2312908 0.2138726 0.14604376
Used Only On Site 0.2793103 0.1940342 0.1467156 0.1345518 0.08903026
Used Only By User 0.9380837 0.9039525 0.8704952 0.8587131 0.79255688
Recommended Tag 0.8815869 0.8222144 0.7676043 0.7491589 0.65246592
system:unfiled apple help reference macintosh
Never Used 0.07601331 0.06013902 0.03583265 0.03308595 0.02597853
Used Only On Site 0.04490126 0.03527622 0.02079629 0.01917925 0.01501284
Used Only By User 0.64761944 0.58838855 0.45362752 0.43324585 0.37337097
Recommended Tag 0.47454218 0.41260586 0.28976299 0.27306421 0.22648031
safari_export admin howto repair sysadmin
Never Used 0.02263178 0.02115477 0.02050680 0.01822853 0.014571272
Used Only On Site 0.01305983 0.01219972 0.01182273 0.01049890 0.008379231
Used Only By User 0.34093558 0.32560579 0.31866845 0.29317988 0.248310357
Recommended Tag 0.20267824 0.19175630 0.18688049 0.16931346 0.139655401
tools software support tutorial tips
Never Used 0.014415421 0.010036002 0.009009858 0.008695364 0.007851134
Used Only On Site 0.008289051 0.005759953 0.005168736 0.004987644 0.004501760
Used Only By User 0.246279288 0.184656979 0.168821230 0.163850758 0.150225387
Recommended Tag 0.138349505 0.100144514 0.090749681 0.087834905 0.079926557
utilities tech Other
Never Used 0.007576162 0.005710198 0.002761909
Used Only On Site 0.004343580 0.003271158 0.001580193
Used Only By User 0.145696258 0.113709856 0.058266966
Recommended Tag 0.077324005 0.059306123 0.029506405
[[7]]
The Library of Congress
http://www.loc.gov/
3b3cb60120b337fa373871347e15418c
Total Number of Users of Site: 552
Number of Users in Fit: 552
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.607801 0.092068 -71.7707 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.407889 0.119043 -3.4264 0.0006117 ***
used.byUserTRUE 3.739711 0.126823 29.4877 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.311265 0.148882 -2.0907 0.0365561 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
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tag_classlibrary 5.386373 0.138544 38.8784 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classreference 4.759235 0.142109 33.4900 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgovernment 4.656189 0.155975 29.8521 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classlibraries 4.539032 0.164330 27.6215 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classbooks 3.953035 0.155860 25.3627 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.897335 0.213840 18.2255 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcongress 3.400048 0.244616 13.8995 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classresearch 3.351144 0.182111 18.4016 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhistory 2.824518 0.190835 14.8008 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classimported 2.520151 0.260905 9.6592 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classloc 2.417560 0.380332 6.3565 2.065e-10 ***
tag_classbibliotecas 2.373027 0.385721 6.1522 7.642e-10 ***
tag_classsafari_export 2.356934 0.314418 7.4962 6.571e-14 ***
tag_classinformation 2.214834 0.293254 7.5526 4.266e-14 ***
tag_classus 2.025083 0.437862 4.6249 3.747e-06 ***
tag_classresource 1.962854 0.363481 5.4002 6.658e-08 ***
tag_classcatalog 1.893764 0.423137 4.4755 7.622e-06 ***
tag_classresources 1.838724 0.321878 5.7125 1.113e-08 ***
tag_classimages 1.824687 0.298556 6.1117 9.857e-10 ***
tag_classusa 1.821653 0.421370 4.3232 1.538e-05 ***
tag_classbook 1.668408 0.378327 4.4100 1.034e-05 ***
tag_classinfo 1.540372 0.424366 3.6298 0.0002836 ***
tag_classliterature 1.472426 0.297691 4.9462 7.569e-07 ***
tag_classsearch 1.448244 0.249212 5.8113 6.199e-09 ***
tag_classarchive 1.332586 0.396459 3.3612 0.0007760 ***
tag_classeducation 1.290172 0.307190 4.1999 2.670e-05 ***
tag_classlaw 1.288687 0.396700 3.2485 0.0011601 **
tag_classpolitics 0.737252 0.352485 2.0916 0.0364756 *
tag_classfree 0.650329 0.414642 1.5684 0.1167853
tag_classtools 0.593553 0.347736 1.7069 0.0878390 .
tag_classmaps 0.409538 0.410787 0.9970 0.3187845
tag_classphotography 0.350238 0.410876 0.8524 0.3939828
tag_classart -0.059074 0.409448 -0.1443 0.8852820
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.56286 +- 0.75024
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 9810 on 1.766e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 9886




Lambda_p: 0.09857 (d= 3.888 ; p-value: 0.0001012 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5453 (d= 30.42 ; p-value: 3.436e-203 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3728 (d= 17.66 ; p-value: 8.8e-70 ) (for selection models)






library reference government libraries books
Never Used 0.2276854 0.13604134 0.12437774 0.11216955 0.06569587
Used Only On Site 0.1639240 0.09479412 0.08631358 0.07751082 0.04467426
Used Only By User 0.9254137 0.86888598 0.85669407 0.84170131 0.74742861
Recommended Tag 0.8580429 0.76350464 0.74439627 0.72147452 0.59044151
system:unfiled congress research history imported
Never Used 0.06235861 0.03887502 0.03708843 0.02224193 0.01650174
Used Only On Site 0.04235646 0.02619503 0.02497603 0.01490309 0.01103552
Used Only By User 0.73676950 0.62993972 0.61846884 0.48910870 0.41388216
Recommended Tag 0.57690748 0.45333724 0.44124774 0.31805470 0.25595620
loc bibliotecas safari_export information us
Never Used 0.014916763 0.014276319 0.014051619 0.012212991 0.010123525
Used Only On Site 0.009970249 0.009540125 0.009389259 0.008155646 0.006755585
Used Only By User 0.389234806 0.378701546 0.374922652 0.342256157 0.300901745
Recommended Tag 0.236912143 0.228955727 0.226127235 0.202230738 0.173336704
resource catalog resources images usa
Never Used 0.009518563 0.00888878 0.008416768 0.008300422 0.008275486
Used Only On Site 0.006350593 0.00592916 0.005613420 0.005535608 0.005518932
Used Only By User 0.287975581 0.27401903 0.263206980 0.260493888 0.259909881
Recommended Tag 0.164600255 0.15531870 0.148233931 0.146470365 0.146091490
book info literature search archive
Never Used 0.007108058 0.006259173 0.005850415 0.005711438 0.005090807
Used Only On Site 0.004738515 0.004171425 0.003898474 0.003805688 0.003391438
Used Only By User 0.231531794 0.209537140 0.198505025 0.194685733 0.177189751
Recommended Tag 0.127991426 0.114368865 0.107664884 0.105363619 0.094948397
education law politics free tools
Never Used 0.004880433 0.004873226 0.002813387 0.002579771 0.002437729
Used Only On Site 0.003251060 0.003246251 0.001872816 0.001717167 0.001622543
Used Only By User 0.171090512 0.170880017 0.106135457 0.098166846 0.093253876
Recommended Tag 0.091365728 0.091242522 0.054681728 0.050358603 0.047711714
maps photography art Other
Never Used 0.002028835 0.001912245 0.0012707522 0.0013479778
Used Only On Site 0.001350200 0.001272559 0.0008454771 0.0008968813
Used Only By User 0.078815401 0.074616096 0.0508269695 0.0537537130
Recommended Tag 0.040013358 0.037796610 0.0254237746 0.0269292398
[[8]]
GDI+ FAQ main index
http://www.bobpowell.net/faqmain.htm
3bda811161161074f8c0f7a003dba847
Total Number of Users of Site: 114
Number of Users in Fit: 114
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -1.15428 0.36548 -3.1582 0.001587 **
used.onSiteTRUE -0.19863 0.28311 -0.7016 0.482919
used.byUserTRUE 3.52840 0.35602 9.9107 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.61131 0.38833 -1.5742 0.115439
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
159
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classgdi+ 1.14270 0.32166 3.5525 0.0003816 ***
tag_classgraphics -0.17186 0.33898 -0.5070 0.6121552
tag_classgdi -0.66461 0.37519 -1.7714 0.0764944 .
tag_classprogramming -0.84539 0.33972 -2.4885 0.0128287 *
tag_classc# -1.02034 0.35375 -2.8844 0.0039217 **
tag_classfaq -1.75308 0.45286 -3.8711 0.0001083 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled -1.84245 0.51161 -3.6013 0.0003166 ***
tag_classdevelopment -2.11846 0.39639 -5.3444 9.070e-08 ***
tag_classdotnet -2.45021 0.47126 -5.1992 2.001e-07 ***
tag_classcsharp -2.47653 0.54196 -4.5696 4.886e-06 ***
tag_classwinforms -2.59124 0.52990 -4.8900 1.008e-06 ***
tag_classreference -3.20541 0.44072 -7.2731 3.513e-13 ***
tag_classasp.net -3.30208 0.47687 -6.9244 4.377e-12 ***
tag_classwindows -3.93512 0.52431 -7.5054 6.125e-14 ***
tag_classOther -4.02836 0.31756 -12.6853 < 2.2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.54605 +- 0.73895
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1524 on 5907 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1564




Lambda_p: 0.1974 (d= 3.977 ; p-value: 6.979e-05 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5712 (d= 16.24 ; p-value: 2.668e-59 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4524 (d= 11.22 ; p-value: 3.377e-29 ) (for selection models)





gdi+ graphics gdi programming c#
Never Used 0.4971055 0.2097977 0.1395675 0.11923749 0.10205273
Used Only On Site 0.4476397 0.1787589 0.1173757 0.09990285 0.08523498
Used Only By User 0.9711626 0.9004518 0.8467731 0.82182023 0.79474657
Recommended Tag 0.9374312 0.8009607 0.7108608 0.67233920 0.63270367
faq system:unfiled development dotnet csharp
Never Used 0.05179096 0.04757388 0.03651835 0.02648103 0.02581084
Used Only On Site 0.04286073 0.03934062 0.03013785 0.02181455 0.02125988
Used Only By User 0.65045510 0.62987273 0.56356938 0.48098689 0.47441953
Recommended Tag 0.45291384 0.43087704 0.36487115 0.29192899 0.28651798
winforms reference asp.net windows Other
Never Used 0.02307812 0.01262102 0.011471341 0.006123948 0.005581822
Used Only On Site 0.01899960 0.01037092 0.009424257 0.005026265 0.004580864
Used Only By User 0.44593172 0.30337219 0.283337494 0.173502345 0.160536313




Used Only On Site 0.004580864
Used Only By User 0.160536313
Recommended Tag 0.078407201
[[9]]
MetaGer - die MetaSuche b e r deutschsprachige Suchmaschinen
http://www.metager.de/
42c34e4f93236add471037122e00a521
Total Number of Users of Site: 174
Number of Users in Fit: 174
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.20370 0.19785 -26.3009 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.49103 0.23038 -2.1313 0.0330615 *
used.byUserTRUE 4.77568 0.31859 14.9900 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -1.35148 0.37043 -3.6484 0.0002638 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classsuchmaschinen 4.63613 0.24474 18.9434 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmeta 3.79541 0.27878 13.6142 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsuche 3.64052 0.28776 12.6511 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsearch 3.56368 0.28058 12.7009 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsearchengine 3.45284 0.28446 12.1382 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsuchmaschine 3.31375 0.30151 10.9906 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 2.93242 0.35179 8.3358 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsuchen 2.48689 0.36440 6.8247 8.813e-12 ***
tag_classdeutsch 2.39514 0.36268 6.6040 4.003e-11 ***
tag_classimported 1.51267 0.47133 3.2094 0.001330 **
tag_classweb 1.05000 0.41107 2.5543 0.010640 *
tag_classgerman 0.82394 0.45902 1.7950 0.072656 .
tag_classinternet 0.34008 0.49958 0.6807 0.496039
tag_classtools 0.19423 0.47006 0.4132 0.679456
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.29043 +- 0.53892
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2017 on 1.216e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2055




Lambda_p: 0.1367 (d= 2.682 ; p-value: 0.007317 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5547 (d= 15.38 ; p-value: 2.192e-53 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3483 (d= 7.904 ; p-value: 2.694e-15 ) (for selection models)






suchmaschinen meta suche search searchengine
Never Used 0.3617970 0.1965032 0.1731908 0.1624625 0.14793819
Used Only On Site 0.2575769 0.1301852 0.1136279 0.1061157 0.09605114
Used Only By User 0.9853435 0.9666695 0.9613019 0.9583399 0.95368260
Recommended Tag 0.9141662 0.8212556 0.7973789 0.7846805 0.76536251
suchmaschine system:unfiled suchen deutsch imported
Never Used 0.13124962 0.09352898 0.06198852 0.05686341 0.02433896
Used Only On Site 0.08463443 0.05939489 0.03887173 0.03558538 0.01503739
Used Only By User 0.94713614 0.92444900 0.88684029 0.87730130 0.74737125
Recommended Tag 0.73947035 0.65968362 0.55387982 0.53111310 0.31911012
web german internet tools Other
Never Used 0.015463275 0.012373246 0.007663300 0.006630182 0.005466128
Used Only On Site 0.009520603 0.007608921 0.004703905 0.004068118 0.003352365
Used Only By User 0.650667461 0.597704454 0.478028640 0.441816503 0.394597823
Recommended Tag 0.227843027 0.190526006 0.126701066 0.111421919 0.093593134
[[10]]




Total Number of Users of Site: 270
Number of Users in Fit: 270
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.03054 0.15082 -39.985 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.11528 0.17872 -0.645 0.51891
used.byUserTRUE 3.71170 0.19469 19.064 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.51837 0.21881 -2.369 0.01783 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classgadgets 4.43104 0.19369 22.8771 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhome 4.01819 0.20399 19.6977 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.96025 0.23011 17.2099 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtechnology 3.74716 0.20098 18.6441 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtech 3.43598 0.21043 16.3287 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classblog 2.77073 0.20348 13.6166 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhtpc 2.43448 0.29289 8.3118 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnews 2.30387 0.20748 11.1043 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmce 2.27713 0.36972 6.1591 7.318e-10 ***
tag_classmedia 2.26215 0.25114 9.0075 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classautomation 2.06736 0.37398 5.5280 3.239e-08 ***
tag_classhomeautomation 2.04530 0.43330 4.7203 2.355e-06 ***
tag_classhometheater 1.86547 0.40079 4.6545 3.247e-06 ***
162
tag_classgadget 1.83066 0.37452 4.8880 1.018e-06 ***
tag_classmediacenter 1.75848 0.43822 4.0127 6.002e-05 ***
tag_classpvr 1.52235 0.37531 4.0563 4.986e-05 ***
tag_classelectronics 1.47928 0.37508 3.9439 8.017e-05 ***
tag_classdigital 1.42464 0.39862 3.5739 0.0003516 ***
tag_classhardware 1.26129 0.31072 4.0592 4.924e-05 ***
tag_classblogs 1.25817 0.34173 3.6818 0.0002316 ***
tag_classdiy 1.20048 0.36879 3.2552 0.0011331 **
tag_classentertainment 0.98864 0.46659 2.1189 0.0341020 *
tag_classtv 0.97039 0.35030 2.7702 0.0056022 **
tag_classgeek 0.88242 0.40389 2.1848 0.0289023 *
tag_classdaily 0.85394 0.40711 2.0976 0.0359447 *
tag_classreviews 0.83831 0.40349 2.0777 0.0377404 *
tag_classmagazine 0.55576 0.45963 1.2092 0.2266043
tag_classvideo 0.50515 0.35879 1.4079 0.1591596
tag_classaudio 0.44507 0.42266 1.0530 0.2923227
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.36981 +- 0.60812
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 4812 on 3.912e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 4880




Lambda_p: 0.08092 (d= 2.407 ; p-value: 0.01609 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5301 (d= 22.29 ; p-value: 4.647e-110 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3063 (d= 10.52 ; p-value: 6.707e-26 ) (for selection models)





gadgets home system:unfiled technology tech
Never Used 0.1680522 0.1179122 0.1120185 0.09250877 0.06948922
Used Only On Site 0.1525456 0.1064403 0.1010542 0.08327504 0.06239520
Used Only By User 0.8920838 0.8454497 0.8377271 0.80663937 0.75345749
Recommended Tag 0.8143539 0.7437777 0.7325817 0.68883266 0.61857070
blog htpc news mce media
Never Used 0.03697603 0.02669933 0.02350708 0.02290089 0.02256807
Used Only On Site 0.03308321 0.02386163 0.02100134 0.02045841 0.02016035
Used Only By User 0.61108890 0.52887922 0.49625863 0.48957349 0.48583062
Recommended Tag 0.45468457 0.37331848 0.34330105 0.33729674 0.33395636
automation homeautomation hometheater gadget mediacenter
Never Used 0.01864824 0.01824881 0.01529113 0.01477578 0.01376096
Used Only On Site 0.01665160 0.01629422 0.01364892 0.01318819 0.01228104
Used Only By User 0.43745952 0.43203875 0.38855904 0.38032251 0.36346341
Recommended Tag 0.29211562 0.28757518 0.25217882 0.24567167 0.23254154
pvr electronics digital hardware blogs
163
Never Used 0.01089834 0.010443688 0.009893800 0.008415366 0.008389341
Used Only On Site 0.00972325 0.009317154 0.008826053 0.007505963 0.007482729
Used Only By User 0.31077767 0.301627712 0.290243082 0.257778912 0.257181738
Recommended Tag 0.19307713 0.186455052 0.178307606 0.155618482 0.155208484
diy entertainment tv geek daily
Never Used 0.007922747 0.006419984 0.006304639 0.005776783 0.005615490
Used Only On Site 0.007066199 0.005724966 0.005622037 0.005151036 0.005007126
Used Only By User 0.246315080 0.209126466 0.206124733 0.192101163 0.187719779
Recommended Tag 0.147793223 0.123050877 0.121095470 0.112040384 0.109238103
reviews magazine video audio Other
Never Used 0.005528866 0.004173654 0.003968498 0.003737974 0.002398431
Used Only On Site 0.004929840 0.003720910 0.003537929 0.003332333 0.002137843
Used Only By User 0.185347645 0.146404902 0.140192614 0.133106525 0.089574675
Recommended Tag 0.107726181 0.083422158 0.079633048 0.075339747 0.049618892
[[11]]
Getting started with SSH - Kimmo Suominen
http://kimmo.suominen.com/docs/ssh/
589f84ca5ce34697974199d47c1cfe2e
Total Number of Users of Site: 938
Number of Users in Fit: 938
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -7.5993403 0.1357615 -55.9757 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.0064323 0.1611449 -0.0399 0.96816
used.byUserTRUE 3.2889931 0.1688023 19.4843 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.3577204 0.1788841 -1.9997 0.04553 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classssh 8.153240 0.132930 61.3349 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsecurity 5.073887 0.127821 39.6951 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtutorial 5.048455 0.129716 38.9192 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhowto 4.975413 0.129573 38.3985 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classlinux 4.759314 0.126333 37.6729 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classadmin 4.484838 0.163412 27.4449 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classunix 4.238420 0.140814 30.0995 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.052004 0.203668 19.8952 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsysadmin 3.409188 0.178405 19.1092 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classscp 3.368176 0.245830 13.7013 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classshell 2.833875 0.193685 14.6314 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnetwork 2.833692 0.172470 16.4301 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtutorials 2.809390 0.189182 14.8502 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtips 2.758361 0.173238 15.9224 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classreference 2.704907 0.156545 17.2787 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcryptography 2.494989 0.283006 8.8160 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcomputer 2.224255 0.229118 9.7079 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 1.957742 0.185539 10.5516 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcommandline 1.899745 0.414961 4.5781 4.691e-06 ***
tag_classgeek 1.859139 0.275055 6.7592 1.388e-11 ***
tag_classvpn 1.764431 0.318252 5.5441 2.954e-08 ***
164
tag_classencryption 1.700403 0.334053 5.0902 3.576e-07 ***
tag_classtoread 1.616547 0.324144 4.9871 6.128e-07 ***
tag_classnetworking 1.486998 0.272912 5.4486 5.076e-08 ***
tag_classubuntu 1.436628 0.305759 4.6986 2.620e-06 ***
tag_classmac 1.431957 0.273284 5.2398 1.607e-07 ***
tag_classtech 1.423481 0.305854 4.6541 3.254e-06 ***
tag_classprogramming 1.394459 0.223929 6.2272 4.748e-10 ***
tag_classapps 1.360999 0.416777 3.2655 0.0010926 **
tag_classwork 1.339767 0.370584 3.6153 0.0003000 ***
tag_classguide 1.051644 0.366112 2.8725 0.0040729 **
tag_classweb 1.025253 0.260390 3.9374 8.238e-05 ***
tag_classwindows 1.003318 0.265864 3.7738 0.0001608 ***
tag_classtechnology 0.317040 0.410045 0.7732 0.4394144
tag_classtools 0.255412 0.346926 0.7362 0.4616009
tag_classopensource 0.156767 0.385072 0.4071 0.6839266
tag_classserver 0.058128 0.443073 0.1312 0.8956232
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.83246 +- 0.9124
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.414e+04 on 1.772e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.423e+04




Lambda_p: 0.1625 (d= 9.357 ; p-value: 8.2e-21 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5734 (d= 46.69 ; p-value: 0 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.5605 (d= 44.94 ; p-value: 0 ) (for selection models)





ssh security tutorial howto linux
Never Used 0.6350399 0.07409293 0.07236703 0.06761427 0.05519914
Used Only On Site 0.6335478 0.07365286 0.07193642 0.06720989 0.05486464
Used Only By User 0.9790182 0.68212169 0.67658195 0.66039738 0.61039346
Recommended Tag 0.9700768 0.59854030 0.59241433 0.57466566 0.52119072
admin unix system:unfiled sysadmin scp
Never Used 0.04251299 0.03353938 0.02799497 0.01491806 0.01432721
Used Only On Site 0.04225193 0.03333151 0.02782047 0.01482383 0.01423666
Used Only By User 0.54351233 0.48202598 0.43577106 0.28881242 0.28046204
Recommended Tag 0.45272612 0.39267547 0.34921403 0.22006089 0.21310268
shell network tutorials tips reference
Never Used 0.008446968 0.008445429 0.008244336 0.007837405 0.007432495
Used Only On Site 0.008393263 0.008391734 0.008191909 0.007787546 0.007385192
Used Only By User 0.185960923 0.185933108 0.182282798 0.174799604 0.167222634
Recommended Tag 0.136977447 0.136955726 0.134108555 0.128292761 0.122432609
cryptography computer software commandline geek
165
Never Used 0.006033652 0.004609179 0.003534657 0.003336154 0.003203824
Used Only On Site 0.005995198 0.004579762 0.003512074 0.003314834 0.003183347
Used Only By User 0.139991839 0.110455925 0.086858943 0.082367815 0.079350244
Recommended Tag 0.101605604 0.079420620 0.061991738 0.058703734 0.056499725
vpn encryption toread networking ubuntu
Never Used 0.002915166 0.002734858 0.002515429 0.002210458 0.002102104
Used Only On Site 0.002896529 0.002717370 0.002499341 0.002196317 0.002088654
Used Only By User 0.072701327 0.068501168 0.063340180 0.056075383 0.053468126
Recommended Tag 0.051658065 0.048609905 0.044875359 0.039638758 0.037765156
mac tech programming apps work
Never Used 0.002092327 0.002074705 0.002015478 0.001949285 0.001908413
Used Only On Site 0.002078940 0.002061430 0.002002581 0.001936811 0.001896200
Used Only By User 0.053232187 0.052806642 0.051373705 0.049767325 0.048772804
Recommended Tag 0.037595757 0.037290289 0.036262277 0.035110920 0.034398682
guide web windows technology tools
Never Used 0.001431362 0.001394133 0.001363928 0.0006871293 0.0006460881
Used Only On Site 0.001422197 0.001385207 0.001355194 0.0006827266 0.0006419483
Used Only By User 0.037015391 0.036086097 0.035330847 0.0181047977 0.0170411669
Recommended Tag 0.026011611 0.025351301 0.024814937 0.0126488389 0.0119018526
opensource server Other
Never Used 0.0005854329 0.0005304722 0.0005005311
Used Only On Site 0.0005816815 0.0005270727 0.0004973234
Used Only By User 0.0154651486 0.0140328869 0.0132509415





Total Number of Users of Site: 457
Number of Users in Fit: 456
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -7.29075 0.24939 -29.2340 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.46218 0.27898 1.6567 0.09758 .
used.byUserTRUE 3.57777 0.27667 12.9314 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.49082 0.29726 -1.6511 0.09871 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classsessions 7.07930 0.17970 39.3957 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classrails 5.81840 0.18964 30.6817 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classrubyonrails 4.44865 0.17954 24.7783 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsession 3.51822 0.22814 15.4213 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classruby 3.22908 0.17367 18.5931 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhowto 2.92281 0.19026 15.3620 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classperformance 2.83987 0.19902 14.2691 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classprogramming 2.46534 0.19033 12.9529 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classror 1.78256 0.43342 4.1128 3.909e-05 ***
tag_classwebdev 1.65674 0.27557 6.0120 1.833e-09 ***
tag_classtoread 1.58466 0.30199 5.2474 1.543e-07 ***
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tag_classtips 1.41860 0.24705 5.7421 9.352e-09 ***
tag_classmemcached 1.29931 0.40209 3.2314 0.0012318 **
tag_classdevelopment 1.24584 0.25474 4.8905 1.006e-06 ***
tag_classarticle 1.23786 0.33363 3.7103 0.0002070 ***
tag_classdev 1.11862 0.45783 2.4433 0.0145539 *
tag_classtutorial 1.03799 0.25240 4.1125 3.913e-05 ***
tag_classcache 0.82829 0.42431 1.9521 0.0509298 .
tag_classdatabase 0.75979 0.29615 2.5656 0.0102997 *
tag_classreference 0.67228 0.29406 2.2862 0.0222434 *
tag_classguide 0.59880 0.42689 1.4027 0.1607103
tag_classweb 0.54103 0.29471 1.8358 0.0663900 .
tag_classmanagement 0.40252 0.38269 1.0518 0.2928904
tag_classblog 0.33640 0.32165 1.0459 0.2956296
tag_classdesign -0.30497 0.40055 -0.7614 0.4464320
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.59188 +- 0.76934
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 6245 on 4.648e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 6305




Lambda_p: 0.2847 (d= 11.56 ; p-value: 6.856e-31 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6297 (d= 36.12 ; p-value: 1.039e-285 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.5582 (d= 29.15 ; p-value: 9.21e-187 ) (for selection models)





sessions rails rubyonrails session ruby
Never Used 0.4473333 0.1865864 0.05509121 0.02247706 0.01692871
Used Only On Site 0.5623563 0.2669478 0.08471701 0.03521799 0.02661022
Used Only By User 0.9666351 0.8914292 0.67604836 0.45146381 0.38133115
Recommended Tag 0.9656991 0.8886264 0.66974529 0.44438232 0.37459848
howto performance programming ror webdev
Never Used 0.01251869 0.01153369 0.00795945 0.004037069 0.003561479
Used Only On Site 0.01972873 0.01818687 0.01257708 0.006393816 0.005642160
Used Only By User 0.31213296 0.29460675 0.22310972 0.126703833 0.113423084
Recommended Tag 0.30601772 0.28869077 0.21818538 0.123568864 0.110575107
toread tips memcached development article
Never Used 0.003314644 0.002808907 0.002493829 0.002364285 0.002345541
Used Only On Site 0.005251880 0.004451887 0.003953244 0.003748175 0.003718500
Used Only By User 0.106374946 0.091589629 0.082136167 0.078193868 0.077620709
Recommended Tag 0.103683246 0.089234696 0.080002893 0.076154489 0.075595053
dev tutorial cache database reference
Never Used 0.002082441 0.001921443 0.001558515 0.001455493 0.001333694
Used Only On Site 0.003301904 0.003046915 0.002471931 0.002308670 0.002115625
167
Used Only By User 0.069502199 0.064465557 0.052915436 0.049586183 0.045620696
Recommended Tag 0.067672866 0.062759850 0.051498513 0.048253866 0.044389950
guide web management blog design
Never Used 0.001239322 0.001169838 0.001018679 0.0009535658 0.0005023477
Used Only On Site 0.001966033 0.001855881 0.001616219 0.0015129698 0.0007972585
Used Only By User 0.042526023 0.040235007 0.035214060 0.0330354859 0.0176719471
Recommended Tag 0.041375145 0.039143595 0.034253985 0.0321328299 0.0171816227
Other
Never Used 0.0006813535
Used Only On Site 0.0010812385
Used Only By User 0.0238233089
Recommended Tag 0.0231663344
[[13]]
Beer Advocate - Respect Beer.
http://beeradvocate.com/
5caf7547955925da56256a4a2f918d7b
Total Number of Users of Site: 489
Number of Users in Fit: 489
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.758360 0.149956 -45.0690 <2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.040025 0.179085 0.2235 0.8231
used.byUserTRUE 3.222382 0.197538 16.3127 <2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.235085 0.217872 -1.0790 0.2806
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classbeer 7.617432 0.173039 44.0215 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classreviews 4.775614 0.168864 28.2809 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classalcohol 4.756587 0.174626 27.2387 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfood 3.722617 0.176009 21.1502 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcommunity 3.610846 0.197011 18.3281 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.462606 0.249887 13.8567 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classforums 3.356673 0.227316 14.7666 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classreference 3.190341 0.177215 18.0027 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classbrewing 2.688758 0.275070 9.7748 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhomebrew 2.409450 0.303207 7.9466 1.918e-15 ***
tag_classdrink 2.379199 0.317377 7.4965 6.557e-14 ***
tag_classdrinks 2.157781 0.339412 6.3574 2.052e-10 ***
tag_classreview 2.067096 0.300228 6.8851 5.775e-12 ***
tag_classdrinking 1.929970 0.382675 5.0434 4.574e-07 ***
tag_classforum 1.896941 0.280962 6.7516 1.462e-11 ***
tag_classinformation 1.649026 0.333672 4.9421 7.730e-07 ***
tag_classblog 1.303412 0.246859 5.2800 1.292e-07 ***
tag_classdatabase 1.117846 0.382733 2.9207 0.003493 **
tag_classmagazine 0.369855 0.450683 0.8207 0.411843
tag_classculture 0.084205 0.449972 0.1871 0.851556
tag_classnews -0.433333 0.450672 -0.9615 0.336287
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
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Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.74977 +- 0.8659
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 5980 on 6.501e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 6032




Lambda_p: 0.2392 (d= 8.769 ; p-value: 1.799e-18 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6117 (d= 31.71 ; p-value: 1.082e-220 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4895 (d= 22.02 ; p-value: 1.827e-107 ) (for selection models)





beer reviews alcohol food community
Never Used 0.7024667 0.1210265 0.1190169 0.04583702 0.04118936
Used Only On Site 0.7107639 0.1253493 0.1232780 0.04761973 0.04279942
Used Only By User 0.9833974 0.7755008 0.7721708 0.54652502 0.51870846
Recommended Tag 0.9798934 0.7397322 0.7360522 0.49789507 0.46998838
system:unfiled forums reference brewing homebrew
Never Used 0.03571715 0.03224280 0.02743763 0.01679723 0.01275607
Used Only On Site 0.03712159 0.03351537 0.02852614 0.01747120 0.01327008
Used Only By User 0.48166543 0.45529369 0.41444103 0.30001660 0.24480249
Recommended Tag 0.43329234 0.40748698 0.36802571 0.26071058 0.21055432
drink drinks review drinking forum
Never Used 0.01238067 0.009946105 0.009091669 0.007935907 0.007680053
Used Only On Site 0.01287975 0.010348072 0.009459434 0.008257310 0.007991177
Used Only By User 0.23925318 0.201298903 0.187112744 0.167143636 0.162596179
Recommended Tag 0.20557004 0.171752769 0.159233696 0.141721180 0.137750990
information blog database magazine culture
Never Used 0.006003841 0.004256903 0.003538477 0.001677947 0.001261546
Used Only On Site 0.006247488 0.004429972 0.003682446 0.001746350 0.001312996
Used Only By User 0.131592451 0.096864024 0.081800478 0.040460686 0.030716048
Recommended Tag 0.110857568 0.081090286 0.068294256 0.033530889 0.025411040
news Other
Never Used 0.0007522471 0.001159785
Used Only On Site 0.0007829426 0.001207091
Used Only By User 0.0185363606 0.028305721
Recommended Tag 0.0153017134 0.023406950
[[14]]
Old Computers - rare, vintage and obsolete computers
http://oldcomputers.net/
78649812ecefdc13a6bd58582db0b438
Total Number of Users of Site: 258
Number of Users in Fit: 258
Type of Data: bysite
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Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.02358 0.15242 -39.5190 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.22792 0.18923 -1.2045 0.228400
used.byUserTRUE 4.05548 0.20816 19.4828 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.65107 0.23386 -2.7841 0.005368 **
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classhistory 4.808523 0.210836 22.8069 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcomputers 4.551049 0.215083 21.1595 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classretro 4.266903 0.218690 19.5111 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcomputer 4.266560 0.218635 19.5145 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.558011 0.275134 12.9319 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhardware 3.411172 0.226172 15.0822 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnostalgia 3.342932 0.291179 11.4807 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtechnology 2.849169 0.234816 12.1336 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgeek 2.737063 0.255930 10.6946 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classold 2.615249 0.340127 7.6890 1.483e-14 ***
tag_classobsolete 2.404661 0.396553 6.0639 1.329e-09 ***
tag_classvintage 2.296474 0.340530 6.7438 1.543e-11 ***
tag_classtech 1.830535 0.277011 6.6082 3.891e-11 ***
tag_classretrocomputing 1.811925 0.467428 3.8764 0.0001060 ***
tag_classapple 1.403370 0.314851 4.4573 8.302e-06 ***
tag_classfun 1.332045 0.295618 4.5060 6.607e-06 ***
tag_classmuseum 1.158257 0.450680 2.5700 0.0101693 *
tag_classimages 1.058347 0.340330 3.1098 0.0018724 **
tag_classcool 1.019019 0.362981 2.8074 0.0049949 **
tag_classreference 0.897997 0.282861 3.1747 0.0014999 **
tag_classscience 0.071794 0.381429 0.1882 0.8507017
tag_classprogramming -0.209106 0.427117 -0.4896 0.6244339
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.45364 +- 0.67353
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 4122 on 3.3e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 4176




Lambda_p: 0.1637 (d= 4.833 ; p-value: 1.345e-06 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5708 (d= 23.82 ; p-value: 1.976e-125 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4439 (d= 16.18 ; p-value: 7.157e-59 ) (for selection models)






history computers retro computer system:unfiled
Never Used 0.2288077 0.1865584 0.1472071 0.1471642 0.07830757
Used Only On Site 0.1910849 0.1544064 0.1208297 0.1207933 0.06335873
Used Only By User 0.9448216 0.9297561 0.9087779 0.9087495 0.83060377
Recommended Tag 0.8766876 0.8460507 0.8053086 0.8052549 0.67060407
hardware nostalgia technology geek old
Never Used 0.06834419 0.06412503 0.04014016 0.03603668 0.03203616
Used Only On Site 0.05518347 0.05173166 0.03222272 0.02890425 0.02567444
Used Only By User 0.80893003 0.79815977 0.70704384 0.68329669 0.65636799
Recommended Tag 0.63739579 0.62148087 0.50051896 0.47252018 0.44229733
obsolete vintage tech retrocomputing apple
Never Used 0.02611159 0.02349700 0.01487563 0.01460536 0.009754645
Used Only On Site 0.02090095 0.01879805 0.01187981 0.01166332 0.007781999
Used Only By User 0.60743952 0.58136385 0.46566311 0.46103564 0.362453835
Recommended Tag 0.39116165 0.36572076 0.26569841 0.26208341 0.190969414
fun museum images cool reference
Never Used 0.00908924 0.007650367 0.006927999 0.006662607 0.005907650
Used Only On Site 0.00725017 0.006100640 0.005523787 0.005311898 0.004709267
Used Only By User 0.34613915 0.307924110 0.287050485 0.279069879 0.255383592
Recommended Tag 0.18019195 0.155928961 0.143226490 0.138467890 0.124651923
science programming Other
Never Used 0.002594445 0.001960321 0.002415143
Used Only On Site 0.002066758 0.001561407 0.001923854
Used Only By User 0.130527210 0.101816215 0.122593202
Recommended Tag 0.058673648 0.044950589 0.054831776
[[15]]
DotNetNuke - Web Application Framework &gt; Home ( DNN 3.2.2 )
http://www.dotnetnuke.com/
83f6625b93df099752919f24e1feb4e7
Total Number of Users of Site: 714
Number of Users in Fit: 714
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -1.45415 0.16066 -9.0512 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.17418 0.12840 -1.3566 0.1749
used.byUserTRUE 3.65935 0.14100 25.9523 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.64858 0.15262 -4.2495 2.142e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classdotnetnuke 0.57278 0.13131 4.3619 1.289e-05 ***
tag_classcms 0.25829 0.13369 1.9320 0.05336 .
tag_classasp.net -0.26347 0.14018 -1.8795 0.06017 .
tag_classopensource -0.59982 0.14105 -4.2525 2.114e-05 ***
tag_classdotnet -0.99252 0.15808 -6.2786 3.416e-10 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled -1.31936 0.18902 -6.9799 2.954e-12 ***
tag_classprogramming -1.78132 0.15172 -11.7407 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdnn -2.04299 0.23736 -8.6071 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classframework -2.39351 0.20274 -11.8059 < 2.2e-16 ***
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tag_classportal -2.46453 0.21245 -11.6004 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classasp -2.54583 0.22815 -11.1585 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdevelopment -2.65892 0.18412 -14.4410 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb -2.87913 0.18048 -15.9524 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdev -3.01813 0.25341 -11.9100 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcontent -3.08704 0.30535 -10.1099 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classapplication -3.21582 0.30294 -10.6152 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnuke -3.34686 0.40930 -8.1770 2.909e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware -3.43863 0.19781 -17.3831 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdev -3.45819 0.35845 -9.6477 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classopen-source -3.51068 0.39561 -8.8740 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtools -3.52395 0.21113 -16.6905 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdesign -3.56160 0.23218 -15.3398 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classopen -3.57456 0.37314 -9.5798 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsource -3.57867 0.34466 -10.3831 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classvb.net -3.67999 0.41452 -8.8776 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnet -3.78785 0.44713 -8.4715 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfreeware -3.79465 0.28339 -13.3902 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classc# -3.81288 0.30139 -12.6510 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcommunity -3.88962 0.31154 -12.4852 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcode -3.91924 0.29892 -13.1114 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classimported -3.92077 0.43821 -8.9473 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtechnology -3.93240 0.27487 -14.3062 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebsite -3.94607 0.41635 -9.4778 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmicrosoft -3.95922 0.26398 -14.9981 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfree -3.98334 0.27452 -14.5104 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcollaboration -4.07367 0.36045 -11.3015 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classinternet -4.39063 0.32286 -13.5991 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classblog -4.41070 0.27597 -15.9826 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmanagement -4.44234 0.37779 -11.7589 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdownload -4.54933 0.37989 -11.9754 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classresources -4.55780 0.46155 -9.8749 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtool -4.71980 0.42746 -11.0415 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphp -4.92900 0.37404 -13.1779 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcomputer -4.97685 0.45710 -10.8878 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwindows -5.15544 0.39278 -13.1255 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwiki -5.21916 0.41938 -12.4451 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb2.0 -5.38025 0.41932 -12.8310 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesign -5.45344 0.37344 -14.6034 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classOther -5.49829 0.12912 -42.5817 < 2.2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.55419 +- 0.74444
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.362e+04 on 1.82e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.373e+04




Lambda_p: 0.09502 (d= 4.737 ; p-value: 2.165e-06 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5413 (d= 38.16 ; p-value: 1.147e-318 ) (for classification models)
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Phi_p: 0.3259 (d= 18.87 ; p-value: 2.052e-79 ) (for selection models)





dotnetnuke cms asp.net opensource dotnet
Never Used 0.2928937 0.2322125 0.1521778 0.11365117 0.07968222
Used Only On Site 0.2581596 0.2026126 0.1310386 0.09724992 0.06780808
Used Only By User 0.9414740 0.9215422 0.8745416 0.83276766 0.77077187
Recommended Tag 0.8760137 0.8376332 0.7537959 0.68624141 0.59626098
system:unfiled programming dnn framework portal
Never Used 0.05877231 0.03785242 0.02939377 0.02088408 0.01948029
Used Only On Site 0.04984537 0.03199500 0.02481151 0.01760436 0.01641732
Used Only By User 0.70802949 0.60440998 0.54046357 0.45305975 0.43552782
Recommended Tag 0.51576178 0.40157891 0.34061474 0.26676844 0.25310931
asp development web webdev content
Never Used 0.01798652 0.01609425 0.01295436 0.011292225 0.010548217
Used Only On Site 0.01515480 0.01355632 0.01090608 0.009504224 0.008876965
Used Only By User 0.41565518 0.38847645 0.33761597 0.307264964 0.292795204
Recommended Tag 0.23805000 0.21814900 0.18291801 0.163050729 0.153863891
application nuke software dev open-source
Never Used 0.009285526 0.008154355 0.007444708 0.007301571 0.006930774
Used Only On Site 0.007812753 0.006859755 0.006262062 0.006141522 0.005829290
Used Only By User 0.266858086 0.242014238 0.225581313 0.222182970 0.213243907
Recommended Tag 0.137835250 0.122988096 0.113427711 0.111475733 0.106381561
tools webdesign open source vb.net
Never Used 0.006840020 0.006588939 0.006504649 0.006478138 0.005857617
Used Only On Site 0.005752876 0.005541478 0.005470514 0.005448195 0.004925840
Used Only By User 0.211025706 0.204825210 0.202722454 0.202058865 0.186215602
Recommended Tag 0.105126429 0.101636694 0.100459448 0.100088582 0.091325635
net freeware c# community code
Never Used 0.005261816 0.005226326 0.005132441 0.004755117 0.004616973
Used Only On Site 0.004424392 0.004394526 0.004315517 0.003998011 0.003881776
Used Only By User 0.170419634 0.169459968 0.166910814 0.156511049 0.152640318
Recommended Tag 0.082760243 0.082245265 0.080880303 0.075356007 0.073317891
imported technology website microsoft free
Never Used 0.004609910 0.004556887 0.004495260 0.004436801 0.004331554
Used Only On Site 0.003875833 0.003831221 0.003779370 0.003730187 0.003641640
Used Only By User 0.152441469 0.150945955 0.149201295 0.147539903 0.144532868
Recommended Tag 0.073213449 0.072428774 0.071515190 0.070647020 0.069080155
collaboration internet blog management download
Never Used 0.003958900 0.002886622 0.002829423 0.002741541 0.002464040
Used Only On Site 0.003328143 0.002426291 0.002378191 0.002304292 0.002070958
Used Only By User 0.133718281 0.101066503 0.099257509 0.096464300 0.087532795
Recommended Tag 0.063492252 0.047057008 0.046165087 0.044791657 0.040430373
resources tool php computer windows
Never Used 0.002443328 0.002078667 0.001686939 0.001608253 0.001345571
Used Only On Site 0.002053543 0.001746955 0.001417650 0.001351508 0.001130713
Used Only By User 0.086859272 0.074840952 0.061583261 0.058875529 0.049725025
Recommended Tag 0.040103352 0.034311346 0.028015852 0.026741974 0.022466483
wiki web2.0 design Other
Never Used 0.001262609 0.0010749570 0.0009991658 0.0009553857
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Used Only On Site 0.001060984 0.0009032713 0.0008395748 0.0008027819
Used Only By User 0.046798973 0.0401154376 0.0373900772 0.0358089243
Recommended Tag 0.021108820 0.0180248127 0.0167740176 0.0160501412
Other
Never Used 0.0009553857
Used Only On Site 0.0008027819






Total Number of Users of Site: 303
Number of Users in Fit: 303
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.15078 0.15189 -40.4953 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.49366 0.18235 -2.7072 0.006786 **
used.byUserTRUE 3.85871 0.18529 20.8258 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.28654 0.21055 -1.3609 0.173531
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classbibtex 5.638640 0.179628 31.3906 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classbibliography 5.280009 0.181733 29.0537 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classlatex 5.178528 0.186233 27.8067 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classosx 4.086542 0.190762 21.4222 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 4.048486 0.180458 22.4346 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtex 3.967272 0.220097 18.0251 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmac 3.824762 0.185886 20.5759 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmacosx 2.430452 0.304465 7.9827 1.432e-15 ***
tag_classcitation 2.305393 0.371040 6.2133 5.187e-10 ***
tag_classresearch 2.056909 0.225721 9.1126 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classapps 2.048390 0.376757 5.4369 5.421e-08 ***
tag_classacademic 1.751879 0.346027 5.0628 4.130e-07 ***
tag_classwriting 1.712766 0.256836 6.6687 2.580e-11 ***
tag_classapplications 1.647059 0.462190 3.5636 0.0003658 ***
tag_classapplication 1.571421 0.462449 3.3980 0.0006787 ***
tag_classapple 1.389684 0.261524 5.3138 1.074e-07 ***
tag_classtool 1.241879 0.367318 3.3809 0.0007224 ***
tag_classopensource 1.111780 0.312997 3.5520 0.0003822 ***
tag_classpapers 1.104088 0.456603 2.4180 0.0156039 *
tag_classpublishing 1.054162 0.455933 2.3121 0.0207723 *
tag_classfree 1.004812 0.348104 2.8865 0.0038952 **
tag_classproductivity 0.996946 0.333548 2.9889 0.0027997 **
tag_classtools 0.991654 0.311207 3.1865 0.0014402 **
tag_classreference 0.958039 0.264673 3.6197 0.0002949 ***
tag_classcocoa 0.939856 0.424045 2.2164 0.0266635 *
tag_classeducation 0.520489 0.391780 1.3285 0.1840050
tag_classdatabase 0.360572 0.418455 0.8617 0.3888669
174
tag_classlibrary 0.070016 0.415981 0.1683 0.8663359
tag_classscience -0.535984 0.441351 -1.2144 0.2245886
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.45009 +- 0.67088
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 5673 on 4.875e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 5741




Lambda_p: 0.2163 (d= 7.743 ; p-value: 9.744e-15 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5979 (d= 30.25 ; p-value: 5.294e-201 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4951 (d= 22.23 ; p-value: 1.641e-109 ) (for selection models)





bibtex bibliography latex osx software
Never Used 0.3746931 0.2950949 0.2744328 0.1126221 0.10887457
Used Only On Site 0.2678032 0.2035216 0.1875653 0.0718979 0.06939952
Used Only By User 0.9659925 0.9520265 0.9471732 0.8574753 0.85276089
Recommended Tag 0.9286655 0.9009422 0.8915099 0.7338552 0.72635667
tex mac macosx citation research
Never Used 0.10124176 0.08899133 0.02365312 0.02093077 0.01640117
Used Only On Site 0.06433437 0.05627020 0.01457186 0.01288092 0.01007545
Used Only By User 0.84226884 0.82240051 0.53454168 0.50333193 0.44148048
Recommended Tag 0.70992123 0.67972121 0.34483558 0.31715490 0.26593192
apps academic writing applications application
Never Used 0.016264297 0.012141672 0.011681380 0.01094664 0.010157292
Used Only On Site 0.009990832 0.007446349 0.007162767 0.00671031 0.006224516
Used Only By User 0.439380916 0.368144348 0.359093890 0.34411582 0.327251131
Recommended Tag 0.264272194 0.210753162 0.204320806 0.19384587 0.182298798
apple tool opensource papers publishing
Never Used 0.008483676 0.007326555 0.006438533 0.006389512 0.006080237
Used Only On Site 0.005195502 0.004484839 0.003939883 0.003909811 0.003720113
Used Only By User 0.288561331 0.259189314 0.235000908 0.233620856 0.224801225
Recommended Tag 0.156753182 0.138191578 0.123413928 0.122584169 0.117314711
free productivity tools reference cocoa
Never Used 0.005789156 0.005744055 0.005713914 0.005526074 0.005427045
Used Only On Site 0.003541617 0.003513963 0.003495483 0.003380324 0.003319619
Used Only By User 0.216318172 0.214987570 0.214095907 0.208494143 0.205509506
Recommended Tag 0.112300156 0.111518334 0.110995134 0.107721224 0.105986004
education database library science Other
Never Used 0.003574724 0.003048042 0.002281224 0.0012457653 0.002127294
Used Only On Site 0.002185010 0.001862699 0.001393669 0.0007607687 0.001299550
Used Only By User 0.145346421 0.126585406 0.097787837 0.0558271599 0.091782256






Total Number of Users of Site: 819
Number of Users in Fit: 819
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -7.3233194 0.1250488 -58.5637 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.0008949 0.1386778 0.0065 0.994851
used.byUserTRUE 2.9164998 0.1507284 19.3494 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.4366632 0.1608335 2.7150 0.006628 **
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classicons 6.265759 0.116006 54.0126 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classicon 5.688782 0.119439 47.6291 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesign 4.419483 0.112900 39.1451 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgraphics 4.349501 0.120189 36.1889 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.846498 0.198691 19.3592 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtools 3.437055 0.120459 28.5330 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classart 3.418147 0.122188 27.9746 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtiny 3.260455 0.228890 14.2446 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmit 2.659850 0.244129 10.8953 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classinternet 2.625658 0.149964 17.5086 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdesign 2.485551 0.142120 17.4891 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfactory 2.355019 0.344235 6.8413 7.847e-12 ***
tag_classpixelart 2.252936 0.296062 7.6097 2.748e-14 ***
tag_classpixel 2.233686 0.238481 9.3663 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfree 2.223560 0.152419 14.5885 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgenerator 2.146741 0.191588 11.2050 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcool 1.998115 0.188153 10.6196 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgraphic 1.984908 0.280061 7.0874 1.366e-12 ***
tag_classbitmap 1.820360 0.411655 4.4221 9.777e-06 ***
tag_classcollection 1.790271 0.351462 5.0938 3.510e-07 ***
tag_classtool 1.760413 0.230752 7.6290 2.365e-14 ***
tag_classweb 1.733007 0.165024 10.5015 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classresources 1.647779 0.237329 6.9430 3.838e-12 ***
tag_classonline 1.531717 0.212689 7.2017 5.948e-13 ***
tag_classfun 1.475808 0.197602 7.4686 8.106e-14 ***
tag_classeditor 1.459206 0.254473 5.7342 9.796e-09 ***
tag_classdiy 1.408927 0.242106 5.8195 5.904e-09 ***
tag_classsmall 1.361061 0.442487 3.0759 0.0020984 **
tag_classfavicon 1.345137 0.382260 3.5189 0.0004333 ***
tag_classcommunity 1.326202 0.230406 5.7559 8.617e-09 ***
tag_classweb2.0 1.199472 0.204357 5.8695 4.371e-09 ***
tag_classuseful 1.137650 0.367298 3.0973 0.0019526 **
tag_classimages 1.079463 0.246470 4.3797 1.188e-05 ***
tag_classgallery 1.048047 0.294325 3.5608 0.0003697 ***
tag_classimage 0.963452 0.316450 3.0446 0.0023302 **
176
tag_classajax 0.957092 0.249962 3.8289 0.0001287 ***
tag_classinteractive 0.930643 0.437934 2.1251 0.0335803 *
tag_classwebsite 0.917056 0.386299 2.3740 0.0175987 *
tag_classmedia 0.810046 0.271381 2.9849 0.0028367 **
tag_classcomputer 0.737366 0.328999 2.2412 0.0250105 *
tag_classillustration 0.679978 0.342616 1.9847 0.0471821 *
tag_classdownload 0.670182 0.314111 2.1336 0.0328766 *
tag_classdrawing 0.664827 0.380547 1.7470 0.0806322 .
tag_classfreeware 0.553447 0.314145 1.7618 0.0781104 .
tag_classsoftware 0.322181 0.274226 1.1749 0.2400441
tag_classinteresting 0.304253 0.434623 0.7000 0.4839034
tag_classjavascript 0.250759 0.314035 0.7985 0.4245760
tag_classfunny 0.236745 0.342838 0.6905 0.4898505
tag_classcode 0.098574 0.432971 0.2277 0.8199034
tag_classsocial 0.073646 0.377508 0.1951 0.8453277
tag_classtechnology -0.180294 0.402885 -0.4475 0.6545090
tag_classblog -0.311065 0.357179 -0.8709 0.3838113
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.77761 +- 0.88182
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.564e+04 on 1.965e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.576e+04




Lambda_p: 0.1337 (d= 7.452 ; p-value: 9.197e-14 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.56 (d= 44.15 ; p-value: 0 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.412 (d= 27.99 ; p-value: 2.398e-172 ) (for selection models)





icons icon design graphics system:unfiled
Never Used 0.2577760 0.1632097 0.05196424 0.04862278 0.02997898
Used Only On Site 0.2579472 0.1633319 0.05200834 0.04866419 0.03000502
Used Only By User 0.8651733 0.7827836 0.50316579 0.48567426 0.36347310
Recommended Tag 0.9085866 0.8480670 0.61069188 0.59393085 0.46934767
tools art tiny mit internet
Never Used 0.02010919 0.01973998 0.01690886 0.009345516 0.009034211
Used Only On Site 0.02012683 0.01975730 0.01692374 0.009353805 0.009042226
Used Only By User 0.27492745 0.27117442 0.24115374 0.148429863 0.144159763
Recommended Tag 0.37000243 0.36560597 0.32986263 0.212585386 0.206918095
webdesign factory pixelart pixel free
Never Used 0.007862414 0.006906924 0.006240820 0.006122562 0.006061249
Used Only On Site 0.007869398 0.006913065 0.006246373 0.006128010 0.006066643
Used Only By User 0.127720198 0.113870611 0.103968885 0.102189186 0.101263861
Recommended Tag 0.184867666 0.166000493 0.152345086 0.149875813 0.148590150
177
generator cool graphic bitmap collection
Never Used 0.005615584 0.004843780 0.004780531 0.004058161 0.003938344
Used Only On Site 0.005620584 0.004848095 0.004784791 0.004061779 0.003941857
Used Only By User 0.094483662 0.082511333 0.081516997 0.070014983 0.068080926
Recommended Tag 0.139131734 0.122265798 0.120855492 0.104433956 0.101653051
tool web resources online fun
Never Used 0.003822934 0.003719971 0.003417099 0.003043794 0.002878763
Used Only On Site 0.003826344 0.003723289 0.003420148 0.003046510 0.002881333
Used Only By User 0.066210813 0.064536405 0.059578107 0.053398153 0.050641649
Recommended Tag 0.098958673 0.096541724 0.089359364 0.080354195 0.076318364
editor diy small favicon community
Never Used 0.002831498 0.002693027 0.002567483 0.002527025 0.002479744
Used Only On Site 0.002834026 0.002695431 0.002569776 0.002529282 0.002481959
Used Only By User 0.049849396 0.047521147 0.045400939 0.044715786 0.043913895
Recommended Tag 0.075156216 0.071735232 0.068612510 0.067601873 0.066418099
web2.0 useful images gallery image
Never Used 0.002185228 0.002054493 0.001938585 0.001878742 0.001726610
Used Only On Site 0.002187180 0.002056328 0.001940317 0.001880421 0.001728153
Used Only By User 0.038890157 0.036644119 0.034644521 0.033609073 0.030967278
Recommended Tag 0.058978700 0.055639644 0.052660159 0.051114774 0.047164123
ajax interactive website media computer
Never Used 0.001715682 0.001670973 0.001648461 0.001481418 0.001377710
Used Only On Site 0.001717216 0.001672466 0.001649935 0.001482742 0.001378942
Used Only By User 0.030776991 0.029997719 0.029604903 0.026680659 0.024856775
Recommended Tag 0.046879125 0.045711376 0.045122364 0.040729706 0.037982909
illustration download drawing freeware software
Never Used 0.001300972 0.001288307 0.001281436 0.001146524 0.000910016
Used Only On Site 0.001302135 0.001289459 0.001282581 0.001147550 0.000910830
Used Only By User 0.023503037 0.023279267 0.023157829 0.020767637 0.016550692
Recommended Tag 0.035940651 0.035602780 0.035419388 0.031804847 0.025404899
interesting javascript funny code
Never Used 0.0008938606 0.0008473406 0.0008355586 0.0007278080
Used Only On Site 0.0008946602 0.0008480986 0.0008363061 0.0007284592
Used Only By User 0.0162613904 0.0154274340 0.0152160072 0.0132784515
Recommended Tag 0.0249647572 0.0236952045 0.0233731610 0.0204184370
social technology blog Other
Never Used 0.0007099017 0.0005507860 0.0004833022 0.0006595326
Used Only On Site 0.0007105368 0.0005512788 0.0004837347 0.0006601227
Used Only By User 0.0129557643 0.0100795743 0.0088549426 0.0120469979
Recommended Tag 0.0199257408 0.0155265507 0.0136492560 0.0185372557
[[18]]
Mint: A Fresh Look at Your Site
http://haveamint.com/
b4b81afe38922cfb189a39e7b26a5719
Total Number of Users of Site: 560
Number of Users in Fit: 560
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.91743 0.11126 -62.1757 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.12023 0.13349 -0.9007 0.36777
used.byUserTRUE 3.57049 0.13683 26.0952 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.36910 0.15439 -2.3907 0.01682 *
178
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classstats 6.27999 0.13000 48.3089 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb 4.32167 0.13657 31.6433 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtools 4.26301 0.13761 30.9781 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.77604 0.22226 16.9896 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classajax 3.50420 0.14313 24.4821 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmint 3.48977 0.23310 14.9713 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 3.48931 0.14130 24.6935 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classanalytics 3.25207 0.22602 14.3883 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphp 3.21898 0.15584 20.6555 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classstatistics 3.20986 0.19519 16.4445 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdesign 2.87388 0.15925 18.0461 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesign 2.83831 0.14549 19.5089 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebdev 2.76147 0.20358 13.5648 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb2.0 2.33318 0.17978 12.9778 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwebstats 2.27357 0.37137 6.1221 9.235e-10 ***
tag_classwebsite 2.15901 0.29893 7.2224 5.107e-13 ***
tag_classtool 2.10178 0.26200 8.0220 1.040e-15 ***
tag_classtraffic 2.08066 0.30507 6.8203 9.084e-12 ***
tag_classtracking 2.06452 0.32566 6.3396 2.304e-10 ***
tag_classutilities 1.95580 0.27480 7.1173 1.101e-12 ***
tag_classanalysis 1.94148 0.35248 5.5080 3.629e-08 ***
tag_classinspiration 1.89574 0.24275 7.8095 5.743e-15 ***
tag_classseo 1.78649 0.26612 6.7132 1.904e-11 ***
tag_classclean 1.78577 0.42221 4.2296 2.341e-05 ***
tag_classsite 1.75346 0.41407 4.2347 2.288e-05 ***
tag_classblog 1.61784 0.20031 8.0767 6.655e-16 ***
tag_classcool 1.56212 0.26977 5.7907 7.011e-09 ***
tag_classwebapps 1.54714 0.44469 3.4791 0.0005031 ***
tag_classdevelopment 1.54328 0.25188 6.1271 8.948e-10 ***
tag_classcss 1.39750 0.19859 7.0370 1.965e-12 ***
tag_classjavascript 1.30544 0.22978 5.6814 1.336e-08 ***
tag_classmysql 1.26681 0.30994 4.0872 4.365e-05 ***
tag_classblogging 1.20179 0.32237 3.7280 0.0001930 ***
tag_classgui 1.09087 0.44030 2.4775 0.0132288 *
tag_classui 1.06944 0.41393 2.5836 0.0097775 **
tag_classapache 0.93940 0.36635 2.5642 0.0103412 *
tag_classblogs 0.37542 0.36736 1.0219 0.3068208
tag_classtech 0.25066 0.41163 0.6089 0.5425591
tag_classsearch -0.11555 0.40467 -0.2855 0.7752368
tag_classbusiness -0.12533 0.38173 -0.3283 0.7426601
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.66832 +- 0.81751
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.21e+04 on 1.573e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.219e+04





Lambda_p: 0.04304 (d= 2.014 ; p-value: 0.04396 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5149 (d= 34.08 ; p-value: 1.504e-254 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.273 (d= 14.7 ; p-value: 6.861e-49 ) (for selection models)





stats web tools system:unfiled ajax
Never Used 0.3458268 0.06941229 0.06571746 0.04143217 0.03188481
Used Only On Site 0.3191542 0.06203697 0.05870996 0.03691192 0.02837535
Used Only By User 0.9494566 0.72606306 0.71424212 0.60566081 0.53923669
Recommended Tag 0.9201020 0.61902562 0.60509798 0.48495061 0.41774087
mint software analytics php statistics
Never Used 0.03144221 0.03142816 0.02495643 0.02416367 0.02394943
Used Only On Site 0.02798005 0.02796751 0.02219207 0.02148519 0.02129417
Used Only By User 0.53564800 0.53553327 0.47630292 0.46805529 0.46578391
Recommended Tag 0.41423383 0.41412191 0.35797048 0.35040089 0.34832659
webdesign design webdev web2.0 webstats
Never Used 0.01723310 0.01664085 0.01542911 0.010108267 0.009528891
Used Only On Site 0.01531080 0.01478362 0.01370523 0.008973464 0.008458575
Used Only By User 0.38389487 0.37551645 0.35767749 0.266246498 0.254764438
Recommended Tag 0.27640328 0.26934523 0.25449451 0.181967350 0.173261646
website tool traffic tracking utilities
Never Used 0.008506200 0.008036877 0.007870275 0.007745188 0.006952838
Used Only On Site 0.007549881 0.007132943 0.006984947 0.006873834 0.006170071
Used Only By User 0.233630077 0.223540143 0.219896518 0.217139120 0.199226324
Recommended Tag 0.157459907 0.150015648 0.147343030 0.145325934 0.132335901
analysis inspiration seo clean site
Never Used 0.006854706 0.006550194 0.005876285 0.005872083 0.005686445
Used Only On Site 0.006082919 0.005812492 0.005214082 0.005210352 0.005045527
Used Only By User 0.196952683 0.189817337 0.173582731 0.173479538 0.168895424
Recommended Tag 0.130701039 0.125590531 0.114075635 0.114002938 0.110779815
blog cool webapps development css
Never Used 0.004968842 0.004700818 0.004631253 0.004613501 0.003990168
Used Only On Site 0.004408446 0.004170523 0.004108774 0.004093016 0.003539757
Used Only By User 0.150703271 0.143709534 0.141876088 0.141406995 0.124615269
Recommended Tag 0.098108500 0.093287449 0.092028152 0.091706260 0.080264645
javascript mysql blogging gui ui
Never Used 0.003640517 0.003503022 0.003283244 0.002939550 0.002877409
Used Only On Site 0.003229446 0.003107428 0.002912397 0.002607422 0.002552284
Used Only By User 0.114914995 0.111043262 0.104785952 0.094827726 0.093004304
Recommended Tag 0.073725943 0.071130430 0.066952823 0.060347657 0.059143923
apache blogs tech search business
Never Used 0.002527413 0.001439514 0.001270891 0.0008815286 0.0008729502
Used Only On Site 0.002241746 0.001276652 0.001127085 0.0007817459 0.0007741377
Used Only By User 0.082599750 0.048729318 0.043261218 0.0303988574 0.0301116933




Used Only On Site 0.0008774150






Total Number of Users of Site: 447
Number of Users in Fit: 447
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.41293 0.13666 -46.9274 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.46879 0.17047 -2.7501 0.0059586 **
used.byUserTRUE 4.35048 0.18819 23.1181 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.79388 0.21586 -3.6777 0.0002353 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classnews 5.328874 0.172431 30.9043 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnewspaper 5.162911 0.172551 29.9211 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classuk 4.864596 0.179767 27.0606 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.771571 0.187075 25.5062 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnewspapers 4.179773 0.203165 20.5733 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtelegraph 4.002661 0.231650 17.2789 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmedia 3.520044 0.211485 16.6444 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnews(international) 2.455547 0.419189 5.8579 4.689e-09 ***
tag_classdaily 2.291876 0.266843 8.5889 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classinternational 2.240188 0.362550 6.1790 6.452e-10 ***
tag_classnoticias 2.183071 0.395246 5.5233 3.327e-08 ***
tag_classimported 2.044132 0.378003 5.4077 6.384e-08 ***
tag_classenglish 1.349521 0.435880 3.0961 0.001961 **
tag_classworld 1.316812 0.469257 2.8062 0.005014 **
tag_classinternet 0.549719 0.459587 1.1961 0.231651
tag_classpolitics 0.286737 0.425932 0.6732 0.500820
tag_classmagazine 0.026858 0.454509 0.0591 0.952878
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.48632 +- 0.69736
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 5029 on 7.016e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 5073




Lambda_p: 0.2109 (d= 6.621 ; p-value: 3.558e-11 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5999 (d= 26.63 ; p-value: 2.813e-156 ) (for classification models)
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Phi_p: 0.4806 (d= 18.66 ; p-value: 9.671e-78 ) (for selection models)





news newspaper uk system:unfiled newspapers
Never Used 0.2527386 0.2226963 0.1753266 0.1622799 0.09681197
Used Only On Site 0.1746754 0.1520245 0.1174166 0.1081142 0.06285847
Used Only By User 0.9632588 0.9569118 0.9427917 0.9375627 0.89257549
Recommended Tag 0.8811907 0.8626874 0.8233887 0.8094518 0.70154248
telegraph media news(international) daily
Never Used 0.08239275 0.05250622 0.01875456 0.01596823
Used Only On Site 0.05319844 0.03351485 0.01181880 0.01005235
Used Only By User 0.87437531 0.81116444 0.59702805 0.55710621
Recommended Tag 0.66318987 0.54857761 0.29534341 0.26245586
international noticias imported english world
Never Used 0.015176045 0.01434561 0.012507980 0.006284203 0.006083207
Used Only On Site 0.009550804 0.00902536 0.007863803 0.003941672 0.003815313
Used Only By User 0.544317924 0.53011870 0.495420457 0.328951866 0.321772352
Recommended Tag 0.252574048 0.24194453 0.217382161 0.121788840 0.118333434
internet politics magazine Other
Never Used 0.002834041 0.002180113 0.001682023 0.001637521
Used Only On Site 0.001775312 0.001365341 0.001053205 0.001025323
Used Only By User 0.180534452 0.144833276 0.115516360 0.112800391
Recommended Tag 0.058668101 0.045721710 0.035630904 0.034719438
[[20]]
Glimpses The Uncanny Valley
http://www.arclight.net/˜pdb/nonfiction/uncanny-valley.html
bcf280a637e27240df2658b8be0cd8c4
Total Number of Users of Site: 166
Number of Users in Fit: 166
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -4.615325 0.407631 -11.3223 <2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.153552 0.190561 0.8058 0.4204
used.byUserTRUE 2.995092 0.220440 13.5869 <2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.088308 0.242934 0.3635 0.7162
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classpsychology 3.57462 0.41653 8.5820 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classuncannyvalley 3.16174 0.42464 7.4457 9.643e-14 ***
tag_classrobots 2.65675 0.42886 6.1949 5.831e-10 ***
tag_classarticle 2.04723 0.43688 4.6860 2.786e-06 ***
tag_classrobotics 1.67272 0.45665 3.6630 0.0002493 ***
tag_classscience 1.62484 0.41827 3.8846 0.0001025 ***
tag_classuncanny 1.52581 0.49504 3.0822 0.0020546 **
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tag_classarticles 1.40906 0.45934 3.0676 0.0021579 **
tag_classaesthetics 1.18562 0.50447 2.3502 0.0187612 *
tag_classanthropomorphism 1.09696 0.54332 2.0190 0.0434872 *
tag_classsystem:unfiled 0.93816 0.56243 1.6680 0.0953063 .
tag_classrealism 0.83783 0.56116 1.4930 0.1354270
tag_classrobot 0.80973 0.52687 1.5368 0.1243301
tag_classwriting 0.61702 0.44690 1.3807 0.1673776
tag_classtoread 0.54458 0.49815 1.0932 0.2742981
tag_classtheory 0.39859 0.50198 0.7940 0.4271750
tag_classanimation -0.18933 0.51575 -0.3671 0.7135526
tag_classgraphics -0.20321 0.48490 -0.4191 0.6751629
tag_classbrain -0.34234 0.59907 -0.5715 0.5676905
tag_classinteresting -0.36309 0.56364 -0.6442 0.5194519
tag_classmovies -0.39285 0.50875 -0.7722 0.4400069
tag_classgames -0.42126 0.47492 -0.8870 0.3750807
tag_classresearch -0.50199 0.53718 -0.9345 0.3500505
tag_classfilm -0.67957 0.54410 -1.2490 0.2116726
tag_classliterature -0.71632 0.58058 -1.2338 0.2172740
tag_classdesign -0.85956 0.48169 -1.7845 0.0743482 .
tag_classreference -0.87973 0.49045 -1.7937 0.0728547 .
tag_classtech -0.93509 0.53709 -1.7410 0.0816760 .
tag_classOther -1.11246 0.37825 -2.9411 0.0032708 **
tag_classart -1.11870 0.50628 -2.2096 0.0271310 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.80014 +- 0.8945
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 3915 on 2.071e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 3985




Lambda_p: 0.03641 (d= 0.9902 ; p-value: 0.3221 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.501 (d= 19.26 ; p-value: 1.261e-82 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.2776 (d= 8.771 ; p-value: 1.777e-18 ) (for selection models)





psychology uncannyvalley robots article robotics
Never Used 0.2610132 0.1894506 0.1236218 0.07122028 0.05008716
Used Only On Site 0.2916969 0.2141596 0.1412412 0.08207050 0.05791858
Used Only By User 0.8759237 0.8236838 0.7381781 0.60515653 0.51311854
Recommended Tag 0.8999116 0.8561122 0.7821740 0.66124732 0.57305980
science uncanny articles aesthetics anthropomorphism
Never Used 0.04785751 0.04354197 0.03893063 0.03137994 0.02879410
Used Only On Site 0.05536063 0.05040431 0.04510048 0.03639846 0.03341333
Used Only By User 0.50115128 0.47641256 0.44740192 0.39302563 0.37208646
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Recommended Tag 0.56130623 0.53679339 0.50767098 0.45196068 0.43010658
system:unfiled realism robot writing toread
Never Used 0.02467054 0.02236818 0.02176178 0.01801619 0.01677842
Used Only On Site 0.02864777 0.02598412 0.02528223 0.02094368 0.01950878
Used Only By User 0.33579858 0.31380240 0.30778260 0.26831031 0.25433022
Recommended Tag 0.39168997 0.36806145 0.36154921 0.31835272 0.30284441
theory animation graphics brain interesting
Never Used 0.01453235 0.008124987 0.008013897 0.006980238 0.006837869
Used Only On Site 0.01690349 0.009460720 0.009331539 0.008129320 0.007963702
Used Only By User 0.22764662 0.140691157 0.139021583 0.123188560 0.120964727
Recommended Tag 0.27293390 0.172544326 0.170571785 0.151778978 0.149126805
movies games research film literature
Never Used 0.006638721 0.006453996 0.005956402 0.004992073 0.004812823
Used Only On Site 0.007732020 0.007517104 0.006938118 0.005815781 0.005607121
Used Only By User 0.117836078 0.114915188 0.106955583 0.091138886 0.088140381
Recommended Tag 0.145390242 0.141896208 0.132347211 0.113251758 0.109613474
design reference tech Other art
Never Used 0.004173203 0.004090220 0.003870787 0.003243715 0.003223620
Used Only On Site 0.004862455 0.004765832 0.004510318 0.003780034 0.003756629
Used Only By User 0.077286614 0.075860544 0.072069408 0.061071420 0.060714909
Recommended Tag 0.096395001 0.094652516 0.090013723 0.076503147 0.076063850
Other
Never Used 0.003243715
Used Only On Site 0.003780034






Total Number of Users of Site: 157
Number of Users in Fit: 157
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.48113 0.24489 -22.3823 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.73047 0.29607 -2.4672 0.01362 *
used.byUserTRUE 2.65604 0.29481 9.0095 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.49408 0.33803 1.4617 0.14384
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classdvd 5.99914 0.28165 21.2996 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classauthoring 5.31423 0.27136 19.5836 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 3.93993 0.25333 15.5523 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classvideo 3.48101 0.24807 14.0325 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.32708 0.35910 9.2650 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classlinux 2.71712 0.25560 10.6302 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfree 2.61797 0.26355 9.9334 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classwindows 2.26271 0.26432 8.5604 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfreeware 2.16148 0.27656 7.8156 5.472e-15 ***
184
tag_classmultimedia 1.54910 0.41722 3.7129 0.0002049 ***
tag_classopensource 1.40454 0.30862 4.5510 5.340e-06 ***
tag_classtools 1.36404 0.31206 4.3711 1.236e-05 ***
tag_classmedia 1.05422 0.36167 2.9149 0.0035583 **
tag_classvideos 0.85252 0.47488 1.7952 0.0726145 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.62496 +- 0.79054
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2495 on 1.097e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2533




Lambda_p: 0.2153 (d= 5.681 ; p-value: 1.337e-08 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5828 (d= 21.71 ; p-value: 1.755e-104 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.46 (d= 14.85 ; p-value: 7.061e-50 ) (for selection models)





dvd authoring software video system:unfiled
Never Used 0.6266811 0.4583705 0.17636106 0.11919010 0.10395375
Used Only On Site 0.4470828 0.2895905 0.09349672 0.06119217 0.05292435
Used Only By User 0.9598458 0.9233768 0.75303087 0.65834318 0.62292823
Recommended Tag 0.9496771 0.9048877 0.70650249 0.60337181 0.56601497
linux free windows freeware multimedia
Never Used 0.05930049 0.05400508 0.03847856 0.03490319 0.019226834
Used Only On Site 0.02946983 0.02676245 0.01891164 0.01712202 0.009354458
Used Only By User 0.47303508 0.44840496 0.36299836 0.33992949 0.218233154
Recommended Tag 0.41475327 0.39090667 0.31029101 0.28905178 0.180586668
opensource tools media videos Other
Never Used 0.016682151 0.016030608 0.01181016 0.009673838 0.004147347
Used Only On Site 0.008105591 0.007786365 0.00572379 0.004683204 0.002002009
Used Only By User 0.194575166 0.188306304 0.14543383 0.122113384 0.055983388
Recommended Tag 0.160173649 0.154800119 0.11844298 0.098949407 0.044724683
[[22]]
digg labs / swarm
http://labs.digg.com/swarm/
c2c2a5ab753a62bcea107e1ae1f841c8
Total Number of Users of Site: 501
Number of Users in Fit: 499
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.53312 0.10685 -61.1431 < 2.2e-16 ***
185
used.onSiteTRUE -0.46853 0.13343 -3.5113 0.0004460 ***
used.byUserTRUE 2.87632 0.14188 20.2726 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.59071 0.15772 3.7452 0.0001802 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classdigg 6.3125109 0.1399020 45.1209 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classswarm 5.8068838 0.1426805 40.6985 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classvisualization 5.5862149 0.1447177 38.6008 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.4169076 0.1874902 23.5581 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classflash 4.0674681 0.1499995 27.1165 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcool 3.9678010 0.1648299 24.0721 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb2.0 3.7769007 0.1478322 25.5486 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classnews 2.9276091 0.1583819 18.4845 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classinterface 2.2541834 0.2323671 9.7010 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classvisualisation 2.2390115 0.3710100 6.0349 1.591e-09 ***
tag_classui 2.1387955 0.2673794 7.9991 1.253e-15 ***
tag_classtraffic 1.9110653 0.3165526 6.0371 1.569e-09 ***
tag_classtagging 1.7984802 0.2680947 6.7084 1.968e-11 ***
tag_classsocial 1.7670326 0.2173801 8.1288 4.337e-16 ***
tag_classawesome 1.7492734 0.4470905 3.9126 9.132e-05 ***
tag_classlabs 1.7429629 0.4144498 4.2055 2.605e-05 ***
tag_classdesign 1.6983548 0.1873628 9.0645 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classexperimental 1.5734239 0.4190706 3.7546 0.0001736 ***
tag_classcommunity 1.4939412 0.2470362 6.0475 1.471e-09 ***
tag_classnetwork 1.4241785 0.2834172 5.0250 5.034e-07 ***
tag_classvisual 1.4210834 0.4512092 3.1495 0.0016355 **
tag_classsocialsoftware 1.3170261 0.3925479 3.3551 0.0007934 ***
tag_classfun 1.2781244 0.2492443 5.1280 2.928e-07 ***
tag_classlive 1.2736978 0.4255342 2.9932 0.0027609 **
tag_classtag 1.2422381 0.4163238 2.9838 0.0028467 **
tag_classinteractive 1.1871142 0.3667840 3.2365 0.0012098 **
tag_classinformation 1.1289599 0.3502273 3.2235 0.0012663 **
tag_classtrends 1.0356668 0.3890792 2.6618 0.0077715 **
tag_classdata 1.0348539 0.3881288 2.6663 0.0076699 **
tag_classtech 0.9686161 0.3291522 2.9428 0.0032530 **
tag_classblog 0.9258900 0.2365397 3.9143 9.066e-05 ***
tag_classdaily 0.8745296 0.3933596 2.2232 0.0262002 *
tag_classgeek 0.8351513 0.3938173 2.1207 0.0339507 *
tag_classgraphics 0.6572854 0.3358190 1.9573 0.0503168 .
tag_classinspiration 0.6561382 0.3667356 1.7891 0.0735937 .
tag_classanimation 0.6226773 0.3676853 1.6935 0.0903592 .
tag_classtags 0.5948162 0.3883870 1.5315 0.1256449
tag_classreference 0.5720605 0.2924418 1.9562 0.0504473 .
tag_classnetworking 0.5148498 0.4403035 1.1693 0.2422801
tag_classresearch 0.5062996 0.3500308 1.4464 0.1480530
tag_classmap 0.4677309 0.4105146 1.1394 0.2545460
tag_classtechnology 0.4030676 0.3333892 1.2090 0.2266627
tag_classtools 0.3756883 0.2905903 1.2928 0.1960646
tag_classajax 0.3004470 0.3462949 0.8676 0.3856109
tag_classinternet 0.2766444 0.3643666 0.7592 0.4477046
tag_classwebdesign 0.2162126 0.3636826 0.5945 0.5521717
tag_classsearch 0.0025052 0.3625578 0.0069 0.9944869
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tag_classweb -0.0088744 0.3468290 -0.0256 0.9795865
tag_classmaps -0.1011101 0.4384185 -0.2306 0.8176065
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.73724 +- 0.85863
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.084e+04 on 1.337e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.094e+04




Lambda_p: 0.1044 (d= 4.695 ; p-value: 2.66e-06 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5454 (d= 34.68 ; p-value: 1.431e-263 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3832 (d= 20.84 ; p-value: 2.07e-96 ) (for selection models)





digg swarm visualization system:unfiled flash
Never Used 0.4450711 0.3260219 0.2795083 0.10753133 0.07830170
Used Only On Site 0.3342259 0.2324086 0.1953791 0.07012722 0.05048974
Used Only By User 0.9343623 0.8956769 0.8731850 0.68137787 0.60124893
Recommended Tag 0.9414697 0.9065543 0.8861093 0.70729729 0.63014855
cool web2.0 news interface visualisation
Never Used 0.07140428 0.05973655 0.02645478 0.013668032 0.01346500
Used Only On Site 0.04592015 0.03824512 0.01672416 0.008599104 0.00847072
Used Only By User 0.57713046 0.52999005 0.32537310 0.197401793 0.19500907
Recommended Tag 0.60663446 0.56027712 0.35274274 0.217476940 0.21490604
ui traffic tagging social awesome
Never Used 0.012196664 0.009736866 0.008709127 0.008441783 0.008294420
Used Only On Site 0.007669165 0.006116810 0.005469062 0.005300647 0.005207828
Used Only By User 0.179756091 0.148586440 0.134899439 0.131271406 0.129259386
Recommended Tag 0.198480504 0.164716048 0.149804692 0.145843373 0.143644936
labs design experimental community network
Never Used 0.008242673 0.007885899 0.006966214 0.006437379 0.006006203
Used Only On Site 0.005175237 0.004950571 0.004371707 0.004039031 0.003767887
Used Only By User 0.128550790 0.123635804 0.110723463 0.103136046 0.096859391
Recommended Tag 0.142870418 0.137494320 0.123338316 0.114998243 0.108086680
visual socialsoftware fun live
Never Used 0.005987753 0.005399200 0.005194265 0.005171442
Used Only On Site 0.003756287 0.003386324 0.003257541 0.003243199
Used Only By User 0.096588978 0.087882327 0.084813589 0.084470627
Recommended Tag 0.107788663 0.098182176 0.094791157 0.094412012
tag interactive information trends data
Never Used 0.005012085 0.004744552 0.004477705 0.004080488 0.004077185
Used Only On Site 0.003143073 0.002975005 0.002807402 0.002557976 0.002555903
Used Only By User 0.082069272 0.078011091 0.073929635 0.067790875 0.067739519
Recommended Tag 0.091756364 0.087264712 0.082742565 0.075932023 0.075875001
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tech blog daily geek graphics
Never Used 0.003816869 0.003657808 0.003475321 0.003341576 0.002798606
Used Only On Site 0.002392483 0.002292644 0.002178115 0.002094188 0.001753548
Used Only By User 0.063674426 0.061174085 0.058289999 0.056165661 0.047447971
Recommended Tag 0.071359063 0.068579066 0.065370177 0.063005071 0.053285742
inspiration animation tags reference networking
Never Used 0.002795406 0.002703666 0.002629574 0.002570564 0.002427975
Used Only On Site 0.001751541 0.001694000 0.001647532 0.001610524 0.001521107
Used Only By User 0.047396145 0.045908070 0.044703064 0.043741296 0.041409781
Recommended Tag 0.053227896 0.051566635 0.050220920 0.049146545 0.046540940
research map technology tools ajax
Never Used 0.002407353 0.002316483 0.002171747 0.002113217 0.001960350
Used Only On Site 0.001508176 0.001451198 0.001360452 0.001323758 0.001227929
Used Only By User 0.041071709 0.039579286 0.037193131 0.036225010 0.033687858
Recommended Tag 0.046162995 0.044494153 0.041824595 0.040741020 0.037900011
internet webdesign search web maps
Never Used 0.001914328 0.001802270 0.001455991 0.0014395399 0.0013128689
Used Only On Site 0.001199081 0.001128844 0.000911835 0.0009015269 0.0008221589
Used Only By User 0.032921556 0.031050914 0.025226964 0.0249486403 0.0228005420
Recommended Tag 0.037041567 0.034945280 0.028412317 0.0280998625 0.0256875894
Other
Never Used 0.0014523532
Used Only On Site 0.0009095557
Used Only By User 0.0251654340
Recommended Tag 0.0283432431
[[23]]
Flickr: The HDR Pool
http://www.flickr.com/groups/hdr/pool/
c41483478648f6b82e9178c4b0fd7417
Total Number of Users of Site: 596
Number of Users in Fit: 596
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.76936 0.16795 -40.3051 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.32584 0.19459 -1.6745 0.09403 .
used.byUserTRUE 3.20806 0.20252 15.8409 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.25780 0.21833 -1.1808 0.23768
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classhdr 6.75149 0.14531 46.4618 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphotography 5.80543 0.14740 39.3858 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classflickr 5.77136 0.14677 39.3216 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.42149 0.19649 22.5018 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphoto 4.17761 0.15976 26.1501 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphotos 3.72899 0.16685 22.3490 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classart 3.53063 0.15663 22.5415 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classphotoshop 3.21363 0.17391 18.4790 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classimages 2.68917 0.20641 13.0286 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classhdri 2.30813 0.39268 5.8779 4.156e-09 ***
188
tag_classfoto 2.28812 0.39087 5.8539 4.801e-09 ***
tag_classpictures 2.23156 0.30807 7.2437 4.367e-13 ***
tag_classcool 1.84203 0.26392 6.9795 2.963e-12 ***
tag_classgallery 1.72548 0.30342 5.6868 1.294e-08 ***
tag_classimage 1.39521 0.36146 3.8599 0.0001134 ***
tag_classinspiration 1.29085 0.35741 3.6117 0.0003042 ***
tag_classcamera 1.28948 0.35724 3.6095 0.0003068 ***
tag_classgraphics 1.05255 0.31526 3.3387 0.0008416 ***
tag_classdigital 1.04007 0.41330 2.5165 0.0118524 *
tag_classcolor 0.65841 0.45378 1.4509 0.1467951
tag_classdesign 0.33561 0.33537 1.0007 0.3169646
tag_classhowto 0.13371 0.38733 0.3452 0.7299351
tag_classtools -0.18483 0.44311 -0.4171 0.6765825
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.51333 +- 0.71647
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 7620 on 7.924e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 7676




Lambda_p: 0.2459 (d= 10.41 ; p-value: 2.237e-25 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6144 (d= 36.78 ; p-value: 3.93e-296 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4826 (d= 24.79 ; p-value: 1.032e-135 ) (for selection models)





hdr photography flickr system:unfiled photo
Never Used 0.4955321 0.2760911 0.2693337 0.08723511 0.06967139
Used Only On Site 0.4149079 0.2158909 0.2101791 0.06454250 0.05129092
Used Only By User 0.9604635 0.9041429 0.9011490 0.70270064 0.64937994
Recommended Tag 0.9312817 0.8403029 0.8356776 0.56869939 0.50816678
photos art photoshop images hdri
Never Used 0.04563480 0.03773375 0.02776743 0.01662320 0.011416307
Used Only On Site 0.03336814 0.02752963 0.02020187 0.01205636 0.008267913
Used Only By User 0.54182377 0.49233221 0.41394793 0.29481120 0.222152270
Recommended Tag 0.39748441 0.35107476 0.28265838 0.18911435 0.137428712
foto pictures cool gallery image
Never Used 0.011192670 0.010583680 0.007193662 0.006407349 0.004613448
Used Only On Site 0.008105445 0.007663128 0.005203661 0.004633853 0.003334820
Used Only By User 0.218713780 0.209202507 0.151964900 0.137546540 0.102836950
Recommended Tag 0.135073862 0.128601161 0.090881649 0.081700491 0.060101469
inspiration camera graphics digital color
Never Used 0.004158170 0.004152525 0.003279410 0.003238851 0.002213529
Used Only On Site 0.003005343 0.003001258 0.002369634 0.002340301 0.001598976
Used Only By User 0.093599986 0.093484309 0.075247449 0.074383239 0.052010952
189
Recommended Tag 0.054470015 0.054399795 0.043422299 0.042906639 0.029697836
design howto tools Other
Never Used 0.001603833 0.001311002 0.0009537118 0.0011471098
Used Only On Site 0.001158357 0.000946784 0.0006886867 0.0008283862
Used Only By User 0.038210299 0.031444271 0.0230643631 0.0276175121





Total Number of Users of Site: 496
Number of Users in Fit: 496
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -4.81222 0.37455 -12.8480 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.24729 0.14379 -1.7198 0.08547 .
used.byUserTRUE 3.95829 0.15415 25.6773 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.82356 0.17257 -4.7724 1.821e-06 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classidentity 4.882652 0.371350 13.1484 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classauthentication 3.461847 0.373017 9.2807 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsxip 3.167495 0.378505 8.3684 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classweb2.0 2.651762 0.371879 7.1307 9.985e-13 ***
tag_classsecurity 2.179750 0.373361 5.8382 5.277e-09 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 1.979156 0.408217 4.8483 1.245e-06 ***
tag_classidentity2.0 1.835189 0.405148 4.5297 5.907e-06 ***
tag_classsso 1.173056 0.430635 2.7240 0.0064494 **
tag_classsocial 0.845434 0.386614 2.1868 0.0287596 *
tag_classweb 0.609714 0.381822 1.5969 0.1102985
tag_classcompany 0.385437 0.465198 0.8285 0.4073625
tag_classvancouver 0.337707 0.519577 0.6500 0.5157147
tag_classidentity-management 0.076157 0.563347 0.1352 0.8924636
tag_classlogin -0.098019 0.567081 -0.1728 0.8627710
tag_classinternet -0.181688 0.423639 -0.4289 0.6680136
tag_classtrust -0.282727 0.562647 -0.5025 0.6153198
tag_classprivacy -0.326609 0.464744 -0.7028 0.4821972
tag_classmanagement -0.328424 0.444413 -0.7390 0.4599031
tag_classtoread -0.458888 0.526653 -0.8713 0.3835744
tag_classfoaf -0.464450 0.561291 -0.8275 0.4079716
tag_classservice -0.509132 0.506369 -1.0055 0.3146768
tag_classopenid -0.519529 0.567851 -0.9149 0.3602427
tag_classtechnology -0.609586 0.426569 -1.4290 0.1529913
tag_classstartup -0.813678 0.518341 -1.5698 0.1164676
tag_classbusiness -0.842691 0.437915 -1.9243 0.0543136 .
tag_classonline -1.093213 0.535911 -2.0399 0.0413586 *
tag_classdevelopment -1.320047 0.501210 -2.6337 0.0084455 **
tag_classtools -1.435759 0.463381 -3.0984 0.0019454 **
tag_classajax -1.653603 0.471702 -3.5056 0.0004556 ***
190
tag_classprogramming -1.759301 0.515402 -3.4135 0.0006415 ***
tag_classOther -1.916894 0.359304 -5.3350 9.554e-08 ***
tag_classopensource -2.540697 0.562867 -4.5138 6.366e-06 ***
tag_classblog -2.850812 0.560672 -5.0846 3.683e-07 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.63427 +- 0.79641
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 8893 on 1.126e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 8969




Lambda_p: 0.1158 (d= 4.737 ; p-value: 2.17e-06 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5513 (d= 31.9 ; p-value: 2.58e-223 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3847 (d= 18.93 ; p-value: 6.011e-80 ) (for selection models)





identity authentication sxip web2.0 security
Never Used 0.5176004 0.2058092 0.1618229 0.10335787 0.06707762
Used Only On Site 0.4558990 0.1683077 0.1310142 0.08258336 0.05316293
Used Only By User 0.9825141 0.9313693 0.9099941 0.85788461 0.79014807
Recommended Tag 0.9506342 0.8230378 0.7760360 0.67414240 0.56339912
system:unfiled identity2.0 sso social web
Never Used 0.05556335 0.04847435 0.02560161 0.01858232 0.01473758
Used Only On Site 0.04392474 0.03826048 0.02010535 0.01457046 0.01154601
Used Only By User 0.75495658 0.72735770 0.57911094 0.49787560 0.43924716
Recommended Tag 0.51359052 0.47761706 0.32044565 0.25362961 0.21164013
company vancouver identity-management login
Never Used 0.011811685 0.011267355 0.008696813 0.007316789
Used Only On Site 0.009247806 0.008820575 0.006804402 0.005722934
Used Only By User 0.384972675 0.373735440 0.314799808 0.278492742
Recommended Tag 0.176630704 0.169795952 0.136034597 0.116829798
internet trust privacy management toread
Never Used 0.006733462 0.006090304 0.005830350 0.005819842 0.005111645
Used Only On Site 0.005266003 0.004762339 0.004558808 0.004550580 0.003996215
Used Only By User 0.261996007 0.242934340 0.234954917 0.234628895 0.212015401
Recommended Tag 0.108469626 0.099078280 0.095229595 0.095073361 0.084426527
foaf service openid technology startup
Never Used 0.005083436 0.004862378 0.004812330 0.004399712 0.003590383
Used Only On Site 0.003974137 0.003801134 0.003761967 0.003439098 0.002805977
Used Only By User 0.211087630 0.203742825 0.202061344 0.187929964 0.158743094
Recommended Tag 0.083997563 0.080622946 0.079855665 0.073483799 0.060741744
business online development tools ajax
Never Used 0.003488071 0.002717194 0.002166945 0.001930623 0.001553291
Used Only On Site 0.002725956 0.002123151 0.001692995 0.001508283 0.001213395
191
Used Only By User 0.154906887 0.124865000 0.102111717 0.091980421 0.075331632
Recommended Tag 0.059107451 0.046619537 0.037513199 0.033551724 0.027162377
programming Other opensource blog Other
Never Used 0.001397709 0.001194163 0.0006403096 0.0004696595 0.001194163
Used Only On Site 0.001091821 0.000932779 0.0005000949 0.0003668000 0.000932779
Used Only By User 0.068291641 0.058921234 0.0324637548 0.0240155965 0.058921234





Total Number of Users of Site: 466
Number of Users in Fit: 466
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.849080 0.143052 -47.8781 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.322004 0.163950 1.9640 0.04953 *
used.byUserTRUE 3.031681 0.167694 18.0786 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.081758 0.180679 -0.4525 0.65091
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classvisualization 6.324734 0.150637 41.9865 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdata 5.318619 0.143525 37.0571 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgraph 4.693085 0.149639 31.3627 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classchart 4.571233 0.156175 29.2699 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classibm 4.430531 0.157875 28.0636 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcollaboration 4.003623 0.152814 26.1993 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classinformation 3.521132 0.163352 21.5555 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 2.858407 0.286920 9.9624 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcharts 2.496509 0.230988 10.8079 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classvisualisation 2.399992 0.303686 7.9029 2.725e-15 ***
tag_classweb2.0 2.083261 0.173383 12.0154 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgraphing 1.865672 0.385218 4.8432 1.278e-06 ***
tag_classdatamining 1.861136 0.324658 5.7326 9.890e-09 ***
tag_classtools 1.852645 0.173558 10.6745 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsocialsoftware 1.831637 0.277874 6.5916 4.351e-11 ***
tag_classcool 1.798221 0.222669 8.0758 6.705e-16 ***
tag_classeyes 1.795477 0.418292 4.2924 1.768e-05 ***
tag_classinfovis 1.759509 0.410322 4.2881 1.802e-05 ***
tag_classanalysis 1.671074 0.291854 5.7257 1.030e-08 ***
tag_classanalytics 1.638527 0.332490 4.9281 8.305e-07 ***
tag_classjava 1.526825 0.221091 6.9059 4.990e-12 ***
tag_classresearch 1.485140 0.218417 6.7996 1.049e-11 ***
tag_classgraphics 1.448012 0.221431 6.5394 6.179e-11 ***
tag_classtool 1.315140 0.273841 4.8026 1.566e-06 ***
tag_classstatistics 1.305405 0.237476 5.4970 3.863e-08 ***
tag_classgraphs 1.267121 0.354086 3.5786 0.0003455 ***
tag_classdatabase 1.095088 0.258757 4.2321 2.315e-05 ***
tag_classsocial 1.006150 0.251633 3.9985 6.375e-05 ***
192
tag_classinteractive 0.994587 0.387857 2.5643 0.0103380 *
tag_classvisual 0.970483 0.442907 2.1912 0.0284397 *
tag_classonline 0.931599 0.298619 3.1197 0.0018104 **
tag_classsocialnetworking 0.883005 0.443582 1.9906 0.0465223 *
tag_classmapping 0.866677 0.385576 2.2477 0.0245924 *
tag_classdesign 0.834267 0.229077 3.6419 0.0002707 ***
tag_classknowledge 0.704055 0.444008 1.5857 0.1128116
tag_classgenerator 0.662179 0.381944 1.7337 0.0829697 .
tag_classcommunity 0.621244 0.297940 2.0851 0.0370573 *
tag_classillustration 0.606318 0.437742 1.3851 0.1660201
tag_classreference 0.520121 0.265631 1.9581 0.0502235 .
tag_classeconomics 0.390650 0.407325 0.9591 0.3375273
tag_classgallery 0.367392 0.437581 0.8396 0.4011340
tag_classpresentation 0.343570 0.405642 0.8470 0.3970064
tag_classscience 0.128040 0.360378 0.3553 0.7223687
tag_classfreeware 0.097137 0.435613 0.2230 0.8235446
tag_classweb 0.072435 0.315810 0.2294 0.8185876
tag_classeducation 0.060558 0.381335 0.1588 0.8738225
tag_classtechnology -0.299876 0.435148 -0.6891 0.4907377
tag_classsoftware -0.486394 0.402334 -1.2089 0.2266899
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.60113 +- 0.77533
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.034e+04 on 9.641e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.045e+04




Lambda_p: 0.1421 (d= 6.454 ; p-value: 1.092e-10 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5619 (d= 36.08 ; p-value: 3.995e-285 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3863 (d= 20.84 ; p-value: 2.073e-96 ) (for selection models)





visualization data graph chart ibm
Never Used 0.3718366 0.1779262 0.1037723 0.09297438 0.08176915
Used Only On Site 0.4495863 0.2299741 0.1377635 0.12391764 0.10943307
Used Only By User 0.9246545 0.8177564 0.7059275 0.68001367 0.64865503
Recommended Tag 0.9397766 0.8508732 0.7532334 0.72989313 0.70127534
collaboration information system:unfiled charts
Never Used 0.05491663 0.03462477 0.01815170 0.01271005
Used Only On Site 0.07423030 0.04715807 0.02487581 0.01745419
Used Only By User 0.54642203 0.42647048 0.27708016 0.21067033
Recommended Tag 0.60503048 0.48599854 0.32766925 0.25338421
visualisation web2.0 graphing datamining tools
Never Used 0.01155416 0.008444006 0.006804063 0.006773477 0.006716592
193
Used Only On Site 0.01587380 0.011614542 0.009364653 0.009322664 0.009244569
Used Only By User 0.19506845 0.150059150 0.124365206 0.123872067 0.122953494
Recommended Tag 0.23556306 0.183338366 0.152971740 0.152384910 0.151291411
socialsoftware cool eyes infovis
Never Used 0.006577881 0.006363083 0.006345758 0.006122942
Used Only On Site 0.009054126 0.008759180 0.008735389 0.008429379
Used Only By User 0.120705974 0.117204058 0.116920460 0.113257625
Recommended Tag 0.148613664 0.144435088 0.144096354 0.139716861
analysis analytics java research graphics
Never Used 0.005607616 0.005429018 0.004858019 0.004660598 0.004491496
Used Only On Site 0.007721444 0.007476028 0.006691183 0.006419746 0.006187214
Used Only By User 0.104675148 0.101663906 0.091906687 0.088486319 0.085537123
Recommended Tag 0.129421987 0.125798867 0.114019288 0.109875557 0.106296604
tool statistics graphs database social
Never Used 0.003934848 0.003896877 0.003751060 0.003160082 0.002891945
Used Only On Site 0.005421553 0.005369313 0.005168685 0.004355337 0.003986187
Used Only By User 0.075699968 0.075021627 0.072407861 0.061669614 0.056719353
Recommended Tag 0.094318257 0.093489953 0.090295561 0.077125095 0.071028122
interactive visual online socialnetworking
Never Used 0.002858792 0.002790899 0.002684745 0.002557728
Used Only On Site 0.003940539 0.003847055 0.003700878 0.003525958
Used Only By User 0.056103846 0.054840989 0.052860004 0.050479327
Recommended Tag 0.070268907 0.068710415 0.066263557 0.063319576
mapping design knowledge generator community
Never Used 0.002516408 0.002436354 0.002139536 0.002051970 0.001969831
Used Only On Site 0.003469050 0.003358792 0.002949926 0.002829287 0.002716118
Used Only By User 0.049702404 0.048193760 0.042560206 0.040886106 0.039310703
Recommended Tag 0.062358009 0.060489674 0.053499593 0.051418303 0.049458005
illustration reference economics gallery presentation
Never Used 0.001940705 0.001780713 0.001564803 0.001528883 0.001492946
Used Only On Site 0.002675986 0.002455526 0.002157972 0.002108466 0.002058934
Used Only By User 0.038750881 0.035664689 0.031469893 0.030768675 0.030066136
Recommended Tag 0.048761010 0.044914843 0.039676831 0.038800070 0.037921325
science freeware web education technology
Never Used 0.001203834 0.001167242 0.001138795 0.001125365 0.000785067
Used Only On Site 0.001660399 0.001609952 0.001570732 0.001552216 0.001082983
Used Only By User 0.024378854 0.023654527 0.023090705 0.022824301 0.016027771
Recommended Tag 0.030795340 0.029886211 0.029178291 0.028843727 0.020291978
software Other
Never Used 0.0006515703 0.001059308
Used Only On Site 0.0008988728 0.001461140
Used Only By User 0.0133369240 0.021511980
Recommended Tag 0.0168975218 0.027194941
[[26]]
Obscure Sound - Indie Music Blog
http://obscuresound.com/
e2325a57fd50fbfa9ef65252e2269492
Total Number of Users of Site: 116
Number of Users in Fit: 116
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.176688 0.332822 -15.5539 < 2.2e-16 ***
194
used.onSiteTRUE -0.472729 0.364469 -1.2970 0.1946
used.byUserTRUE 2.899205 0.431712 6.7156 1.873e-11 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE 0.047964 0.465324 0.1031 0.9179
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classmusic 4.56071 0.34289 13.3007 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classindie 3.80723 0.33525 11.3564 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmp3 3.78032 0.33049 11.4385 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmp3blog 3.65311 0.34677 10.5346 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classblog 3.43983 0.33898 10.1475 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 3.07146 0.40470 7.5894 3.213e-14 ***
tag_classblogs 2.38274 0.37608 6.3357 2.362e-10 ***
tag_classdownload 2.01316 0.44480 4.5260 6.011e-06 ***
tag_classaudio 1.03329 0.51854 1.9927 0.04629 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.61925 +- 0.78693
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1133 on 4161 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1161




Lambda_p: 0.3354 (d= 6.265 ; p-value: 3.729e-10 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6399 (d= 16.85 ; p-value: 1.124e-63 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.6014 (d= 14.93 ; p-value: 2.243e-50 ) (for selection models)





music indie mp3 mp3blog blog
Never Used 0.3506959 0.2027066 0.1983928 0.1789354 0.14971240
Used Only On Site 0.2518611 0.1367922 0.1336460 0.1195913 0.09889279
Used Only By User 0.9074780 0.8219686 0.8179970 0.7982879 0.76175882
Recommended Tag 0.8651171 0.7511914 0.7461285 0.7212886 0.67646666
system:unfiled blogs download audio Other
Never Used 0.10858951 0.05765192 0.04056173 0.015621026 0.005614971
Used Only On Site 0.07057044 0.03673210 0.02567437 0.009794199 0.003507223
Used Only By User 0.68868414 0.52628920 0.43430252 0.223707814 0.093005053
Recommended Tag 0.59126789 0.42079478 0.33423697 0.158563735 0.062840806
[[27]]




Total Number of Users of Site: 218
Number of Users in Fit: 218
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.24359 0.27958 -22.3321 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.08551 0.30083 0.2843 0.77622
used.byUserTRUE 3.81976 0.33844 11.2863 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -1.15149 0.35141 -3.2768 0.00105 **
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classdojo 6.302757 0.243974 25.8337 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classmanual 4.801595 0.244126 19.6685 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classajax 4.531513 0.235560 19.2372 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classjavascript 4.349905 0.235664 18.4581 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdocumentation 4.140649 0.249389 16.6032 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classreference 3.139983 0.252456 12.4377 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 2.797672 0.369620 7.5690 3.760e-14 ***
tag_classframework 2.760640 0.266492 10.3592 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdocs 1.929746 0.471501 4.0928 4.262e-05 ***
tag_classtoolkit 1.740600 0.427249 4.0740 4.622e-05 ***
tag_classwebdev 1.696404 0.383986 4.4179 9.967e-06 ***
tag_classapi 1.464293 0.352345 4.1559 3.241e-05 ***
tag_classprogramming 1.371089 0.299739 4.5743 4.779e-06 ***
tag_classlibrary 1.089032 0.382662 2.8459 0.004428 **
tag_classweb2.0 1.032855 0.355004 2.9094 0.003621 **
tag_classweb 0.981484 0.334309 2.9359 0.003326 **
tag_classtools 0.469910 0.433479 1.0840 0.278346
tag_classdevelopment 0.456201 0.433578 1.0522 0.292718
tag_classwiki 0.438994 0.450060 0.9754 0.329356
tag_classtutorial 0.285186 0.406761 0.7011 0.483232
tag_classopensource 0.238845 0.476100 0.5017 0.615900
tag_classdesign -0.092029 0.476529 -0.1931 0.846862
tag_classwebdesign -0.107341 0.481981 -0.2227 0.823762
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.95385 +- 0.97665
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 3139 on 1.370e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 3195




Lambda_p: 0.2314 (d= 6.896 ; p-value: 5.36e-12 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5909 (d= 24.85 ; p-value: 2.753e-136 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.5377 (d= 21.12 ; p-value: 5.481e-99 ) (for selection models)






dojo manual ajax javascript documentation
Never Used 0.5147867 0.1912361 0.1528941 0.1308245 0.1088110
Used Only On Site 0.5361055 0.2048116 0.1643007 0.1408584 0.1173846
Used Only By User 0.9797456 0.9151154 0.8916470 0.8728135 0.8477177
Recommended Tag 0.9433713 0.7878113 0.7391780 0.7026799 0.6571990
reference system:unfiled framework docs toolkit
Never Used 0.04295858 0.03089073 0.02980119 0.01320526 0.01095447
Used Only On Site 0.04661482 0.03355589 0.03237548 0.01436719 0.01192074
Used Only By User 0.67175767 0.59238527 0.58341377 0.37893032 0.33553923
Recommended Tag 0.41342379 0.33355714 0.32537650 0.17363719 0.14814663
webdev api programming library web2.0
Never Used 0.01048583 0.008331871 0.007596034 0.005739877 0.005428018
Used Only On Site 0.01141125 0.009068932 0.008268543 0.006249088 0.005909727
Used Only By User 0.32575827 0.276969392 0.258697735 0.208365654 0.199250953
Recommended Tag 0.14265539 0.116549466 0.107290311 0.083113232 0.078931250
web tools development wiki tutorial
Never Used 0.005157617 0.003098655 0.003056596 0.003004608 0.002577363
Used Only On Site 0.005615465 0.003374346 0.003328558 0.003271959 0.002806805
Used Only By User 0.191181130 0.124125718 0.122643023 0.120803492 0.105396443
Recommended Tag 0.075276369 0.046534795 0.045930329 0.045182162 0.038991981
opensource design webdesign Other
Never Used 0.002460939 0.001768909 0.001742075 0.001939094
Used Only On Site 0.002680044 0.001926519 0.001897299 0.002111837
Used Only By User 0.101106298 0.074753359 0.073701133 0.081372950





Total Number of Users of Site: 124
Number of Users in Fit: 124
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.13398 0.18703 -27.4499 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE -0.72117 0.23635 -3.0513 0.002279 **
used.byUserTRUE 3.21058 0.23453 13.6896 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.32243 0.27802 -1.1597 0.246161
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classkde 5.40483 0.27059 19.9746 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classlinux 3.78224 0.26187 14.4433 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsoftware 3.76153 0.26138 14.3913 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classproductivity 3.37702 0.27552 12.2569 < 2.2e-16 ***
197
tag_classnotes 3.14172 0.31933 9.8385 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdesktop 3.07802 0.28699 10.7253 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classtools 3.00970 0.27356 11.0020 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classopensource 2.96551 0.27037 10.9683 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classgtd 2.32572 0.34989 6.6471 2.990e-11 ***
tag_classnotetaking 1.91783 0.44544 4.3055 1.666e-05 ***
tag_classnote 1.88880 0.49355 3.8269 0.0001297 ***
tag_classorganization 1.87951 0.41174 4.5648 4.999e-06 ***
tag_classapplication 1.70153 0.48925 3.4778 0.0005055 ***
tag_classorganizer 1.69789 0.50146 3.3859 0.0007094 ***
tag_classmanagement 1.56620 0.39721 3.9431 8.045e-05 ***
tag_classpim 1.54397 0.45758 3.3742 0.0007403 ***
tag_classresearch 0.82188 0.48147 1.7070 0.0878193 .
tag_classfree 0.67292 0.39701 1.6949 0.0900862 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.69026 +- 0.83082
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2550 on 1.225e+04 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2596




Lambda_p: 0.1339 (d= 3.333 ; p-value: 0.0008577 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5451 (d= 19.17 ; p-value: 7.017e-82 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4822 (d= 15.79 ; p-value: 3.39e-56 ) (for selection models)





kde linux software productivity notes
Never Used 0.5673025 0.2055867 0.2022237 0.14717199 0.12001795
Used Only On Site 0.3892856 0.1117582 0.1097181 0.07740593 0.06218551
Used Only By User 0.9701547 0.8651616 0.8627264 0.81055481 0.77176689
Recommended Tag 0.9196668 0.6932246 0.6888012 0.60109225 0.54356774
desktop tools opensource gtd notetaking
Never Used 0.1134517 0.10675956 0.10261783 0.05687949 0.03856245
Used Only On Site 0.0585727 0.05491717 0.05266807 0.02848638 0.01912740
Used Only By User 0.7603532 0.74768408 0.73925597 0.59924395 0.49860616
Recommended Tag 0.5277255 0.51067278 0.49962601 0.34495611 0.25938330
note organization application organizer management
Never Used 0.03750047 0.03716651 0.03129644 0.03118651 0.0274441
Used Only On Site 0.01859030 0.01842152 0.01546448 0.01540927 0.0135337
Used Only By User 0.49134966 0.48902746 0.44475669 0.44385986 0.4116372
Recommended Tag 0.25384571 0.25208968 0.22003198 0.21940924 0.1976888
pim research free Other
Never Used 0.02685687 0.013228002 0.011418188 0.005858530
Used Only On Site 0.01324006 0.006475242 0.005584091 0.002856918
198
Used Only By User 0.40626332 0.249453729 0.222615554 0.127482286





Total Number of Users of Site: 1427
Number of Users in Fit: 1000
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -7.99067 0.12369 -64.6040 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.10863 0.14881 0.7300 0.4654
used.byUserTRUE 4.29687 0.15840 27.1267 < 2.2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -1.10583 0.17012 -6.5001 8.024e-11 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classcooking 6.77400 0.12355 54.8295 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classrecipes 6.71510 0.12334 54.4453 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfood 6.62546 0.12408 53.3982 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classrecipe 4.80598 0.15272 31.4699 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 4.75186 0.17780 26.7262 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfoodblog 4.73222 0.16489 28.6989 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classblog 4.64266 0.13018 35.6636 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classblogs 4.00063 0.15456 25.8842 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcookbooks 3.92841 0.23023 17.0631 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcookbook 3.32181 0.28211 11.7748 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classfoodblogs 2.94831 0.33613 8.7714 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classcuisine 2.92733 0.32695 8.9535 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classkitchen 2.89870 0.28472 10.1807 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classdaily 2.65502 0.23125 11.4810 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classrecipies 2.60528 0.38521 6.7632 1.350e-11 ***
tag_classcook 2.17557 0.45326 4.7998 1.588e-06 ***
tag_classchef 2.16460 0.45334 4.7748 1.799e-06 ***
tag_classbook 2.03836 0.31157 6.5422 6.063e-11 ***
tag_classweblog 2.03392 0.43338 4.6931 2.691e-06 ***
tag_classreference 1.76827 0.22859 7.7357 1.028e-14 ***
tag_classvegan 1.73286 0.45170 3.8363 0.0001249 ***
tag_classforum 1.69895 0.35190 4.8280 1.379e-06 ***
tag_classvegetarian 1.66659 0.45072 3.6976 0.0002177 ***
tag_classdiy 1.62613 0.32036 5.0759 3.856e-07 ***
tag_classresource 1.53836 0.44037 3.4934 0.0004770 ***
tag_classcommunity 1.49756 0.34542 4.3354 1.455e-05 ***
tag_classhowto 1.45756 0.27419 5.3159 1.061e-07 ***
tag_classinspiration 1.20724 0.43415 2.7807 0.0054237 **
tag_classphotography 1.15462 0.28742 4.0172 5.889e-05 ***
tag_classlinks 1.12391 0.38050 2.9538 0.0031393 **
tag_classphotos 1.10720 0.34218 3.2357 0.0012135 **
tag_classguide 1.10133 0.46839 2.3513 0.0187084 *
tag_classinformation 1.05112 0.46840 2.2441 0.0248283 *
199
tag_classbooks 0.96412 0.31582 3.0527 0.0022678 **
tag_classtools 0.70858 0.35246 2.0104 0.0443885 *
tag_classreviews 0.65708 0.46051 1.4268 0.1536248
tag_classhealth 0.59107 0.44564 1.3264 0.1847238
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.62729 +- 0.79201
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 1.201e+04 on 2.88e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 1.21e+04




Lambda_p: 0.2595 (d= 13.45 ; p-value: 2.968e-41 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.6263 (d= 45.92 ; p-value: 0 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.4987 (d= 31.5 ; p-value: 9.378e-218 ) (for selection models)





cooking recipes food recipe system:unfiled
Never Used 0.2285228 0.2183049 0.2033954 0.03974572 0.03773093
Used Only On Site 0.2482371 0.2374090 0.2215645 0.04410557 0.04187941
Used Only By User 0.9560685 0.9535271 0.9493897 0.75253423 0.74231892
Recommended Tag 0.8892406 0.8833050 0.8737436 0.52871406 0.51521151
foodblog blog blogs cookbooks cookbook
Never Used 0.03702427 0.03396032 0.01816303 0.01691887 0.009295766
Used Only On Site 0.04109837 0.03771047 0.02020521 0.01882384 0.010351459
Used Only By User 0.73854415 0.72088543 0.57611202 0.55838443 0.408061010
Recommended Tag 0.51030454 0.48791896 0.33395331 0.31808561 0.202752631
foodblogs cuisine kitchen daily recipies
Never Used 0.006417012 0.006284648 0.006108376 0.004793670 0.004562121
Used Only On Site 0.007148132 0.007000793 0.006804573 0.005340829 0.005082986
Used Only By User 0.321803728 0.317243016 0.311075272 0.261384752 0.251896153
Recommended Tag 0.148972036 0.146332248 0.142792368 0.115477204 0.110492887
cook chef book weblog reference
Never Used 0.002973312 0.002940965 0.002593072 0.002581613 0.001980550
Used Only On Site 0.003313384 0.003277350 0.002889780 0.002877014 0.002207326
Used Only By User 0.179722171 0.178110481 0.160374358 0.159777336 0.127246377
Recommended Tag 0.074784060 0.074028493 0.065826679 0.065554148 0.051041813
vegan forum vegetarian diy resource
Never Used 0.001911764 0.001848148 0.001789405 0.001718566 0.001574387
Used Only On Site 0.002130681 0.002059795 0.001994339 0.001915402 0.001754738
Used Only By User 0.123364796 0.119744548 0.116375420 0.112278588 0.103823622
Recommended Tag 0.049353358 0.047786645 0.046335549 0.044579976 0.040987570
community howto inspiration photography links
Never Used 0.001511536 0.001452355 0.001131105 0.001073184 0.001040761
Used Only On Site 0.001684700 0.001618750 0.001260741 0.001196189 0.001160055
200
Used Only By User 0.100088098 0.096542521 0.076805855 0.073156625 0.071101444
Recommended Tag 0.039413427 0.037926639 0.029778142 0.028294829 0.027462603
photos guide information books
Never Used 0.001023529 0.001017547 0.0009677669 0.0008872037
Used Only On Site 0.001140850 0.001134183 0.0010787031 0.0009889141
Used Only By User 0.070005497 0.069624453 0.0664415490 0.0612446637
Recommended Tag 0.027019732 0.026865903 0.0255839681 0.0235024028
tools reviews health Other
Never Used 0.0006872737 0.0006527954 0.0006111249 0.0003384920
Used Only On Site 0.0007660814 0.0007276524 0.0006812068 0.0003773210
Used Only By User 0.0480980573 0.0457941230 0.0429948796 0.0242733964
Recommended Tag 0.0182995149 0.0173968674 0.0163037956 0.0090941071
[[30]]
Snipplr - Code 2.0
http://snipplr.com/
7a5886991afef3a8cf539d011e58ead3
Total Number of Users of Site: 1137
Number of Users in Fit: 850
Type of Data: bysite
Main Effects:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.52001 0.42436 -15.3645 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE 0.43035 0.12925 3.3295 0.00087 ***
used.byUserTRUE 3.53595 0.13729 25.7554 < 2e-16 ***
used.onSiteTRUE:used.byUserTRUE -0.14401 0.14510 -0.9925 0.32098
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Tag Effects (in order of likelihood):
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
tag_classcode 5.2026805 0.4136093 12.5787 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classprogramming 4.1396694 0.4133828 10.0141 < 2.2e-16 ***
tag_classsnippets 2.9388801 0.4247409 6.9192 4.541e-12 ***
tag_classreference 2.8021117 0.4140949 6.7668 1.316e-11 ***
tag_classsnippet 2.1292389 0.4511837 4.7192 2.367e-06 ***
tag_classphp 2.0221716 0.4157046 4.8644 1.148e-06 ***
tag_classprogramacion 1.9758039 0.4450899 4.4391 9.033e-06 ***
tag_classsystem:unfiled 1.9131317 0.4699627 4.0708 4.685e-05 ***
tag_classhtml 1.8426235 0.4183060 4.4050 1.058e-05 ***
tag_classrepository 1.8355523 0.4535642 4.0470 5.189e-05 ***
tag_classcss 1.7171231 0.4152080 4.1356 3.541e-05 ***
tag_classtextmate 1.6472560 0.4584584 3.5930 0.0003269 ***
tag_classcodigo 1.6406117 0.4774917 3.4359 0.0005906 ***
tag_classprogramaci\303\263n 1.5496807 0.4771130 3.2480 0.0011620 **
tag_classscripts 1.4120243 0.4421945 3.1932 0.0014070 **
tag_classweb 1.3979176 0.4175326 3.3480 0.0008138 ***
tag_classcoding 1.3478291 0.4593638 2.9341 0.0033449 **
tag_classrecursos 1.1969001 0.4806457 2.4902 0.0127674 *
tag_classresource 1.1310599 0.4657709 2.4284 0.0151672 *
tag_classsocial 1.0830160 0.4297032 2.5204 0.0117228 *
tag_classwebdev 1.0595880 0.4397234 2.4097 0.0159670 *
tag_classsharing 1.0212176 0.4522077 2.2583 0.0239274 *
tag_classshare 0.9245173 0.4840350 1.9100 0.0561304 .
201
tag_classexamples 0.8933844 0.4782189 1.8681 0.0617412 .
tag_classdev 0.8426576 0.4995331 1.6869 0.0916244 .
tag_classdevelopment 0.7715536 0.4327064 1.7831 0.0745720 .
tag_classtagging 0.7635115 0.4548410 1.6786 0.0932234 .
tag_classjavascript 0.7558481 0.4235451 1.7846 0.0743303 .
tag_classsource 0.7472162 0.4831385 1.5466 0.1219627
tag_classcommunity 0.7072198 0.4443387 1.5916 0.1114694
tag_classdesarrollo 0.6907356 0.5291177 1.3054 0.1917403
tag_classtags 0.6552763 0.4525164 1.4481 0.1475969
tag_classsnipplr 0.6306293 0.5880681 1.0724 0.2835519
tag_classtools 0.6071724 0.4269800 1.4220 0.1550216
tag_classresources 0.5359458 0.4623369 1.1592 0.2463704
tag_classdevelop 0.4756411 0.5726022 0.8307 0.4061623
tag_classweb2 0.4044437 0.5571781 0.7259 0.4679132
tag_classweb2.0 0.4031038 0.4317507 0.9336 0.3504847
tag_classsearch 0.3820099 0.4350219 0.8781 0.3798681
tag_classutilidades 0.3376165 0.6030998 0.5598 0.5756145
tag_classruby 0.3026161 0.4444763 0.6808 0.4959744
tag_classjava 0.2704220 0.4457713 0.6066 0.5440909
tag_classtag 0.2097310 0.5127964 0.4090 0.6825436
tag_classtutoriales 0.1611149 0.5699259 0.2827 0.7774111
tag_classajax 0.1344633 0.4326715 0.3108 0.7559720
tag_classtool 0.1226272 0.4732098 0.2591 0.7955278
tag_classc 0.0918098 0.5696836 0.1612 0.8719679
tag_classfree 0.0784238 0.4417410 0.1775 0.8590894
tag_classhowto 0.0023616 0.4468112 0.0053 0.9957828
tag_classwebmaster -0.0512528 0.5961793 -0.0860 0.9314912
tag_classperl -0.0570092 0.4903654 -0.1163 0.9074476
tag_classactionscript -0.0721495 0.5229779 -0.1380 0.8902728
tag_classwebdesign -0.0757332 0.4453126 -0.1701 0.8649571
tag_classtips -0.0988696 0.4579774 -0.2159 0.8290788
tag_classdeveloper -0.1382148 0.5937046 -0.2328 0.8159162
tag_classsoftware -0.1917691 0.4397940 -0.4360 0.6628056
tag_classfolksonomy -0.2198894 0.5517949 -0.3985 0.6902629
tag_classarchive -0.2394456 0.5691992 -0.4207 0.6739953
tag_classxhtml -0.2743048 0.4913357 -0.5583 0.5766505
tag_classservice -0.3062400 0.5408563 -0.5662 0.5712488
tag_classwork -0.3062914 0.5375094 -0.5698 0.5687900
tag_classlist -0.3681731 0.5098054 -0.7222 0.4701817
tag_classtutorial -0.3706259 0.4515223 -0.8208 0.4117394
tag_classbookmarks -0.4071940 0.5284013 -0.7706 0.4409351
tag_classpython -0.4526535 0.5104380 -0.8868 0.3751896
tag_classonline -0.4658716 0.4973998 -0.9366 0.3489572
tag_classdel.icio.us -0.6563270 0.4915726 -1.3352 0.1818247
tag_classdesign -0.7369985 0.4641176 -1.5880 0.1122962
tag_classinternet -0.8521634 0.4955311 -1.7197 0.0854875 .
tag_classlibrary -0.8874212 0.5380391 -1.6494 0.0990735 .
tag_classdhtml -0.9522025 0.5899567 -1.6140 0.1065229
tag_classlinks -0.9650278 0.5522653 -1.7474 0.0805682 .
tag_classproductivity -1.0375777 0.5522515 -1.8788 0.0602699 .
tag_classopensource -1.0997470 0.5006263 -2.1967 0.0280388 *
tag_classtemplates -1.1040862 0.5903950 -1.8701 0.0614726 .
tag_classmysql -1.1295883 0.5507604 -2.0510 0.0402707 *
tag_classOther -1.4770398 0.4100102 -3.6024 0.0003152 ***
---
202
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Standard Deviation on normal distribution of user values: 0.88188 +- 0.93909
Goodness of Fit Tests:
Residual Deviance: 2.087e+04 on 3.025e+05 degrees of freedom (p-value: 1)
AIC: 2.104e+04




Lambda_p: 0.1199 (d= 7.483 ; p-value: 7.255e-14 ) (for prediction models)
Tau_p: 0.5543 (d= 48.91 ; p-value: 0 ) (for classification models)
Phi_p: 0.3528 (d= 25.73 ; p-value: 5.664e-146 ) (for selection models)





code programming snippets reference snippet
Never Used 0.2112636 0.08468447 0.02709003 0.02370927 0.01223956
Used Only On Site 0.2917351 0.12455518 0.04106084 0.03600109 0.01869891
Used Only By User 0.9019093 0.76053409 0.48870705 0.45463811 0.29842259
Recommended Tag 0.9244892 0.80875721 0.56000088 0.52607563 0.36158865
php programacion system:unfiled html repository
Never Used 0.01101050 0.01051687 0.009884299 0.00921758 0.009153224
Used Only On Site 0.01683228 0.01608189 0.015119709 0.01410488 0.014006884
Used Only By User 0.27650035 0.26732137 0.255226677 0.24205680 0.240761843
Recommended Tag 0.33725681 0.32697241 0.313333042 0.29836600 0.296887803
css textmate codigo programaci\303\263n
Never Used 0.008139265 0.00759418 0.007544269 0.006893046
Used Only On Site 0.012462017 0.01163083 0.011554701 0.010560981
Used Only By User 0.219782138 0.20803620 0.206943641 0.192417329
Recommended Tag 0.272774468 0.25913707 0.257863520 0.240848412
scripts web coding recursos resource
Never Used 0.006011917 0.005928202 0.005640215 0.004853906 0.004546023
Used Only On Site 0.009215334 0.009087421 0.008647297 0.007444905 0.006973828
Used Only By User 0.171926454 0.169927390 0.162978646 0.143421336 0.135521095
Recommended Tag 0.216583201 0.214199207 0.205889124 0.182304096 0.172693842
social webdev sharing share examples
Never Used 0.004333702 0.004233777 0.004075052 0.003700836 0.003587801
Used Only On Site 0.006648874 0.006495915 0.006252914 0.005679844 0.005506698
Used Only By User 0.129990417 0.127363764 0.123159817 0.113091733 0.110006461
Recommended Tag 0.165937323 0.162720162 0.157559906 0.145145178 0.141324792
dev development tagging javascript source
Never Used 0.003410948 0.003177581 0.003152210 0.003128220 0.003101417
Used Only On Site 0.005235753 0.004878150 0.004839266 0.004802500 0.004761420
Used Only By User 0.105137421 0.098633061 0.097920389 0.097245547 0.096490389
Recommended Tag 0.135280262 0.127176127 0.126286113 0.125442966 0.124499040
community desarrollo tags snipplr tools
Never Used 0.002980182 0.002931602 0.002829760 0.002761057 0.002697218
Used Only On Site 0.004575593 0.004501123 0.004344994 0.004239660 0.004141776
203
Used Only By User 0.093059333 0.091677382 0.088767038 0.086793502 0.084952236
Recommended Tag 0.120204540 0.118472134 0.114818701 0.112337369 0.110019492
resources develop web2 web2.0 search
Never Used 0.002512252 0.002365577 0.002203368 0.002200424 0.002154594
Used Only On Site 0.003858131 0.003633164 0.003384331 0.003379815 0.003309501
Used Only By User 0.079576596 0.075270123 0.070461887 0.070374183 0.069006623
Recommended Tag 0.103236596 0.097785738 0.091681809 0.091570294 0.089830639
utilidades ruby java tag tutoriales
Never Used 0.002061229 0.001990474 0.001927535 0.001814236 0.001728293
Used Only On Site 0.003166250 0.003057679 0.002961095 0.002787214 0.002655303
Used Only By User 0.066208578 0.064077256 0.062173416 0.058727282 0.056096811
Recommended Tag 0.086266472 0.083547235 0.081115046 0.076704891 0.073331914
ajax tool c free howto
Never Used 0.001682916 0.001663148 0.001612757 0.001591346 0.001474966
Used Only On Site 0.002585650 0.002555304 0.002477949 0.002445081 0.002266406
Used Only By User 0.054702193 0.054093367 0.052538021 0.051875671 0.048259582
Recommended Tag 0.071541291 0.070759077 0.068759376 0.067907179 0.063248132
webmaster perl actionscript webdesign tips
Never Used 0.001398077 0.001390063 0.001369204 0.001364313 0.001333151
Used Only On Site 0.002148348 0.002136043 0.002104014 0.002096503 0.002048652
Used Only By User 0.045855835 0.045604631 0.044950167 0.044796572 0.043816929
Recommended Tag 0.060145003 0.059820429 0.058974563 0.058775996 0.057509047
developer software folksonomy archive xhtml
Never Used 0.001281783 0.001215025 0.001181374 0.001158521 0.001118876
Used Only On Site 0.001969769 0.001867246 0.001815564 0.001780466 0.001719574
Used Only By User 0.042197754 0.040085537 0.039017389 0.038290702 0.037027486
Recommended Tag 0.055413227 0.052675887 0.051290173 0.050346885 0.048706076
service work list tutorial bookmarks
Never Used 0.001083747 0.001083692 0.001018730 0.001016237 0.0009797822
Used Only On Site 0.001665617 0.001665532 0.001565746 0.001561916 0.0015059162
Used Only By User 0.035905474 0.035903698 0.033822131 0.033742067 0.0325699341
Recommended Tag 0.047247542 0.047245232 0.044536499 0.044432239 0.0429052396
python online del.icio.us design
Never Used 0.0009362798 0.0009239968 0.000763882 0.0007047204
Used Only On Site 0.0014390871 0.0014202171 0.001174216 0.0010833089
Used Only By User 0.0311675854 0.0307709142 0.025571154 0.0236361485
Recommended Tag 0.0410767830 0.0405592766 0.033763070 0.0312280361
internet library dhtml links
Never Used 0.0006281085 0.0006063618 0.0005683478 0.0005611092
Used Only On Site 0.0009655795 0.0009321596 0.0008737386 0.0008626138
Used Only By User 0.0211192900 0.0204025717 0.0191472733 0.0189078852
Recommended Tag 0.0279258894 0.0269845455 0.0253347548 0.0250199812
productivity opensource templates mysql
Never Used 0.0005218629 0.0004904224 0.0004883000 0.0004760106
Used Only On Site 0.0008022960 0.0007539731 0.0007507109 0.0007318221
Used Only By User 0.0176079976 0.0165642347 0.0164936964 0.0160850711
Recommended Tag 0.0233098801 0.0219356694 0.0218427650 0.0213044890
Other Other
Never Used 0.0003363419 0.0003363419
Used Only On Site 0.0005171333 0.0005171333
Used Only By User 0.0114177874 0.0114177874
Recommended Tag 0.0151460396 0.0151460396
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Appendix D
Proofs of Major Theorems in Chapter 5
D.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Since person i’s decision will depend on what everyone else contributions, we need to first
start by making an assumption about what person i’s expects others to do. She assumes
that others will contribute a total of x−i information to the pool. Eventually, we will find a
fulfilled expectations equilibrium, which is an equilibrium where everyone decides to choose
exact what is expected. But for now, we are just concerned with a single person’s choice
given their expectations.
First, we calculate what person i would choose if there were no threshold constraint. In
that case, she would choose xi that maximizes her utility:
x0i (x−i) = argmaxxivi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi)
We call the choice of contribution that maximizes this utility x0i (x−i). The threshold t is a
constraint; if x0i (x−i) > t then person i will happily choose to contribute this amount.
However, if her optimal choice of contribution falls below the threshold t, then she must
either raise her contribution up to at least t, or she must be willing to forego the benefits
of accessing the information pool. If she chooses to contribute below t and not receive
any benefits from the information pool, then her utility is simply −ci(xi). Since ci(·) is
increasing and positive, the best she can do is to contribution nothing (xi = 0). If she chooses
to contribute xi >= t, her utility is vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi). This expression is decreasing in xi
for xi ≥ t > x0i by the assumptions on vi(·) and ci(·). Therefore, the best choice would be to
choose xi = t since that is the smallest contribution that satisfies the threshold constraint.
Person i’s final choice then depends on how valuable the information pool is relative to
the cost of contributing at the threshold level. If we assume that the cost of contributing
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nothing is zero (ci(xi) = 0), then she should choose to contribute exactly the minimum
threshold t if and only if she would prefer to contribute below the threshold (x0i (x−i) < t)
and the utility from contributing the threshold (vi(αt +x−i)−ci(t)) is greater than the utility
from contributing nothing (ci(0) = 0).
D.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Before we begin this proof, we must first repeat a famous result from Milgrom and Shannon
(1994):
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) define a function f (x, i) to have increasing differences (ID)
if for all x′ > x′′, i′ > i′′, f (x′, i′)− f (x′′, i′) > f (x′, i′′)− f (x′′, i′′). Another way of saying
this is that for x > y, f (x, i)− f (y, i) is increasing in i. For continuous and differentiable
functions, this is similar and related to the property that the cross derivative is positive.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) were then able to prove the following theorem:
Theorem D.1 (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) If f (x, i) is supermodular in x, and f (x, i)
has increasing differences in (x, i) then argmaxx f (x, i) is non-decreasing in i.
This theorem allows us to describe properties of a user choice (choosing x to maximize
f (x, ·)) as a function of an external parameter i. We also use one more simple result from
that same paper that relates more common properties to the notion of increasing differences:
Lemma D.1 (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) if f (x, i) is continuous and differentiable in
x, then f (x, i) has increasing differences if and only if ∂
∂x f (x, i) is weakly increasing in i. If
f (x, i) is twice continuously differentiable, then f (x, i) has increasing differences if and only
if
∂ 2 f (x, i)
∂x∂ i
≥ 0
We will prove this proposition by calculating a fulfilled expectations equilibrium. In
this type of equilibrium, everyone forms an expectation about everyone else’s behavior. We
define x̄i to be the expected contribution from user i. Users will then make contribution
decisions based on the expected contributions from everyone else. We then calculate a set of
contributions x∗i where each person will choose to contribute exactly what is expected of
them (x∗i = x̄i), thus fulfilling expectations and providing a stable equilibrium.
Before we can prove this theorem, we must prove a couple of helpful lemmas:
Lemma D.2 The function f j(x, i) = v j(αx+ x̄−i) has increasing differences in (x,i).
206
Proof: First look at the assumption that users expect x̄−i ≤ x̄− j for i > j. This is
basically saying that x̄−i is decreasing in i. The first derivative f ′j(x, i) = αv
′
j(αx + x̄−i)
is weakly increasing in i since x̄−i is decreasing in i, and v′j(y) is decreasing in y (by the
concavity of v(·)). Another way of seeing this is by looking at the continuous analog:
∂ x̄−i
∂ i ≤ 0, and
∂ 2
∂x∂ i




since v′′j (·)≤ 0 by the concavity assumption.
Lemma D.2 means that v j(αxH + x̄−iH )− v j(αxL + x̄−iH )≥ v j(αxH + x̄−iL)− v j(αxL +
x̄−iL). This allows us to separate the individual value and cost functions from the changes in
expected contributions as i changes.
Given total expected contributions x̄−i from everyone else, each user i will choose her
contribution to maximize her personal utility function:
g(x, i) = Ui(x, x̄−i) = vi(αx+ x̄−i)− ci(x)
Now we can state the main lemma that we need to prove this proposition:
Lemma D.3 If users expect that x̄−i ≤ x̄− j for all i > j, then g(x, i) has increasing differ-
ences.
Proof: To show this, we must prove that if xH > xL, i > j then g(xH , i)− g(xL, i) ≥
g(xH , j)−g(xL, j):
g(xH , i)−g(xL, i)
=
(




















v j(αxL + x̄− j)− c j(xL)
)
= g(xH , j)−g(xL, j)
The first equality is by definition of g(x, i). The next line is a direct result of Lemma D.2. The
next line is a consequence of our assumption on the ordering of users; the first derivative of
vi(αx+y)−ci(x) with respect to x is increasing in i and therefore has increasing differences
in (x, i). Finally, the last equality is by definition.
A straightforward corollary of Theorem D.1 and Lemma D.3 states that the optimal
choice of contribution x∗i is weakly increasing in i. This means that users with a higher
marginal benefit of contribution will voluntarily choose to contribute more information.
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Corollary D.1 If users expect x̄−i ≥ x̄− j when i > j, then x∗i is weakly increasing in i.
Finally, to complete the proof we combine Lemma 5.1 and Corollary D.1. We assume
that everyone has identical expectations that users will contribute:
x̄∗i = 0 if i≤ i0 (D.1)
x̄∗i = t if i
0 < i < i∗ (D.2)
x̄∗i = x
0
i (x̄−i) if i > i
∗ (D.3)
First note that this schedule of contributions is weakly increasing in i: no user i contributes
less than any user numbered less than i. If users expect each other to contribute according to
this schedule of contributions, then the precondition for Lemma D.3 is fulfilled.
Let us begin with line D.3. Assume that for some i, x∗i = x
0
i , meaning that user i chose
to contribute his optimal amount, which is greater than the threshold t by Lemma 5.1. Then
all users j > i will also want to contribute their optimal amount x0j , since by Corollary D.1,
x0j > x
0
i and the user’s optimal choice according to Lemma 5.1 is to contribute x j. Define i
∗
to be the smallest i that contributes xi.
Next we move to line D.1. If, given the expectations x̄i, no user will choose x∗i = 0 by
Lemma 5.1, then i0 = 0. If at least one person chooses x∗i = 0 then by Lemma 5.1, we know
that x0i < t and vi(αt + x̄−i)) < ci(t). This last statement is equivalent to saying g(t, i) < 0.
Then all users j < i will also want to contribute 0: We know that x∗j ≤ x∗i by Corollary D.1
and the only possible optimal choice from Lemma 5.1 is x∗j = 0. Let i
0 be the largest i that
contributes exactly 0.
Line D.2 is all that is left, and is fairly straightforward now. Choose an i such that
i0 < i < i∗. We know that x∗i ≤ t since i < i∗. We know that vi(αt + x̄−i)− ci(t) > 0 since
i > i0. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, person i will choose to contribute t.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Everyone who contributes greater than t is choosing their contribution to maximize their
utility function Ui(xi,x−i) = vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi). The first order condition for this maxi-
mization states that
αv′i(αxi + x−i)− c′i(xi) = 0





i (αxi + x−i)
α2v′′i (αxi + x−i)− c′′(xi)
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This derivative is always negative (since v′′i (·) < 0 and c′′i (·) > 0 by assumption), and fur-
thermore has the same sign for all i ≥ i∗. Therefore, as the total contribution from other
people (x−i) increases, all users who voluntarily contribute more than t will decrease their
contribution slightly; however this decrease will not be enough to decrease the total size of
the pool.
D.4 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Let X̄t be the expected total contributions of everyone in this equilibrium. As long as
everyone contributes, we know that X̄t ≥ Nt, where N is the total number of users. User 1,
the person with the lowest marginal net benefit, will be willing to contribute t as long as his
or her net benefit is positive. This net benefit is:
U1(t) = v1(αt + x̄−i)− c1(t)≥ v1((N−1)t)− c1(t)
As N increases, the total value to user 1 also increases since v1(·) is increasing. As long as




then there will exist an N such that any population size greater than N will lead to enough
value that user 1 is willing to contribute t. By Proposition 5.1, if user 1 is willing to
contribute t then so are all of the other users, and this is a Nash equilibrium.
In an informative pool without a threshold, the dominant strategy equilibrium is for ev-
eryone to contribute nothing, and consequently the pool will be of size 0. In this equilibrium
everyone has zero utility since there is nothing in the pool and no one contributes. In the
threshold equilibrium described above, all users have voluntarily chosen to contribute t, and
to do so they must have a net utility that is greater than 0. Therefore each user has greater
utility than in the no-threshold equilibrium and using a threshold is a Pareto improvement in
welfare.
In a collaborative pool, users will voluntarily contribute some information even with-
out a threshold, leading to a non-zero pool size X0. User i was receiving non-zero utility
Ui(x0i ) = vi(X0)− ci(x0i ). Once a threshold is introduced, user i will have to increase their
contribution if they were below the threshold. Their new utility Ui(t) = vi(Xt)− ci(t) is
positive because they are willing to contribute, but this utility may be smaller than the
utility they received without a threshold. However, not everyone loses utility upon the
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introduction of the threshold; users who voluntarily contribute above the threshold see their














Since no one has dropped out, Xt ≥ X0. By Lemma 5.2, users who contribute above the
threshold will voluntarily decrease their contribution. Therefore, any user who voluntarily
contributes above the threshold increases total welfare.
Only users who contribute exactly t can cause a decrease in welfare (due to the increased
costs of contributing t). However, if X0 is sufficiently small, then this decrease can be offset













We know the each element of the summation on the right hand side is positive since no one
has dropped out. The left hand side is continuous in X0; therefore, there exists a maximum
X̄0 that makes this an equality. We can ignore the costs of the voluntary contributions
because they just make this condition weaker (vi(X0)− ci(x0i ) ≤ vi(X0)). As long as the
voluntary equilibrium is sufficiently bad (X0 ≤ X̄0), then introducing a threshold t leads to
an increase in total welfare.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 5.3
We begin by making two assumptions. First we assume that the system designer increases
the threshold to t from t ′ < t. Second, we assume that this increase causes the total size
of the information pool to decrease, from Xt ′ to Xt . We observe that if t increases but X
decreases, then it must be the case that some users stopped contributing and i0 increased.
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Now, we can compute the change in aggregate welfare:





















i )− ci(t ′)) (D.5f)
(Note, only one of (D.5e) and (D.5f) will be non-zero, depending on whether users switch to
contributing the threshold from contributing above the threshold, or vice versa.)
(D.5a) is negative, and indicates a welfare loss; the value of the pool to each user de-
creases because the total size of the information pool decreases. (D.5b) is also a welfare
loss from the users who have left the system because of the threshold increase. (D.5c) is a
welfare loss as everyone who contributes the threshold has increased their costs due to the
threshold increase. (D.5d) is also a welfare loss; users who contribute above the threshold
will choose to increase their contributions to compensate for the decrease in pool size, and
this increase will lead to a corresponding increase in costs. Finally, both (D.5e) and (D.5f)
are both negative because whichever direction the user switches, they do so because it is a
higher contribution, and therefore a higher cost. Since all components of the expression are
negative, the total change in welfare is negative.
The second half of the proposition can be shown by reversing the direction of the change
of both t and X . It is straightforward to show that this reverses the sign on everything in
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